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Abstract 
 
The study theorizes that a nation-state can manifest a condition similar to that of 
personality commonly associated with humans.  Through the identification of consistent 
behaviors, a personality like condition is recognizable, and the underlining motivations 
dictate national policy independent of any current social/political influence.  The research 
examines Russia during two historical periods examining the conflict events and 
social/political transitions of the period, to identify common behavioral characteristics, 
which indicate the existence of any independent personality like trait.   
The study focuses on two historical periods: the Monarch Period of Peter I (The Great), 
and the Post-Soviet Union period of Vladimir Putin, periods selected as historical eras in 
which Russia experienced major political or social transition. Using a comparative 
qualitative historical analysis with a behaviorist focus, the research examines these 
periods by profiling each era’s elements of society and the events of domestic and 
international conflict that Russia experienced, while evaluating the actions taken in 
response to each.  
The research discovers that Russia exhibits personality like traits, similar to those 
associated with humans and are likewise developed from experience, and once imbedded 
into Russian psychology, regardless of the current social/political elements or situational 
conditions, remain prime motivators to Russian behavior.  The personality like 
characteristic identified was similar to inferiority, which leads to behavior characteristics 
comparable to narcissism, as the definition of narcissism relates to the need for 
admiration and or acceptance. The study identified the origins of the inferiority like 
complex and the narcissistic like behavior pattern exhibited by Russia in both periods. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
This research is an examination of nation-states from the perspective of human 
behavior, conducted to determine if constructs of society exhibit, retain, and are 
motivated by personality like characteristics.  The research’s theoretical foundation 
hypothesizes, that by examining the behaviors of nation-states, identifiable associated 
personality like characteristics, similar to those associated with humans exist, and create 
an independent identity, that influence action independent of the current situations or 
social/political ideology. The study postulates that nations are examinable through the 
lens of behaviorism.  
A nation’s personality, although not retaining all influences, will incorporate those 
that are significant enough in scope, thereby creating new paradigms of behavioral 
characteristics. The personality of the nation-state therefore increases in dimension as 
experiences the number of significant events increase. The personality of a nation-state is 
different from its culture, as “Culture is a way of life shared by a group, a system of 
ideas, values, beliefs, knowledge, and customs transmitted from generation to generation 
within a social group” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 50).  
Through a comparative qualitative historical analysis of a nation-states behavioral 
pattern, during periods of conflict and social/ political transition, associated personality 
like causal mechanisms can be identified, if similar behavioral patterns are recognized in 
both historical periods.  The behaviors and associated personality like characteristic 
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therefore attributed to the nation-state, if the nation-state is the only identified constant 
element of the historical profile. 
Ideology versus Motivation 
 
This section is presented as a framing of the study’s concept of motivation versus 
methodology.  The researcher sees a definitive difference between motivation and 
methodology, with methodology being the how and motivation being the why in 
determining actions.  The study is focused on the why, through the identification of the 
behavioral characteristics.  Although the study concedes that motivation plays a part in 
determining methodology, methodology when attached to motivation is either a reflection 
of ideological parameters or logistical constraints, and there is no basis in which to 
believe that the options of methodology would greatly influence behavioral 
characteristics. 
Transitions can create new conflict potentials which were previously unrealized, and 
of which the state may or may not be fully prepared.  Changes in intra-state political 
motivations can sever ties with former allies while forging new cooperative ties with 
other nation-states with similar political structures, previously unrealized.  A new 
democratic nation may find its ties with other democracies stronger following a transition 
to democracy, whereas that same nation who might formerly have held strong ties with 
communist nations may find those relationships strained or decreased.  The emergence of 
these new conflict potentials may require new conflict engagement techniques previously 
unutilized and possibly beyond the capability of the transitioning state.  There is a 
potential for previous conflicts to remain, even following transition.  These previous 
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conflicts may require new engagement techniques, due to changes in capability, of the 
transitioning nation-state.  
Significance of Topic         
   
Currently, at the time of the writing of this dissertation, the international community 
is embroiled in numerous deadly conflicts throughout the world. In the region of the 
Middle East, the state of Israel and the territory controlled by the Palestinian organization 
Hamas in Gaza are embroiled in a conflict that continues to kill innocent civilians.  In 
Syria, there remains a state of civil war, as the totalitarian government of Bashir Al Assad 
fights for control of the country against a fractured opposition with a variety of political 
agendas, many of which are unknown. In many other areas of the Middle East, unrest 
intensifies as fundamental groups, such as ISIS, attempt to annex portions of Syria and 
Iraq in an effort to create a theocratic Islamic caliphate.  Egypt remains in political 
turmoil, under the control of a new secular government. This new government led by the 
Egyptian military recently overthrew its predecessor, a fledgling democracy dominated 
by the Muslim Brotherhood.  Meanwhile, Iran continues to hold the world’s attention 
with fears of its nuclear ambitions. The European continent has seen recent violent 
encounters, as Russia and the Ukraine remain entangled in a conflict that threatens the 
sovereignty of the Ukrainian state and has seen the annexation of portions of Ukraine’s 
sovereign territory.  In Asia, North Korea continues to utilize threatening rhetoric against 
their neighbors South Korea and Japan, while continuing to challenge the United States. 
Afghanistan remains in political turmoil in their continuing war against the 
fundamentalist Taliban, and internal issues created by accusations of fraud in their 
democratic process. Additionally, on the African continent, many nations are dealing 
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with civil war and political instability. These are examples of only the major conflicts in 
which the world is embroiled in 2014.   
Each of these examples on the surface has varying causes and histories that 
perpetuated the current conflicts. The root cause of the individual conflicts is not the 
subject that this dissertation will address, nor will this dissertation address the resolution 
of the conflicts presently existing throughout the world. These examples provided are a 
foundation that illustrates the importance of undertaking the study and the selection of the 
study’s subject, Russia, for in each of these examples, world-dominating nation-states 
have interests and influence. The dissertation will contend that world power intervention 
is as much a product of that nation’s personality which dictates behavior as any other 
reason attributed in current political theory.  
Purpose 
 
This study seeks to offer a deeper profile perspective of national behavior and thereby 
identify any consistent behaviors of the actors.  There is no method or theories, like in 
humans, that can predict 100% of the potential actions of a nation (Dunne, Kurki, & 
Smith, 2010, pp. 3 - 8).  Nevertheless, the greater our understanding of a nation’s 
motivations, the closer we are to having the ability to predict, with a moderate level of 
certainty, that nation’s potential actions. To this end, and to better address conflict 
throughout the world, conflict analysis scholars must seek new epistemologies regarding 
those nations with the greatest influence potential.   
The purpose of this dissertation is not to create a model that implies 100% accuracy 
in predicting Russian actions. Rather, the purpose is to advance current knowledge 
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through the employment of a different model of inquiry. The study will explore if Russia 
has exhibited historically, and continues to exhibit today, any behavioral homogony 
which can be attributed to personality like characteristics.  Through the examination of 
the model’s data, the formulation of a more complete model of Russian motivations in 
conflict.  The identification of a behavioral homogony would thereby expose a different 
perspective.   
Problem Statement 
 
Why do nation-states act in the manner that they do? This fundamental question has 
been the focus of many a political scientist and conflict analysis and resolution scholar 
with the answers postulated being diverse.  
Current political and social theory ignores or downplays the potential relationship 
between human behavior characteristics and the similar behaviors of nation-states, which 
potentially signal the existence of personality like characteristics, normally assigned to 
humans, being associated to nation-states.  Also ignored is potential for cumulative 
historic memory within nations and the role those memories play upon the formation of 
national identities, which are analogous to the personality development through 
experience seen in humans. This disconnect creates a gap in the overall epistemology, 
which is not covered in current political, social, or conflict theories.  
There exists a plethora of theory to apply to conflict situations.  Each theory designed 
to define why a nation or group acts in the manner that it does.  However, applying these 
theories requires that the actions of a nation or group be measured within the confines of 
the theoretical model. (For example, application of liberalism requires remaining within 
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the parameters of the concept of liberalism). The theoretical model of these theories is 
therefore itself the bias, which determines the conclusion of whether the model fits the 
subject or not. Hence, there is a need for a new, unbiased scientific inquiry not restricted 
to the confines of any political or social ideology, a methodology which examines the 
subject without preconceived parameters and instead examines behavior during conflict 
including the elements of society engaged or indirectly influential to the conflict.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
Within this dissertation the primary hypothesis being that nation-states possess 
personality like characteristics similar to those traditionally found in humans, identifiable 
through the examination of behaviors, and that nation-state behavioral profiling, a model 
of inquiry that examines a conflict and its elements to discover behavioral characteristics 
and their associated personality traits, is valid.  Discovering these traits is possible 
through the utilization of similar techniques traditionally reserved for the sciences of 
sociology, psychology, and criminal profiling.  
Within Russia, there exists a personality like component that regardless of transitions 
in political, economic, or social structures consistently exerts influence on Russian 
conflict and foreign policy.  This personality like component exists and is identifiable 
through a comparative qualitative historical analysis of Russian behaviors, both domestic 
and international.  
The dissertation, in an effort to address this hypothesis, will answer the following 
questions: 
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1. Does nation-state possess personality like characteristics, identifiable by 
recognition of associated consistent behaviors exhibited over a period different 
historical periods? 
2. Is the proposed personality like component independent of the current 
social/political mechanism?   
3. Does the proposed personality like component define the parameters in which the 
nation-state behaves? 
4. Is the proposed personality component and associated behaviors independent of, 
and maintained despite, experienced conflict or political/social transitions?  
5. Can methods of inquiry, traditionally employed in the study of humans, be valid if 
employed as a method of inquiry for nations?  
6. Is nation-state behavioral profiling a valid methodology? 
7. Can the identification of this behavioral homogony contribute to a more detailed 
model with which to predict future Russian actions? 
8. Can this new information be used to create proactive conflict mitigation? 
Summary of Methodology 
 
The methodology of this dissertation is the employment of a qualitative comparative 
historical analysis, examining Russian behavior to discover an associated personality like 
component consistent with the behavioral characteristics identified.  The study will 
conduct the examination using identified historical periods in which Russia was engaged 
in conflict during periods of social/political transition. The study believes that the greatest 
potential to disrupt any homogony would be evident during these transitional periods.  
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 The study will employ comparative qualitative historical analysis from which a 
historical data set is created.  This analysis will include a detailed description of the 
period’s social/political transition, a brief biographical examination of the current 
period’s leadership, and a brief historical account of selected conflicts which the nation 
faced, both international and domestic. The transition can take the form of social reform, 
political ideological shifts, and declines of empires.   
The study will then apply nation-state behavioral profiling, a technique that utilizes 
similar methods as those used in criminal profiling, to the data to examine behaviors and 
draw conclusions from the findings by comparing the behavior consistencies to 
associated personality definitions traditionally accepted by the discipline of behavioral 
science.  
For this study, two periods of Russian history will be examined.  The two periods 
selected encompass those periods in Russian history within which an identifiable 
transition in the social political structure is present. The two periods will be Russia’s 
Monarchal society of the late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 century, and the post-Soviet era of the 
late 20
th
 early 21
st
 century.   
Table 1-1 
Period Transition Governance 
Structure 
Leader Conflicts  
Russia’s 
Monarchal society 
of the late 17
th
 and 
early 18
th
 century 
Social Reform 
(Europeanization of 
Russian Society) 
Monarchy Czar 
Peter the 
Great 
Strel’sty Revolt 
 
The Great 
Northern War 
Post-Soviet era of 
the late 20
th
 early 
21
st
 century 
Capitalistic 
Economy 
(Break up of Soviet 
Union) 
Democratic 
Federal 
Republic 
Vladimir 
Putin 
Chechen 
Revolts 
 
Democratization 
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.  The selection of the periods of Russian transition (see table 1-1), required that each 
selected period demonstrate: 
Table 1-2 
Component necessary for inclusion Further explanation 
Either a social or a political transitioning 
component.  
A period can contain more than one 
social/political transition as a variable for 
the examination. 
The governance structure in Russia during 
the transition period must be different or in 
transition.   
A monarchy and a dictatorship, although 
with similar components, are nevertheless 
differing types of political structures. 
There must be an identifiable head of state 
with which to examine and compare.  This 
leader must be either a driver of the 
transition or a leader who must deal with 
the effects of the transition. 
The leader in question must be the decision 
maker regarding the addressing of conflict. 
 
There must exist, within the period, a 
domestic and international conflict with 
which the transitioning political or social 
structure was required to deal.  
 
 
The conflicts must be relatable to the 
conflicts in the other periods examined. 
 
Cases of social unrest and international 
conflict or war must be present from which 
to compare the historical periods. 
 
Limitations 
 
The methodology employed in this dissertation has the same limitation as would be 
experienced in any conduction of comparative historical analysis or profiling.  It is within 
the definition of personality and behavioral traits that the research is most limited.  
Classification and identification of these traits must be conducted under the accepted 
definitions commonly used in the behavioral sciences. The assignment of a personality 
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like characteristic, if found using the acceptable definition, does not imply that the 
subject is in fact suffering from any personality disorder which may commonly be 
assigned to individuals who exhibit the same characteristics. The study recognizes that in 
the theoretical framework’s infancy, the defining components are the parameters in which 
it must operate. New terminology, which would define behavioral characteristics and 
associated personality like components with definitions and parameters more suited and 
thereby directly applicable to nation-states may be necessary to undertake. This 
recognition of the need for specific terminology does not imply that the research believes 
there is any real disconnect from the previous definitions used in sociology or behavioral 
science, but that for the purpose of universal acceptance, new designations would remove 
the traditional stigmas sometimes attached to the previous definitions.  
Qualitative Comparative Historical Analysis 
 
The common issue with any qualitative historical analysis exists within the 
historiography.  “How one chose from the historical record the materials that will best 
help one to develop or test theory, or even simply describes a set of events, in a particular 
case or small set of cases” (Thies, 2002, p. 351). It is in source material selection that the 
bias cannot be eliminated, only mitigated, and that the conduction of any historical based 
analysis it is the historiography which receives most of the criticism. “The most notorious 
problem that persistently face qualitative historical analysis, namely, investigator bias and 
unwarranted selectivity in the use of source material” (Thies, 2002, p. 352).   
The researcher accepts that bias could be claimed as to the selection of the time 
periods in which data will be collected. In fact, the selection of the periods was done 
11 
 
 
intentionally to meet the set of parameters as a condition of selection (see table 1-2).  It is 
in this selection of periods with the condition of great transition which the study 
acknowledges the use of bias in the act of selection as a necessary condition to conduct a 
fair assessment of the hypothesis.   
It is also accepted that the selection of a different subject, other than Russia, has the 
potential to elicit a different result and therefore could be considered biased.  However, 
the selection of Russia was concluded to address the motivation to increase knowledge, 
through a research subject who offered the greatest potential impact for conflict 
understanding and engagement. Russia’s influence as not only a direct conflict 
participant, but also a secondary external participant, makes its selection as a subject the 
most potentially beneficial.  Although other subjects may have had more direct conflict 
implications, few other nations could have as extensive global implications.  
The study also acknowledges that historical accounts are inherently biased by the 
authors of the histories. However, any author bias is believed to be minimal, as the study 
seeks to collect factual data rather than author opinion. To further limit any unintentional 
bias, the historiography data will be selected “by identifying one school of historiography 
that (the study) will stick with as the historical record against which (the study) test your 
(its) theories” (Thies, 2002, p. 365). The researcher acknowledges that to accomplish this, 
commitment to one school of historiography the researcher is required “to become 
familiar with general trends in historiography, as well as developments in historical 
inquiry” (Thies, 2002, p. 365; Iggers, 1997; N. Wilson, 1999).  
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Lustick (1996) also envisioned a bias that is cumulative in nature, called “selection 
bias”:  
The first concern is the bias of the historian who may draw on some 
primary sources to the exclusion of others, such that he produces distorted 
account of some historical event. The second concern is the selection 
effects introduced by the political scientist when he chooses to focus on a 
particular historians work and consciously or unconsciously excludes 
others. The worst-case scenario for Lustick, but he seems to me when he 
describes “selection bias” is when these two problems are conjoined. In 
this scenario a political scientist with a particular theoretical and 
conceptual disposition purposefully selects certain historians who share 
this bias, and whose work is already tainted as such leading to a 
misleading historical account, and therefore mistaken confirmation of the 
political scientist theory. (Thies, 2002, p. 359; Lustick, 1996).  
Therefore the data will be from a consistent school of historiography, all attempts will 
be made to collect data from multiple historical authors, albeit from the same theoretical 
point of view.    
Profiling 
 
The limitations of profiling are based upon the methodology’s inherit subjectivity. 
The limitations of nation-state behavioral profiling are similar to the limitations of 
criminal profiling or any other social science methodology, which it is designed after.  
Profiling is not an approach of research that has the ability to define a subject or conflict 
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through its application alone. However, the subjectivity of the methodology can be 
reduced if the criterion from which a profile is derived remains consistent. To accomplish 
this, application of nation-state behavioral profiling must adhere to the set methodologies 
that will be expanded upon in chapter 3.   
A secondary limitation to profiling exists within the defined parameters of the 
behavioral characteristics with which the subject data is coded.  Although psychological 
diagnosis texts such as the DSM IV define behavioral characteristics and assign the 
degrees to which those characteristics influence the subject, the researcher’s perception of 
the definitions presented is always an issue of bias. The researcher understands, 
acknowledges, and accepts that this bias exists inherently within all social science 
research that contains subjective components. 
Definition of Terms and Concepts 
 
Historiography – “The writing of history based on a selective, critical reading of 
sources that synthesize particular bits of information into a narrative description or 
analysis of a subject” (Thies, 2002, p. 351). For the purpose of this dissertation, the 
information collected for the qualitative comparative historical analysis, including the 
criteria used to select and validate the time periods, transition events, governance 
structures of the periods, leader biographies, and historical accounts of the domestic and 
international conflicts will conducted using standard historiography as outlined by Thies 
(2002).   
Qualitative comparative historical analysis – “A methodological approach that 
employs qualitative instead of quantitative measurement and the use of primary historical 
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documents or historians’ interpretations thereof in service of theory development and 
testing” (Thies, 2002).  For the researches purpose, a comparative component is included, 
to accommodate the selection of two historical periods. The data used for the application 
of nation-state behavioral profiling will be derived from the qualitative comparative 
historical analysis through historiography.  
Nation-state behavioral profiling – The application of accepted behavioral science 
profiling techniques, as specifically outlined in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, to 
historiography data generated from a qualitative comparative historical analysis of 
specific historical periods, their conflicts, and common social/political elements, and 
transitions, to examine these data points for consistent behavioral homogony.  
Nomothetic Profiling – “the study of groups which results in knowledge about the 
characteristics of groups, which is not only useful but necessary when trying to define 
groups, solve group related problems, or generate initial theories about issues in specific 
cases” (Bartol, 2013, p. 69). 
Definitions regarding template categories are presented in Chapter 3, which are the 
research methodologies.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction: Topics and Methods 
 
 The literature review’s intent was to conduct its inquiry from a mainstream 
perspective. All the researched subjects presented in this section currently hold 
acceptable concepts within the disciplines in which they reside. Literary interpretations of 
the subject matter, which were outside the defined parameters of contemporary schools of 
thought, are not included into the study’s literature review. The creation of a new 
theoretical paradigm, as proposed by the study, limits previous writings regarding the 
subject of human behavioral characteristics application to nation-states.  
The literature review approached the problem first reviewing scholarship 
regarding human characteristics and how the behavioral sciences conduct their inquiry 
into the identification and development of human characteristics, thus allowing for the 
presentation of corollary opportunities.  It is within the corollary inferences that the study 
derives its theoretical foundation.  Presented here, is a direct reflection of the theoretical 
paradigm proposed and the conceptual framework and problem statement sections 
postulated in chapter 1. The bulk of the chapter is an examination of the present political 
theories in use today and commentary on their correlative values to the proposed 
theoretical foundation of the study, as well as a reinforcement of the problem statement 
regarding current theoretical limitations.  
The literature review explored the concept of behavioral characteristics,  
specifically, what they are, how they develop, and how social science examines them, 
with the intent to promote the concept that if we understand the subject from the 
perspective of traditional use, we can therefore expand the subject concepts to other 
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environments. This necessitates a need to present a short section addressing correlating 
methodology and evaluate the experience by the disciplines and professions who use it 
most. In this section, the development and presentation of the correlation perspective 
between human behavioral characteristics and their existence in nation-states is studied.  
In addition, the literature review examines the identity of society and social structure and 
correlating parallels between individuals and larger social constructs.  Since the 
foundational concept of the study is a case study to identify behavioral characteristics in 
nation-states, identification of the same correlation in the environment within which the 
nation-state resides is required. 
When reviewing the political theory of today, the main goals of the research is to 
identify the reciprocity of political theory characteristics as they relate to the individual.  
In doing so, a correlation of characteristics values is created, and as the research objective 
is to do the reverse, we thereby apply human behavioral characteristic to the nation-state.  
Therefore, while conducting the literature review, the study will provide commentary 
regarding the existence of this reciprocity correlation, thus strengthening the argument 
that reverse application of characteristics is valid.  The review of current political and 
social theories will also evaluate any shortcomings, therefore strengthening the position 
that an examination of nation-states from a different perspective is necessary.  This 
section will examine and analyze the current political science theories used to explain the 
actions of nations and thereby further understand their motivations. According to Smith 
(2010), “The study of international relations has classically focused on the analysis of the 
causes of war and the conditions of peace. Such an agenda seem politically pertinent in 
the 20
th
 century in the aftermath of two world wars” (p. 1). Within the realm of 
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international relations in the social sciences, political scientists and conflict scholars have 
an abundance of theoretical perspectives with which to evaluate nations. This plethora of 
different theoretical perspectives is one of the prime reasons for the development of the 
theoretical methodology explored in this dissertation.  
When the literature turns to a subject such as profiling, the literature source is the 
FBI, an accepted world authority in the field.  The study employs the same criteria when 
reviewing political science and behavioral science theories.  Through the maintaining of 
currently accepted schools of thought in the subject matter, the study presents the most 
comprehensive examination of current theoretical paradigms, allowing for scholarly 
critical correlation to the theoretical principles presented herein.  
Critique of Scholarly Literature 
 
As presented in the previous section, the literature to be reviewed will reflect the 
current schools of thought regarding the subject matter presented.  This maintains the 
consistency with the historiography principle of adhering to one school of thought when 
conducting a historical case study. Since there is little literature which the theoretical 
concepts of the study are argued either for or against, except within the framework of the 
political science theories, which argue different factors as motivators of nation-state 
behavior, the critique of dissenting literature is limited.  With the starting point of the 
research subjects data being the late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 century, some of the theories 
presented in this literature review were not even conceived when Peter I was Czar of 
Russia, or at least not conceived in the framework of current understanding. Likewise, the 
subject matter regarding human behavior also had different foundations during that 
earlier period than they do now. However, it is the current accepted derivative of the 
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individual theories with which the study concerns itself. Therefore, although Marxism 
and critical theory in the time of Peter the Great had yet to exist, those theories are 
relevant to the present day and therefore deserve the study’s consideration.  The study 
also believes that theories developed after certain eras are retroactively applicable.  
Whenever inquiry enters into a new perspective of scholarship, in many cases 
pervious literature, the concepts presented in that literature are the focus of a study’s 
critique.  However, in the case of human behavioral characteristic development, the 
review of literature is presented less as a competing theoretical paradigm, but more a 
conceptual framework to be applied to another subject.  Although there might be some 
discourse regarding acceptance of all the principles found in behavioral science, as they 
will relate to nation-states, these areas of contention are more a product of the dynamics 
inherently found in the differences between living persons and inanimate objects. Nation-
states do not feel; however, it is proposed that they do learn, and that learning is 
cumulative, as would be the case in the living being. Therefore, the presentation of 
behavioral concepts in the individual, presented here, are not subjects of critique but 
rather points of correlation from which the theoretical framework of the study is based.  
However, when considering the literature of current thought as it relates to 
political international theory, some critique is apparent. In reviewing the literature for the 
study, a focus was placed upon international relations theoretical concepts as utilized by 
the discipline of political science. On the surface, each theoretical concept presented in 
this literature review has merit if you examine the subjects in question from the 
perspective of the theorist. The one common theme that runs through all of the theories 
presented is that they are assessments of why nations act the way they do from the 
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perspective of the theorist. Another common theme is that each theorist would seem to 
lump nation-states into one generic construct. The only delineation that these theorists 
seem to make is the difference between powerful nations and weaker ones. 
The study takes its greatest issue with each of these theory’s dismissal of the 
overall effect of human nature upon the decisions of the nations in which they reside. 
These theorists also seem to ignore the concept of national memory, or more simply put, 
the effects of the past creating influential ideologies which interject themselves 
independently of their current governmental structures in any theoretical model. Whether 
a theorist sees a nation as an autonomous construct whose decisions and fate lie within or 
as a component of a larger construct which must work within the boundaries of the 
system in which it resides, political theory, as presented here, shows the tendency to 
disconnect the nation from its people. 
From this foundation, the theory that nation-states possess behavioral characteristics 
and personalities not unlike those found in humans was conceived. Although the original 
question will be reserved for later inquiry, the principle that proposed the existence of 
national behavioral characteristics was presented.  However, this theoretical model was in 
direct contrast to much of the precepts of current political science thought. This presented 
the first research problem.  For political science, when analyzing conflict or those factors 
with direct influence upon conflict, nation-states are traditionally presented as entities, 
which are independent of human behavior and are reactionary to the environment in 
which they reside (Mearsheimer, 2010). This political theoretical construct sounds very 
close to the definition of the situational model of human personality development 
presented in Spencer (1985), which is presented in the literature review section. 
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Objections the study will raise in the case of human personality development are 
continued in regards to nation-state personality development.  The study persists in 
postulating that although the current environment in which a nation-state exist in will 
have some influence upon the methodology of a nations actions, other factors exist which 
determine the reason for a nation’s conduct.  Human behavioral characteristics are 
dismissed in mainstream political science theory and therefore, vital components are 
missing. The historical memory of the nation or the cumulative memories of experience 
of that nation also play a factor.  Furthermore, the behavioral characteristics both past and 
present of those entities within the system that are main drivers of policy and ideology, 
and have, through their actions, transferred those characteristics to the state’s overall 
identity, also require consideration.   
Ignoring these two elements creates inadequacies in our theoretical models. The 
study proposes that nations, like humans, are a product of their experiences and historical 
influences of previous actors within the system, and that the culmination of these 
experiences and historic influences guide the actions of nations, regardless of the current 
political or social environment.  However, nations are not autonomous entities, which 
have the ability to act on their own.  Rather, the historically created personality of a 
nation defines the parameters in which the leaders of the system must conduct their 
actions.  Going back to the case of Israel and the support of the United States, our leaders 
are predisposed to support Israel, despite any personal ideology, because the personality 
of the United States demands it.  
The second problem is the existence of a plethora of differing international relations 
theories, which although applicable to any given conflict, are insufficient due to their 
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inherent limited parameters, which are a result of their generic theoretical construction. 
The resulting discourse, created by the sheer number of differing theories vying for 
acceptance, makes the ability to select one as all-inclusive or conflict appropriate 
problematic. Although the study will not lessen the number of available theories, nor 
does it propose a necessity for a reduction in the number of political science theories, the 
study recognizes the limitations of political theory regarding international and domestic 
relations and acknowledges the necessity for additional foundations of inquiry. The 
designed methodology is independent of any one present theory of international relations 
thought, but is potentially applicable in conjunction with all theories.  The research 
design analyzes conflict from two different perspectives, as events which potentially can 
shape the personality of a nation-state, and as events in which the personality 
characteristics of a nation-state which already exist, can be identified through actions and 
reactions.  In regards to these two perspectives, the research approaches the inquiry of 
these political and conflict questions from the perspective of the 
sociologist/anthropologist in regarding the former, and from the perspective similar to 
that of a forensic criminal profiler in the case of the later.  In the case of the 
sociological/anthropological approach, the characteristics of the conflict are identified 
and the effects of those characteristics are evaluated to their potential effect on a nation-
states personality. From the position of a forensic profiler, the characteristics of the event 
are compared to the behavioral characteristics of the nation and the elements within the 
national structure, which through their design implement foreign and domestic policy, to 
discover if policy overrides the proposed national personality.  
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It is imperative for conflict scholars to understand the motivations of nation-states if 
we are to address conflict. Political science theory offers a starting point in which to 
evaluate the motivations of nations. Unfortunately, there exists an overabundance of 
differing social and political science theories designed to comprehend and forecast the 
actions of nation-states.  One disadvantage to reliance upon political science theory exists 
when we consider their quantities and diversity. Thus far, political theory alone is 
insufficient to obtain the necessary direct comprehension into the motivations of nations 
in the current complex world.  When we consider recent events, and the overwhelming 
number of conflicts in which the world engages today, we must acknowledge that there 
exist gaps in our epistemology of conflict and of nations. The inadequacies of present 
theoretical models that contemporary peace scholars utilize reduce the opportunities to 
proactively mitigate conflict. To be fair, these theoretical inadequacies may be nothing 
more than a societal perception created as an excuse for our ineffectual mitigation of 
conflict.  
Alternatively, cautious application of these existing theories could lead to these 
misconceptions.  Caution is understandable when we consider the potential devastating 
ramifications that exist if these theoretical models are incorrectly applied. The fear and 
scope of these ramifications may well be the impetus for cautious application.  However, 
the study contends that there is no actual gap in the theoretical models or the manner in 
which they are applied, but rather within all conflicts, as elements exists which have so 
far remained undefined or ignored.  On the other hand, the study also contends that 
political science theory is restrictive in the parameters of the ideology in which they 
operate.  Each views the world from a pre-conceived perspective, and thereby formulates 
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theory within those parameters.  Hence the study, although with a preconceived 
hypothesis that behavioral characteristics exist within the personality of the nation state, 
has no preconceived bias as to what those characteristics are to cloud the study. 
Dunne, Kurki, and Smith (2010) writes that “By the 1980s it was commonplace to 
speak of the three approaches (realism, liberalism, and Marxism) as constituting an intra-
paradigm debate” (p. 4). Each of these theories has an application; however, each view 
the conflict from a different perspective. “Since international relations was defined as 
being about war, the theory that would appear to be most useful in explaining it, not 
surprisingly, would be the one that focuses on war” (Dunne et al., 2010, p. 4). This 
imposing of a single parameter in which to examine a subject presents the bias which 
political theory experiences.  However, the focus on war, as mentioned by Dunne et al. 
(2010), is not the only parameter which creates this bias.  Each international theory also 
imposes its own ideological bias.  They may all look at the subject of war, but they do so 
from a pre-defined ideological perspective.  This ideological perspective creates a 
secondary bias condition within which the subject is limited.  For example, Neo-realism 
looks at war from the perspective of the parameters of the ideology of the neo-realist, and 
therefore, applies generalities of the facts of conflict to fit within that framework.   
Still, realism, neorealism, and Marxism, are not the only theoretical divisions that 
create discourse in international relations theory. The broader debate between rationalists 
(neorealism and neoliberalism) and reflectivists (feminism and post structuralism) argues 
the value of positivism.  Robert Keohane (1989), a rationalist, argues the weakness of the 
reflectivist approach:  
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Until the reflective scholars or others sympathetic to their arguments have 
delineated such a research program and show in particular studies that can 
illuminate important issues in world politics, they remain on the margins of the 
field, largely invisible to the preponderance of empirical researchers, most of 
whom explicitly or implicitly accept one or another version of rationalistic 
premise (p. 173). 
This discourse between the reflectivist and the rationalists, those that support 
positivism and those that oppose it, is irrelevant for the purpose of this study. Rather, it is 
the existence of this discourse which is the problem, and thereby creates the impetus for 
examining the problem from a different approach. As Keohane (1989) presented, the 
focus should be on empirical research, conducted under a scientific design free of 
ideological bias.  The research, designed to be a new approach, might be unacceptable to 
either camp, not because of its empirical approach, but due to the focus of its theoretical 
foundation.  The research contained here proposes no ideological preconception other 
than the existence of behavioral characteristics in nation-states.  The extent and context of 
those characteristics have no predefinition beyond the limitations of the currently 
accepted behavioral characteristics of humans.  
The study proposes no ideological parameters, but rather empirically examines the 
factual accounts of conflict by applying defined behavioral characteristic parameters from 
which to develop its conclusions. There currently exists ample discourse regarding the 
merits of each individual political science theory, and the ideology focus from which they 
derive their theory.  Therefore, rather than entering into the discourse through rejecting 
the validity one side or the other, this study chooses to accept the merits of all political 
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theories mentioned as valid from their limited perspective. The actual cause of this 
discourse is as diverse as the theories of which the discourse is about.  Academic 
disagreement regarding theoretical models is a fundamental component of all academic 
endeavors and is nothing new. However, inquiry that is fact based and not predicated 
upon any ideological bias gives empirical results, which allows for a different paradigm 
discourse. 
The study also acknowledges that the introduction of behavioral science can only 
make the questions about nations’ actions more complex. Nonetheless, it is not the 
study’s intent to avoid complexity, but rather to increase understanding. Regardless of the 
issues that are taken with the political theories presented in this chapter, the study does 
not believe the methodology presented is a replacement for current political theory, but 
rather an epistemological adjunct from which these political theories can be explored. 
Human Behavioral Characteristics and the Nation-state 
 
Comparing the characteristics of nations and societies to those of humans is nothing 
new.  “The historian Oswald Spengler portrayed the life cycles of civilizations as similar 
to the life cycles of people” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 533). Spengler (1926-1929) wrote that 
“Civilizations are born, grow up, become senile, and finally die.” Likewise, “Herbert 
Spencer also thought of evolution as a process of “growth”, comparing all societies to 
organisms” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 534).  H. Spencer postulated, “All societies that are at 
the same stage of growth must be similar in a number of ways” (H. Spencer, 1890; H. 
Spencer, 1898-1899). Although the earlier Spencer’s view was a reflection of his belief in 
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“unilinear evolutionism” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 534), it shows the correlation even early 
sociologists placed upon human characteristics and the characteristics of societies.  
Nation-states are not independent entities, which have autonomous propensities. They 
do not possess the ability to disconnect themselves from the characteristics of those who 
created the system.  The nation-state is a constructed system of society and not a 
traditional living organism, and therefore cannot independently create personality or 
behavioral characteristics. The personality of the nation-state increases in dimension as 
those that control the nation-state interject their personality traits upon this social system. 
It is important to note that the personality of a nation-state is different than its culture.  
“Culture is a way of life shared by a group, a system of ideas, values, beliefs, knowledge, 
and customs transmitted from generation to generation within a social group” (M. 
Spencer, 1985, p. 50). This is an important distinction, as many might argue that the 
study is mistaking cultural differences for differences in personality and behavioral traits. 
Although the culture of a nation-state may in fact be a reflection or a component of a 
nation’s personality, culture is a concept that resides within the nation-state, whereas 
personality is expressed externally. When dealing with conflict situations, even those of 
the domestic variety, personality trumps culture.   
However, since the research is being conducted using qualitative comparative 
historical analysis as the method of data collection, the closest theoretical discipline from 
which the study draws is that of the behaviorists, which explain personality in terms of 
the effects external stimuli have on behavior. The approaches used to analyze the 
behavioral aspect of personality are known as behavioral theories or learning-
conditioning theories (Skinner, 1970). Still, the study, as covered in the theoretical 
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framework section of Chapter 1, does not adhere to any behavioral model that proposes 
that personality characteristics are developable from only one view of learning.  The 
research foundation believes that behavioral conditioning is achievable through the 
repetition of action, yet it is also achievable through experiential enlightenment and 
historical exposure to major influential factors. 
Because the research does not adhere to any psychological model in its entirety, 
the developmental frameworks addressed in Chapter 1 are sufficient for example 
purposes. Definitions, model charts, and even the theoretical framework borrowed from 
behavioral science presented within the framework of the study’s application to nation-
states. At this early stage of theoretical development, the study acknowledges and 
concedes that further development is necessary before the methodology can present 
practical and reliable results.  The purpose of this paper is to show correlations between 
human behavior and the behavior of nation-states, present a rudimentary methodology 
from which to examine the phenomenon, and create a starting point for further 
development of the theoretical principles herein. 
The humanistic approach to personality development would better suit the theoretical 
framework of the study.  Since a state is not a living organism it cannot develop a 
behavioral personality through nature, one of the principle factors attributed to human 
personality development.  It therefore develops personality through the act of nurture, or 
what the state learns and remembers from experience. This historical memory potential of 
the nation should therefore lead to behavioral characteristics, as it does in human 
behavior.  Human personalities and behavioral characteristics are products of their 
experiences, and nation-states are no different. According to Coon (1977), “Humanists 
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reject the Freudian view of personality as a battleground for biological instincts and 
unconscious forces” (p. 465). Humanists also have issues with the behaviorist position: 
“Humanists also oppose the mechanical, “thing like”, overtones of the behaviorists’ 
viewpoint” (Coon, 1977, p. 465). The humanist position is quite different: “We are not, 
they say, merely a bundle of moldable responses; instead, we are creative beings capable 
of making responsible choices.  The humanistic viewpoint leads to a greater emphasis 
being placed on immediate subjective experience than on prior learning” (Coon, 1977, p. 
465). The humanistic viewpoint would tend to assert that individuals are reasonable 
actors, a concept not foreign to many political science theories in regards to the state.  
Carl Rogers (1961) presents the best philosophical interpretation of the study’s 
theoretical framework, as “Rogers’ theory of personality centers on the concept of self, a 
flexible and changing perception of personal identity that emerges from the phenomenal 
field” (Coon, 1977, p. 466). It is in this cumulative perception of identity that behavioral 
actions and the personality of the nation-state is formed: “The phenomenal field is the 
person’s total subjective experience of reality. Much human behavior can be understood 
as an attempt to maintain consistency between one’s self image and actions” (Rogers, 
1961; Coon, 1977, p. 466). It is this attempt to maintain consistency which compels 
nations to conduct their activities under the confines of the behavioral norms within that 
personality and associated behavioral characteristics, both of which, the personality traits 
and behavioral characteristics, are a historical reflection of the personalities, behaviors, 
and experienced events that make up society. As products of those that previously and 
currently reside within it, the state will abide by the behavioral characteristics of the 
individuals who influence it, if those characteristics are not in opposition to the 
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previously indoctrinated characteristics of history; the maintaining of consistency being a 
prime motivator in determining a nation’s action potential.  
It is the study’s position that any social construct of society that inherently exhibit a 
direct replication of the personalities and behavioral characteristics of those who created 
it and historically influenced it, will create a condition of identity from which consistency 
of action is promoted. A condition of homogony is created, and this identity is further 
strengthened by the indelible consequences of cumulative events that it has experienced.  
A nation’s actions, therefore, are examinable through the lens of human behavioral 
characteristics.  
From the standpoint of Rogers (1961), the phenomenal field for the nation-state 
would consist of the historical actions, experiences, and ideology, experienced by the 
creators of the state, which then become an inherent part of a state’s identity. These 
experiences create a state personality over time, which create parameters within which 
national leaders must confine themselves.  Therefore, since a nation exhibits the 
behavioral traits of its creators and the cumulative traits of any historical leadership, the 
social system known as the nation-state, like humans, is also susceptible to the memories 
of these historical experiences.  
However, these theoretical musings address the individual and not its position within 
greater society. As is the case in human personality development, the society in which an 
individual lives creates parameters of behavior and limitations upon the individual’s 
personality within socially acceptable norms. The society in which the individual lives 
also has a role in the development of the individual’s personality and behavioral 
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characteristics, which cannot be ignored.  All societal constructs or groups in which like 
elements organize are relatively the same, containing the same dynamics, regardless of 
scope or size.  The model of greater society, or that society construct that is viewed in the 
macro level in which only nation-states reside, is no different in its dynamics from other 
social structures.  Whether the social structure is a family, small organization, gang, or 
nation-state, the group dynamics are relatively the same.  
Any model for determining the actions of nation-states that does not take into 
consideration the factors of behavioral characteristics and national personality will 
therefore be lacking. The behavioral characteristics of a nation-state are important 
dynamics to complete analytical models. These dynamics present the state with the self-
imposed parameters in which its actions are conducted and thus a pattern that can be 
observed and predicted. Without their inclusion, full understanding of a nation’s 
motivation cannot be determined.  
Any nation can be unpredictable, much like humans. However, in humans, this 
unpredictability is mitigated through a conscious examination of an individual’s 
behavioral characteristics and the evaluation of the individual’s personality traits which 
the said individual has exhibited through their life cycle. This evaluation, although not 
100% successful in eliminating human unpredictability, does present a broad picture from 
which to infer potential actions. However, although there is a correlation between the 
unpredictability of individuals and that same element in nation-states, in the case of 
nation-states, the stakes are relatively higher. Unpredictability of a nation forces other 
nations to exhibit caution when constructing responses to international conflict. 
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Human Personality Trait Theories 
 
 
                                Figure 2-1  
Within the discipline of social science, there exists numerous theoretical models 
which attempt to explain the development of personality traits and behavioral 
characteristics in humans (see figure 2-1).  Within these models also exist the defining 
characteristics of human identity, from the perspective of the model’s foundation, which 
lead to a categorization of human mental states from the clinical standpoint of a level of 
stability.  The research presented here is not interested in the level of a given personality 
or behavioral characteristics in the quantifiable terms associated in the practice of 
psychoanalysis.  Rather, the study will focus on the parallel of human characteristics, 
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which are observable from the actions of the nation-state and the potential of pattern 
discovery.  “Personality… refers to the pattern of thoughts, feelings, social adjustments, 
and behaviors consistently exhibited over time that strongly influences one's 
expectations, self-perceptions, values, and attitudes. It also predicts human reactions to 
other people, problems, and stress” (Gittinger & Winnie, 1973; Krauskopf & Saunders, 
1994). Although within the discipline there is no consensus as to the exact definition, 
within the parameters of contemporary thought “Personality is that pattern of 
characteristic thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that distinguishes one person from 
another and that persists over time and situations” (Phares & Chaplin, 1997).  It is under 
this definition from which the research will proceed.  
The traits of personality exhibited in humans, as defined by Spencer (1985), have 
three potential models for development.  The “developmental model which suggests that 
personal traits change according to the stage one’s life is in” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 126).  
In the case of assigning personality characteristics to nation-states, this model may have 
some validity, if it were determined that older nation-states exhibited different behavioral 
characteristics or more imbedded characteristics than of those of younger nations. The 
study would agree that the chronological age of a nation-state is directly proportional to 
the amounts of experiences a nation-state may encounter.  Moreover, increased amounts 
of experiences may in fact either diversify or intensify the behavioral characteristics of a 
nation. However, it is difficult, if not impossible, to correlate the stages of human 
existence into a parallel of nation-state existence.  Spencer’s (1985) stages of life are 
dependent upon the chronological age of the individual and the changes one experiences 
through the advancement of age.  Nation-states, not being biological in nature, do not 
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experience this same transitory process and therefore cannot experience the same 
experience.  This does not negate the importance of increases in experience in the 
development of personalities within nation-states; it does, however, show a fundamental 
difference in literally applying some concepts of individual behavioral development to 
the nation-state problem. Nevertheless, it is accepted that “personal character…is a 
matter of growth” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 126).  The difference is that growth, as described 
in the developmental model, is reliant upon different factors than growth would be in 
relation to nation-state character development.  
Another model of human behavioral characteristic development is “the situational 
model, which suggest that most of the time our actions do not reflect our character traits 
so much as the situations we face or have faced” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 126).  This model 
directly addresses the study’s delineation between ideology and methodology. Situations 
may elicit different responses; however, the study would argue that although the situation 
may require different methods from which the individual will engage, those methods are 
limited by the parameters of the individual’s personality. This model also speaks to the 
concept that those in power today, although influential, are restricted in action by the 
parameters previously set within the national characteristics. A nation-state, which has 
traditionally exhibited a behavioral trait, would find it difficult to engage in behavior that 
is contrary to those traits.  In fact, the society in which the nation-state resides would 
react to the nation-state’s actions that were purely situational driven.  Not only does the 
nation-state need to conform to its historical behavioral characteristics, it must also 
maintain the social norms of the society in which it resides, unless of course the national 
personality historically exhibited was one of situational driven action, rather than actions 
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that are character driven.  Character defines the parameters in which individuals act, and 
therefore our actions, contrary to the situational model, are a reflection of our personality. 
However, there is a theorized cumulative effect that situations have upon personality 
construction.  The hypothesized theory does accept that situations experienced by the 
nation-state have cumulative developmental influence, which over time helps to develop 
the nation-states personality. Yet, in the case of nation-states, this developmental factor is 
not as real time as proposed by Spencer (1985).  How a nation-state reacts to a situation is 
as much dependent upon the cumulative experience personality development of the state 
as the parameters the current situation presents. 
Finally, human behavioral development is expressed in the “interpretive model which 
doesn’t assume character traits develop in any particular order and doesn’t think they 
depend on one’s situation.  A given situation may affect different people in very different 
ways, depending on what it means to them” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 126).  The theoretical 
framework of the study does not suggest that there is a predefined order of character 
development as presented in the developmental model, nor that a situation has the ability 
to rewrite nation-states personality characteristics immediately, as is suggested in the 
situational model. However, the interpretive model, which promotes that individuals react 
to situation as they interpret them, is consistent with a portion of the theoretical 
framework of the study. Still, the interpretive model is not, in the study’s opinion, a valid 
model of development as much as a model of situational engagement. Nation-states do 
interpret situations within the context of its own experiences. Those interpretations are 
influenced by what those experiences tell the nation-state the presented situation means to 
it. This concept is one of the foundations in nation-state personality development: like 
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humans, the state is also susceptible to the memories of its historical experiences, and 
therefore has the potential to exhibit in its policies and ideologies characteristics that are 
consistent throughout a nation’s history and are a product of these experiences. It is 
hypothesized that the theoretically proposed historical memory potential of a nation 
should therefore lead to a behavioral homogony, or personality characteristic, as it does 
in human behavior.  
To this point, there has been a great deal of reference to the concepts of personality 
traits and human behavior.  From the standpoint of the theoretical conceptual framework 
of the study, since both are “characteristics” in which the parameters of a nation’s action 
can be predicted, there is no difference between the two concepts.  However, the study 
does recognize that there are fundamental differences from a behavioral science point of 
view.  “Learning theorists John Dollard and Neal Miller consider habits as the basic 
structure of personality” (Coon, 1977, p. 464).  Dollard and Miller (1950) believe that, as 
in Spencer’s situational model, personality is learned from the situational environment: 
“Habits are governed by four elements…drive, cue, response, and reward” (Donald & 
Miller, 1950; Coon, 1977, p. 464). It is within their definition of drive that personality is 
developed. “A drive is any stimulus strong enough to goad a person to action…Cues are 
signals from the environment that guide response so they are most likely to bring about 
reinforcement (reward)” (Donald & Miller, 1950; Coon, 1977, p. 464). This construct 
harkens back to Pavlov’s dog and positive reinforcement of acceptable behavior. 
Although this is a good model to describe the American foreign policy perspective, it 
is not fully applicable to this study’s theoretical construct. The study would agree that 
positive reinforcement is occasionally applicable to the development of personality traits 
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in a nation-state.  However, these traits created by Dollard and Miller’s (1950) model, in 
the case of nation-states, would be short lived since the social environment and 
situational potentials in which the nation-state resides are far more diverse and the 
concept of reward changes too frequently. The environment of the nation-states society is 
far too complex with too many variables for positive reinforcement techniques to enjoy 
long standing success.  
Dollard and Miller (1950) were not the only behaviorists to address personality 
development. B.F. Skinner (1970) once said “intelligent people no longer believe that 
men are possessed by demons… but human behavior is still commonly attributed to 
indwelling agents” (p. 5). Coon (1977) refers to Skinner as a “radical behaviorist” with an 
extreme view of personality: “For Skinner, personality is a convenient fiction we 
invented to pretend we have explained behavior that is actually controlled by the 
environment” (Coon, 1977, p. 464).  Coon (1977) further berated Skinner’s position 
when he wrote, “Skinner believes that everything a person does is ultimately based on 
past and present rewards and punishments. Perhaps Skinners point of view has been 
shaped by his environment” (Coon, 1977, p. 464). The study will refrain from enjoining 
the Coon/Skinner debate regarding credibility, since evaluation of Skinner’s work would 
require a more extensive examination than will be conducted here.  It is enough to say 
that for the behaviorist, the environment is the key to personality development.  The 
study reaffirms its belief that environment plays a key factor in this development. 
However, it is the environment of the social structure in which the nation-state resides, 
not the individual situational circumstances that the state experiences, that holds more 
sway over development.  
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Human behavior is a complex subject.  However, our current understanding of the 
development of human behavioral characteristics and the ramifications of those 
characteristics has advanced. The main research design framework of this study is 
devoted to identifying if the existence of identifiable behavioral characteristics is 
applicable to nation-states. The concept of nations having identifiable personality traits, 
not unlike those displayed by humans, comes from the observation of nation-state action 
within the confines of the social parameters in which they reside. Nations can exhibit 
characteristics similar to those of an introvert, whereas other nations might present a 
personality better described as an extrovert.  Nations can conduct their business and 
implement their policies in a singularly organized manner, almost to the point of being 
diagnosable as obsessive compulsive, while other are equally as successful with a more 
disorganized or attention deficit disorderly approach.  Regardless of the characteristics a 
nation may display, once ingrained into the fabric of the national identity, these 
characterizes, as this study will show, remain and form the foundation of any future 
actions a nation might engage in.    
 If we accept the premise that like humans, nation-states can develop behavioral 
characteristics and personality identities, and that development is a product of many of 
the same dynamics as seen in humans, our understanding of nation-state actions during 
periods of conflict might also increase. One of these dynamics, which can be associated 
to human characteristic development, is existence and interaction within a social 
structure. 
Nation- states live within a social structure of like entities. According to Keynes, 
“Europe was so organized socially and economically as to secure the maximum 
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accumulation of wealth” (Lemert, 2010, p. 203). The organization of the world political 
structure is the result of nations attempting to obtain security. The structure of human 
society seeks the same goal: security. However, regardless of the underlining reasons for 
the creation of the system, the nation-state is a constructed system of created society. 
Social experience is a factor that forms the individual’s personality. Like Pavlov’s dog, 
the individual will learn from repeated experiences, and that knowledge becomes 
ingrained into the personality of the individual.   
The study proposes that experience is an influencing factor to the development of 
a nation-states behavioral and personality traits.  The nation-state creates behavioral 
characteristics through retention of event memories.  The nation-state learns from 
experience. The environment of the society within which the nation-state resides also 
plays an influential factor on development of behaviors. The interactions of nations are 
similar to the interactions of individual humans or groups.  The structure of the world 
society of nations is similar to the structure of society in which the individual lives. As is 
the case with the individual’s society, nations too live in an environment which is 
hierarchal and exhibits the same dynamics of its individualistic cousin.  (See the 
following section on unbalance influence). The dichotomy, which exists within the 
structure of world social dynamics, is a foundation for the conflicts in which present-day 
society is embroiled. The conceptual framework of the study proposes that the 
community or societal structure, in which the nation-state resides, is an influencing factor 
upon behavioral characteristics. Human social interaction studies have studied this 
concept. 
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During the late 1920’s, Thrasher (1927) examined the concepts of personality and 
social group belonging.  “The significance of sociological conception of personality, 
namely as the role of the individual in the group, comes out clearly in the study of gangs” 
(Thrasher, 1927). Thrasher concluded that the personality of the individual became a 
component of the social structure of the community in which it existed: “Every boy in the 
gang acquires a personality…is a person, that is plays a part and gets a place with 
reference to the other members of the gang” (as cited in Lemert, 2010, p. 257). The study 
extends this concept of social integration to the society of nation-states, and agrees that in 
some part the expectations of the social group upon the nation-state have direct influence 
upon the behavioral characteristics the state will exhibit.  This concept is within the 
framework that the society of nation-states is a social construct, which is analogous to 
any other social construct in which humans live.  The nation-state is nothing more than an 
individual within that social structure, and therefore will have behavioral characteristics 
influenced by the expectations of the group.  This concept also goes to the proposal of the 
unbalanced influence within the nation-state social structure, which will be discussed 
later.  
Thrasher’s gang evaluations coincide with the conceptual framework of the study as 
his observations, directed at individuals within a gang social structure have obvious 
parallels to the larger social construct within which nation-states reside:  “The inner circle 
is usually composed of a constellation of especially intimate pals, formed about a leader. 
The rank and file – the less enterprising and less capable- are subordinate to the inner 
circle…” (Thrasher, 1927, as cited in Lemert, 2010, p. 258). The study will argue in later 
sections that this concept within a gang structure is no different from the structures of 
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NATO or the United Nations.  Therefore, since nation-states reside in a similar social 
structure, which is no different from that of gangs, the concept of viewing nation-states in 
this context strengthens the argument that nation-states can be viewed like the individual 
human, with behavioral characteristics, and the process of development of those 
characteristics are similar in developmental construction to that of the individual.  
Social Constructs, Personage and the Law 
 
The following are selected portions of the abstracts of the Supreme Court rulings 
that highlight the concept of corporations as personages.  This section is presented as an 
example of the evolution of the concept that social constructs can be viewed as persons, 
and therefore has the potential for development of personality and behavioral traits. 
The first case presents the first record of the court signaling that corporations can, 
for the purpose of legal proceedings, be considered citizens. 
Louisville, Cincinnati & Charelston R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (U.S. Supreme 
Court 1844). 
A corporation created by and transacting business in a state is to be 
deemed an inhabitant of the state, capable of being treated as a citizen for 
all purposes of suing and being sued, and an averment of the facts of its 
creation and the place of transacting business is sufficient to give the 
circuit court’s jurisdiction. (Louisville, Cincinnati & Charelston R. Co. v. 
Letson, 1844) 
This concept is continued in the second case excample. 
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Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 57 U.S. (16 Ho.) 314 (U.S. Supreme 
Court 1853). 
The constitutional privilege which a citizen of one state has to sue the 
citizens of another state in the federal courts cannot be taken away by the 
erection of the latter into a corporation by the laws of the state in which 
they live. The corporation itself may therefore be sued as such. (Marshall 
v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1853) 
The following case expands the citizenship concept proposed in the first two cases 
and extends the concept to corporations being considered as people that have the same 
constitutional rights as any other person. 
County of Santa Slara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394 (1886) (U.S. 
Supreme Court May 10, 1886). 
The defendant Corporations are persons within the intent of the clause in 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United. 
States, which forbids a state to deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. (County of Santa Slara v. Southern 
Pacific Railroad, 1886) 
The concept of personage and the extension of right usually reserved for people is 
continued in Smyth. 
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 1898 (U.S. Supreme Court March 7, 1898)  
A railroad corporation is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment declaring that no state shall deprive any person of property 
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without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws. (Smyth v. Ames, 1898) 
This continued in Hale and Russian Volunteer Fleet. 
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (U.S. Supreme Court March 12, 1906). 
The benefits of the Fifth Amendment are exclusively for a witness 
compelled to testify against himself in a criminal case, and he cannot set 
them up on behalf of any other person or individual, or of a corporation of 
which he is an officer or employee. (Hale v. Henkel, 1906) 
Property rights are extended: 
Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481 (U.S. Supreme Court 
February 24, 1931). 
Aliens who are citizens or subjects of any government which accords to 
citizens of the United States the right to prosecute claims against such 
government in its courts shall have the privilege of prosecuting claims 
against the United States in the Court of Claims, whereof such court, by 
reason of their subject matter and character, might take jurisdiction. So 
held in the case of a Russian corporation where the property was taken 
under the 1917 Act after the recognition by the United, states of the 
Provisional Government of Russia. (Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United 
States, 1931) 
 Double jeopardy is extended to corporations: 
United States v. Martin Linen Suppl, 430 U.S. 564 (U.S. Supreme Court April 4, 
1977). 
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to a court of appeals from a . . . judgment . . . of a district court dismissing 
an indictment . . . except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy 
clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution. 
(United States v. Martin Linen Suppl, 1977) 
First amendment right also extended to corporations: 
Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 588 U.S. ____ (U.S. Supreme 
Court January 21, 2010). 
“The Court has recognized that the First Amendment applies to corporations” 
(Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 2010). 
Burnwell v. Hobby Lobby, 13 U.S. 354 (U.S. Supreme Court June 30, 2014). 
HHS’s concession that a nonprofit corporation can be a “person” under 
RFRA effectively dispatches any argument that the term does not reach 
for-profit corporations; no conceivable definition of “person” includes 
natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations. 
(Burnwell v. Hobby Lobby, 2014) 
Each of the presented cases extends the legal concept which assigns personage to 
a social construct, corporations.  In the case of Hobby Lobby, the court recognizes that a 
corporation can exhibit a moral conscience from which its actions can be dictated.  The 
merits of all these case are not the focus of the study, yet they do illustrate the potential to 
assign human characteristics and rights to social constructs. 
Profiling  
 
A methodology in which behavioral characteristic and personality traits play an 
important role is in the science of profiling. When the study addresses profiling, it is done 
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in the context of the scientific examination of events and the behavioral characteristics, 
which can be deciphered from an event, rather than the social practice of racial profiling 
so prominently reported in the news media. The study recognizes the stark differences 
between these two definitions of profiling, and herein rejects the later practice as socially 
unacceptable behavior. Yet, however incendiary the term profiling may be, the scientific 
practice employed by law enforcement in the capture of serial killers is well documented 
and proven valid in identifying behavioral characteristic and the patterns of actions 
exhibited by those with the defined personalities.  
“In late 20th century and into the 21st, criminal profiling became ubiquitous” (Bartol, 
2013, p. 1).  Law enforcement and behavioral science collaborated to create profiling 
techniques to identify such heinous criminals as serial murderers.  “Profiling can be 
broadly defined as a technique that identifies behavioral, cognitive, emotional, and 
demographic characteristics of known and unknown individuals, based on clues gleaned 
from a wide range of information” (Bartol, 2013, p. viii). In this context, profiling is the 
behavioral identification of homogenous traits, created from the factual historic actions of 
the person sought, which gives identifiers that in turn are translated into criminals traits. 
These traits allow for comparison to potential suspects and lend insight to future actions.  
Profiling works under the auspice that a profiled individual will act in a consistent 
manner, or display a homogony of actions, with minor deviation, and has proven a 
successful tool for the capture and conviction of numerous perpetrators (Bartol, 2013). 
The concept of using behavioral profiling in the case of a nation-state, from which to 
better understand and predict the actions of those states, was conceived through the 
unlikely and seemingly unrelated evolution of corporations to personage status.  The 
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United States Supreme Court, as outlined in the previous section, has evolved 
corporations through decisions, whose concepts have assigned personage status, and 
citizenship rights and responsibilities to corporations (Bartol, 2013) (Burnwell v. Hobby 
Lobby, 2014) (Citizens United v. Federal Elections Commission, 2010) (County of Santa 
Slara v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 1886) (Hale v. Henkel, 1906) (Louisville, Cincinnati 
& Charelston R. Co. v. Letson, 1844) (Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 1853) 
(Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 1931) (Smyth v. Ames, 1898) (United States v. 
Martin Linen Suppl, 1977). The concept evolving from these rulings, whether we agree 
or not, proposes that corporations possess characteristics which are parallel to 
individuals, and because of these characteristics, deserve legal consideration for 
protection of civil rights.  These ideological components are a fundamental protected 
right of the corporation and is therefore immune from hindrances.   
This study extended the development of this concept to consider the theory that if 
corporations could be viewed as persons, then why not nation-states?  Many of the 
theories of nation-state action, international relations theory, liberalism, conservatism, 
neo-realism, and conflict theory, all contain concepts that are as relevant and applicable 
to behavior in persons as they are to their intended subjects, nations.  Therefore, why not 
utilize elements of the behavioral science process of profiling and the foundation of 
anthropological and behavioral characteristics, commonly used for individuals and 
groups of individuals, to a larger assemblage, such as nation-states?  If corporations, as 
suggested by the United States Supreme Court, have the same ideological characteristics 
as individuals and this concept is valid in large entities such as nation-states, then 
utilizing the techniques to find homogony in individuals should be applicable and a valid 
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concept when applied to nation-states.  The concept of conflict profiling is nothing new.  
Conflict scholars “profile” existing conflict to discern the causes of conflict all the time. 
However, the application of nation-state behavioral profiling, as well as the application of 
similar profiling techniques commonly used in behavioral science to historical conflicts 
in the effort to discover a behavioral homogony, is a new approach. 
This theory gains credence when we consider that the framework contained within 
political science theories. Many characteristics assigned to the nation-state, would also be 
applicable if related to an individual or group of individuals.  As an example the fourth 
and fifth tenants of the political science theory of neo-realism is that: the state’s primary 
motivation is to survive and that nation-states are rational actors (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 
80). Both of these concepts are arguably also true when considering the psychological 
motivations of individuals and their groups. It is from the theoretical interchangeability of 
these concepts embraced by political science and behavioral science that the theory of 
nation-state Historical Conflict Behavioral Profiling was developed.  Since profiling of an 
individual seeks to identify homogony in the individuals actions with which to identify 
and predict future activities, then profiling the nation-state under the same basic concept 
should also produce a similar result.   
As indicated earlier, the purpose of this dissertation is not to discount previous 
international and/or conflict theory, but rather to create an adjunct methodology which 
provides a different approach to insight into Russian motivations.  Nor is the purpose to 
argue against any specific theories presented by current international experts or media 
pundits.  Rather, this dissertation will offer a behavioral profile perspective, similar to 
profiles used in present day criminal investigative techniques, to identify consistent 
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actions.  This profile will be compiled utilizing historical case studies that will examine 
Russia during periods that exhibit social, economic, and political, transitions as a focal 
point of case selection.   
Focusing on periods of transition garners its foundation from the theory that Russia’s 
transition following the fall of the Soviet Union and rejection of communism is a 
transition of such magnitude that if there would be a change in Russian international 
policy, it would occur as such a time. I will note here that the dissertation does not 
propose that all nations will necessarily follow the Russian model. The focus of the 
dissertation is the application of Historical Conflict Behavioral Profiling to a single 
subject during periods of transition.  These transitions will include differing social and 
political factors traditionally seen as disruptions to homogony and drivers of ideological 
change in other nations. The general hypothesis is that a homogony exists in Russia and 
Historical Conflict Behavioral Profiling can identify it. 
For the purpose of reviewing the literature regarding profiling, the study will 
utilize the sources and definitions as they pertain to the current accepted function of the 
methodology. The terms used in this section of the literature review are not a reflection of 
the study’s belief that the subjects examined in this research are in any way representative 
of a criminal element. Similarly, any references to psychological terms used in the 
literature do not infer that the study is using the methodology for the purpose of 
compiling a psychological profile of the subject. It is common in the literature of criminal 
profiling to describe events as crime scenes and the elements of the profile’s attention as 
offenders. Again, the language of the literature available that outlines profiling and its use 
has a deep history within the profession of law enforcement. Therefore, this disclaimer is 
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being presented at the beginning of the literature being reviewed, to inform the reader 
that it is the methodology of profiling that is being examined, not the specific application, 
as proposed in the literature. Nor are the potential diagnostic results traditionally assigned 
to the personalities of those criminal elements normally the focus of the methodology 
when used by criminologists.  
It is also important to note that the literature review of profiling is done so in a 
very generic manner. Although some elements of the methodology of criminal profiling 
are employed within the research design, it is the principal of understanding the subject 
through the development of the behavioral profile from which the study actually draws.  
For this reason, this section on profiling will not delve into the intricacies of criminal 
profiling methodology, but rather will examine the principles of the application.  In many 
ways, the theoretical construct of the methodology might also fall under the science of 
political anthropology, as the information presents a picture of the evolution of a nation’s 
personality. However, the exact scientific classification of the methodology is a subject to 
be explored after the simple design presented here is further developed and refined. 
“The FBI defines criminal investigative analysis as an investigative process that 
identifies the major personality and behavioral characteristics of the offender based on 
the crimes he or she has committed” (Burgess, Burgess, Douglas, & Ressler, 1992, p. 
310; Turvey, 2008, p. 79). The study does not claim that any crime has been committed. 
Nor does it classify the subjects of the study as offenders. Rather, the study attempts 
through the methodology of profiling to discover the behavioral characteristics of the 
participants of a nation’s international relations processes, which include the 
governmental structure and the leadership, through their actions and reactions to domestic 
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and international events. If, as the study postulates, there is a parallel between the human 
behavioral characteristics of the people that have created the nation in the behavioral 
characteristics of the nation itself, then if the process of profiling is applied, a pattern of 
homogeny regarding actions may be discovered. “Offender profiling is the process of 
inferring the characteristics of an offender from the way that offender acted when 
committing the crime” (Turvey, 2008, p. 80; Canter, 1995). For the purpose of the 
methodology to be employed in conflict analysis, the offender as described by Canter 
(1995) is made up of three separate yet equal elements: the nation itself, the structure of 
government the nation employs, and the head of state at the time of the event. Through 
the act of profiling each of these elements, it may be possible to determine if a correlation 
exists between any and all. However, it is the nation and its behavioral characteristics 
with which the study and the methodology is primarily concerned. The characteristics of 
the head of state, and the government, are secondary, yet are included because of the 
potential influence that they may have upon the state. In the act of criminal profiling, the 
identity of the offender is an unknown.  For the purpose of historic behavioral, conflict 
profiling all elements regarding the participants and the events are pre-described. It is the 
function of the methodology to create a deeper understanding from a behavioral 
standpoint of these elements. 
The criminal profile is a report that describes the investigatively relevant 
and/or probative characteristics of the offender responsible for a particular 
crime, or series of related crimes… Offender characteristics include any 
attributes that the examiner describes specifically to the unknown person 
or persons responsible for the commission of particular criminal acts, 
50 
 
 
including those that are physical, psychological, social, geographical, or 
relational (Baeza, Chisum, Chamberlin, McGrath, & Turvey, 2000). 
The quote previous could be edited by removing the terms criminal and crime to 
create a comprehensive description of the proposed methodology’s intentions. A conflict 
profile is therefore a report that describes the historically relevant and/or probative 
characteristics of the elements of society as they apply to a particular conflict or series of 
conflicts. Societal element characteristics include any behavioral attributes that the 
researcher hypothesizes is relevant to the known elements responsible through 
participation in the relevant conflict, including those that are physical in action, 
behavioral, social, geographical, or relational. 
“As with all nomothetic and inductive profiling methods, the problems come 
when broad theories are applied to actual cases and to certain a fashion” (Turvey, 2008, 
p. 99). This was the case in the study of geographic profiling, which was dismissed as 
applying too broad a theory, a theory that had exhibited no scientific validity, and a 
theory that attempted to identify offenders through the narrow lens of geography.  “This 
method breaks the tenant of behavioral evidence analysis… it takes a single manifestation 
of offender behavior and attempts to infer its meaning out of the overall behavioral and 
emotional context that it was produced in” (Turvey, 2008, p. 99). To avoid the pitfalls 
encountered by the proponents of geographic profiling, the model created for the purpose 
of conflict profiling, although centered on behavioral characteristics, is not limited by 
them. In conflict profiling, the methodology looks to discover common behavioral 
characteristics, through the use of closed ended templates, which focus upon a broad 
range of potential possibilities. There exists no inference as to what these characteristics 
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might be, nor is there any bias as to what homogony the research might find.  The 
discoveries are grounded into the template design theme, and are only limited in scope to 
the applying researcher’s area of inquiry. 
Within the literature of profiling, there is an extensive amount of technical data 
which is irrelevant to the study’s purpose. The common theme of which the study wishes 
to derive from profiling literature is that if the correct questions are asked and the focus is 
not limited to one aspect of behavior, commonality can be found. 
Normative International Relations Theory 
 
Normative international relations theory exists under a plethora of alternate 
names: those that call it “normative IR theory” (Erskine, 2007) (Brown, 1992) (Frost, 
1996) (Frost, 1986) (Jackson & Sorensen, 2007).  Others label it “international political 
theory” (Beitz, 1979/1999) (Linklater, 1990) (Hutchings, 1999).  There are those that 
simply refer to it as the more descriptive “international ethics” (Nardin & Maple, 1992).  
“This array of labels does not indicate a case of multiple confused identities on the part of 
the community of scholars who contribute to the field” (Erskine, 2010, p. 38).  However, 
is Erskine right? Each naming of the theoretical concept seems to focus upon a different 
aspect of the whole.  If in fact the focus is different, and then therefore would there not 
exist confusion in the identity?  Ethics coupled with anything labeled as political offer 
their own conundrum. Nevertheless, levity aside, the array of labels to this one theoretical 
model would suggest there is some question as to the focus of the theory, and that focus 
is dependent upon who you ask. 
“While normative international relations theory is deeply influenced by 
philosophical sources, work within the field is characterized by an acute awareness of 
52 
 
 
practical issues in international politics” (Erskine, 2010, p. 37).  The use of philosophical 
sources is the correlating concept between normative IR theory and historical behavioral 
conflict profiling.  It is not the fact that the study’s methodology utilizes philosophical 
sources, but rather that the application of morality, which is a very human concept to the 
inanimate objects of nation-states, presents an acknowledgement of conceptual crossover 
potentials. Since Normative International Relations Theory uses philosophical references 
and application of moral codes as a vehicle with which to explain the actions of nations, 
this humanizing of nation-states is directly in line with the research’s contention that 
nations can be examined through the lens of human behavior.  
The concept of morality and of a moral responsibility should not exist within the 
repertoire of inanimate social constructs, such as nations.  Morality is rather a principle, 
which defines whether human behavior is right or wrong.  Morality is the yardstick from 
which humanity justifies its actions. However, for the normative international relations 
scholar, the same is true of nations.  When an individual of society acts immorally, 
society will demand that the individual be held accountable and society takes remedial 
action. So too does the international community hold its member states to a moral code of 
action of which the state is judged. The morality of the individuals within the nation-state 
transfers their moral code upon the construct, from which we judge future actions. This is 
the basis of normative international relations theory, and a prime example correlation of 
the parallel between nation-states and the transfer of characteristics of personality.  It is 
also a correlating factor, which demonstrates that even within political science theory 
there exists an understanding of social dynamics and the concept that the social dynamics 
of the individual in fact has parallels to the social dynamics of nation-states.  
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From its philosophical position,  “normative theorizing about international 
relations appear not only against a backdrop of committed behaviorism within the 
discipline, but following a long period in which moral philosophers have been more 
concerned with abstract analytical questions than with real-world moral dilemmas” 
(Erskine, 2010, p. 39; Brown, 1992). Of course, political scientists who reject the concept 
of nation-state having the potential to develop personalities that contain aspects which are 
independent of current governance structures of leadership influence, might argue that the 
philosophical musings and moral applications are meant not for the nation-state as an 
entity but those factors within the structure of the nation-state which influence its actions.  
One of the main issues the study has with the concepts of normative international 
relations theory is with the concept of what is just and unjust. Like morality, the concept 
of justice is subjective, and in the study’s opinion, an imitating factor to normative IR 
Theory. Morality is a vehicle for which actions can either be justified or denounced. In 
the realm of international relations theory, violent actions such as war can be classified as 
either just or unjust. Throughout history, the victors of conflict have engaged in the 
practice of justifying their actions as moral or just in an attempt to minimize the actual 
devastation that their actions created or to give credence to their actions. To the 
international relations theorist, the verdict of the justice of the act and the maintaining of 
the arbitrary moral responsibility of a nation engaged in the act is the main grounds for 
determining if an act is right or wrong.  It is within the subjective propensity of normative 
IR theory that the study also takes issue.  There is a paradox created by the premise that if 
one life is lost unjustly then this loss is morally reprehensible, whereas in cases in which 
10,000 are lost under the perception of just conditions, the loss is morally acceptable. 
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This paradox is further complicated by the necessity of the question; who is responsible 
for determining whether something is just or unjust? To whose set of values are the 
definitions of justice used? When we consider these questions, we realize the problems 
that ensue when philosophy and the philosophical definitions of right and wrong become 
benchmarks from which history is judged and political theory is developed. Regardless of 
international relations theory’s claims of being acutely aware of the practical issues of 
politics, the social questions of morality should never enter into the discussion when 
conflict between nations leads to human death or suffering. 
This study conceded, however, that international relations theory attempts to bring 
order to a world which if left to its own devices, could perpetrate reprehensible acts 
beyond the imagination. Articles such as the Geneva Convention outline rules for the 
conducting of war. The Geneva Convention Articles exist regardless of the fact that the 
concepts of wars with acceptable rules is an ironically acceptable premise. Yet articles 
such as these are an unfortunate necessity as a mechanism to reign in the full potential of 
human depravity. However, it is not the study’s intent to question the value of using 
moral judgments as a basis for theoretical concepts regarding the actions of nations. 
Rather, the fact that normative international relations theory uses morality, which has 
traditionally defined acceptable human behavior, and is an acceptable model for a 
theoretical perspective in international relations, presents us with an acknowledgement  
of the crossover potential of these concepts.  
It is not the research’s intent to become a moral compass regarding the actions of 
nations. Nor does the study wish to employ philosophical constructs to increase the 
epistemology of international interactions. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that as historical 
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behavioral conflict profiling develops, and the behavioral profile of a nation becomes 
clearer, that profile could create discourse regarding the morality of a nation’s intention. 
The study accepts this premise is a potential result of obtaining a better understanding 
through the definition of the behavioral characteristics a nation possesses. Yet the 
argument of morality is beyond the scope of this study or the methodology, which the 
study proposes to introduce into the field. The methodology strives to discover facts. If in 
the future the methodology effects our assessment of nation-states moral judgments, 
conclusions will be left to the normative international relations theorists. 
Classical Realism 
 
“Classical realists have holistic understandings of politics the stress the 
similarities, not differences, between domestic and international politics, and the role of 
ethics and community in promoting stability in both domains” (Lebow, 2010, p. 59).  The 
principal proponents of classical realism include Thucydides, Machiavelli, Clausewitz, 
and Morgenthau (Lebow, 2010). The theoretical concepts of classical realism conjure the 
stage full of Greek tragedy. “In keeping with their tragic orientation, they recognize the 
communal bonds are fragile and easily undermined by the unrestrained pursuit of 
unilateral advantage by individuals, factions, and states” (Lebow, 2010, p. 59). The 
concept is that within society, actors exist who believe they are above the law and have 
eclipsed, through their self-perceived power, the constraints of civil society, which no 
longer apply to them. Because these actors exist, “time honored mechanisms of conflict 
management like alliances and the balance of power may not only fail to preserve the 
peace but may make domestic international violence more likely” (Lebow, 2010, p. 59).  
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Morgenthau and Thucydides’ conceptual framework based upon Greek tragedies 
is a powerful correlating factor that helped develop the conceptual framework of this 
study.  Traditional Greek tragedies framed around the actions of individual and the 
human faults in which they base their decisions are key.  Morgenthau and Thucydides 
saw nation-states and their decision process much in the same light as nations having 
faults which affected their judgment and lead to poor decisions. Realism understands that 
nation-states will take advantage of each other.  Realists also acknowledge that the goal 
of every nation is to survive.  These realistic attitudes are at the heart of the many conflict 
issues.  Let us take the Korean peninsula as an example. Both Koreas want to dominate 
the other, one through militarily means, and the other through economic coercion. Both 
Koreas understand that their neighbor could be the greatest threat to their continued 
survival. However, both are aware that the key to dominating the other ultimately 
remains beyond their control and in the hands of others.  For North Korea, there is China, 
for the South Koreans there is the support of the United States. This realist Balance of 
Power has maintained each nation’s security.  This balance failed when the North 
Koreans attacked the South in the 1950’s, but following the successful defense of South 
Korea, the present Balance of Power has maintained stability. This would be a very 
Morgenthau concept, as he believed that “the success of the balance of power… was less 
a function of the distribution of capabilities than it was an existence and strength of 
international society that bound together the most important actors in the system” 
(Lebow, 2010, p. 63).  We therefore see that the success and security of the Koreas is 
influenced as much by outside forces as internal ones. 
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Realism’s correlation with human behavioral characteristics is based upon the 
conceptual framework that nations seek security and power. This concept is equally true 
when we consider basic human needs. However, security and power, in the case of 
humans, does not always go as planned. “People seek dominance but most often end up 
subordinate to others” (Lebow, 2010, p. 65) (Morgenthau, 1947, p. 145). “They try to 
repress this unpleasant truth, and those who exercise power effectively employ 
justifications and ideologies to facilitate this process” (Lebow, 2010, p. 65) (Morgenthau, 
1958, p. 59).  This concept of manipulation is as much an example of a human behavioral 
characteristic as it is when applied to nation-states. “Whenever possible they attempt to 
convince those who must submit to their will that they are acting in their interests or 
those of the wider community” (Lebow, 2010, p. 65) (Morgenthau, 1958, p. 59).  Again, 
it is easy to see the correlation of a classic human personality trait being attributed to the 
nation-states actions. 
This presents us with the concept that within a society exists certain individuals 
who will gain power and thereby control others. The security of the masses in a society 
from which these individuals gain power is as much in the hands of the powerful as it is 
in the hands of the individual. This is a direct parallel to the examples previously cited 
regarding the Korean Peninsula. In that scenario, the two nation-states have some 
potential for individual power. However, the overall security and the greatest proportion 
of the power are in the hands of more powerful nations. This is an important concept that 
formed the theoretical principles of the study and speaks to correlation of personality 
development, which is influenced by the social structure in which the entity resides, even 
if that entity is a nation-state. Not only does the study contend that nation-states exhibit 
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personality traits, which are a product of their history, and in direct correlation with the 
behavioral characteristics of the nation’s human population, the study furthermore 
acknowledges that the interaction between nation-states is also a direct parallel to the 
interactions of human beings and their development within their social structures. 
International relations are fundamentally the same as the relationship with human beings 
within society. 
Classical realism paints us with a very dark picture regarding the motivations of 
nations when they deal with the rest of the international community. Within classical 
realism, there exist nations with greater power that in turn have greater influence over the 
course of international interactions. Weaker nations that seek security align themselves 
with these great powers, and through this alignment, to some degree or another, forfeit 
some of their individual power for the sake of security. It is better to experience a little 
subjugation by an ally who provides security than to experience total subjugation by a 
conqueror.  This too is a common personality trait amongst the human population.  
The use of classical realism as a tool to determine how nations will act is, like all 
other political theoretical models, limited by the parameters of which it accepts as the 
norm for national entities, and vague in its evaluation of the deeper reasons why nations 
choose these courses of action. It is fully comprehensible that within society there exists 
individuals who seek greater power and dominion. It is also understandable that within 
society there are those who would prefer security to the attainment of personal influence. 
These two conditions are characteristics that have been part of human society since the 
beginning of time. There have always been leaders and followers. What classical realism, 
59 
 
 
and many other proposed political science theoretical models, fail to explain is the deep 
reason why nations with these characteristics choose one path or the other. 
Classical realism also addresses domestic politics. “For the classical realists, 
transformation is a broader concept, and when associated with processes that we have 
come to describe as modernization, it brings about shifts and identities and discourses 
and, with them, changing concepts of security” (Lebow, 2010, p. 66).  This concept does 
not only mean to describe the transformations of technology that affect the ability of 
nations to defend themselves against aggressors. Domestic modernizations, such as the 
internet, also precipitate shifts and discourses, changes in the perception of personal 
identities, and new frontiers of security. Nevertheless, even within its broadest concept, 
transformation, or for the purpose of this study transition, although responsible for 
changes in our conceptualization of the world around us, does not change the basic need 
for maintaining an identity in achieving security. Modernization may offer new and 
different paths to the achievement of our goals, yet it does nothing to change the basic 
desire to realize our goals.  “Hegel warned of the dangers of a homogenization of society 
arising from equality and universal participation in society. It would sunder traditional 
communities and individual ties to them without providing an alternative source of 
identity” (Lebow, 2010, p. 67) (Hegel, 1977). This thesis by Hegel (1977) would have us 
believe that the identity of the individual directly relates to the community in which 
he/she resides and that homogenization is the byproduct of equality within society and 
the ability of all members of that society to participate equally. It is, however, a 
fundamental conception of this study that the community, or in this case the greater 
nation, receives its identity from the people from within it, not the reverse.  It is the 
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community which derives its identity intrinsically from the individual or group of 
individuals.  The community will take upon itself the behavioral characteristics of those 
that reside within it, as much as the reverse being true. Contrary to the belief of the 
classical realists, transformations and transitions that may in fact affect our 
methodologies or how we go about our daily business, have little effect upon the overall 
ideology of the community, which is a byproduct of historical experience, societal 
structure, and all other factors that shape human identity. 
Yet within the ranks of the classical realists, Morgenthau (1947) presented one of 
the most direct statements which launched the theoretical methodology presented in this 
study when he “repeatedly invoked tragedy and its understanding of human beings as the 
framework for understanding contemporary international relations” (Lebow, 2010, p. 74). 
(Morgenthau, 1947). In a small way, Morgenthau acknowledged the intrinsic importance 
and direct influence of human behavior upon the constructs of society. And, in his 
acknowledgment of his correlation between understanding humans as a precursor for 
understanding international relations, he quite possibly inadvertently proposed the 
potential for studying nations from the perspective of human behavior. 
Structural Realism 
 
Structural Realism, like classical realism, is another school of political theory that 
was instrumental in facilitating the creation of historical behavioral conflict analysis. Few 
political theory models allow for such direct application of its principles to human 
behavior.  Although for the structural realist or neorealist this correlation potentially flies 
in the face of everything they believe, to the neorealist, “human nature has little to do 
with why states want power” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 78). Instead, a neorealist would 
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contend, “It is the structure which forces states to pursue power. Great powers are trapped 
in an iron cage… and have little choice but to compete” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 78).  
However, regardless of the potential objections of the structural realists, this conceptual 
framework was one of the first inspirational connections from which historical behavioral 
conflict profiling emerged.  If a political theory created to reject human behaviors 
influence upon events could regardless be applied to individuals and still provide 
practical explanations for their behavior, then it stood to reason that those characteristics 
traditionally reserved for individual human behavior might be applicable to the behavior 
of nations.  It is in this idea of reciprocity that the study acknowledges the neorealists. 
Historical behavioral conflict profiling, or the use of human characteristic traits to 
code a nation’s actions and thereby create a profile of that nation for the purpose to 
understanding actions, was a direct extension of Hans Morgenthau’s concept that nations 
want power because of human nature (Morgenthau, 1948).  The study agreed with 
Morgenthau’s concept “that everyone is born with a will to power hardwired into them, 
which effectively means that great powers are led by individuals who are bent on having 
their state dominate their rivals” (Morgenthau, 1948) (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 78).  Hence, 
nations take on the personalities of their people and leaders.   
The study’s concept was born when Neorealism’s five assumptions were examined 
from a behavioral perspective rather than a structural one, and the theoretical possibility 
of reciprocity of the assumptions to corresponding human characteristics.  For the 
structural realist, “power is the currency of international politics” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 
78). Formally introduced by John Worrall in 1989, structural realism is a compromise of 
different political theories.  Poincare’s structuralism and Kantian liberalism are two 
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ideologies that helped solidify structural realism.  There is a strong argument that 
regardless of structural realism’s dismissal of human behavior as an influential factor in 
nation-states, if examined, a case could be made that there exists a closer correlation to 
that of human behavior than the neorealist would like to admit, and that the general 
construct of structural realism possesses some very human behavioral traits.  Structural 
realism has five main assumptions, which when examined closely correlate to human 
behavioral traits.  Structural realism, regardless of its suspected objections, is one of the 
primary political theories that offers one of the best demonstrations of the application 
reciprocity of human characteristics to nation-states. 
The first assumption of the structural realist is that “great powers are the main actors 
in world politics” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 79).  The definition of “world power” is not 
dependent only upon military capabilities, as was once the case in the feudal periods of 
human history. Power today translates to influence, which can manifest itself in a number 
of ways.  The economics and the power of a nation’s economy, which exhibits a global 
influence upon other nation’s economies, is a significant measure of power in a 
globalized world. This economic influence can directly translate to political influence, as 
the richest countries dominate the poorer ones.  Yet the same could be said of economics 
in relation to human behavior. Money also directly translates to social influence and 
perceptions of status for the individual.  The economic disparity in today’s society is 
evident, as the wealthy control the economies and thereby the politics of entire nation-
states. To understand this concept of “great powers as main actors in world politics” in 
human rather than nation-state terms, one has only to examine wealth inequality:   
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“Economists define wealth in terms of marketable assets, such as real estate, stocks, 
and bonds, leaving aside consumer durables like cars and household items because they 
are not as readily converted into cash” (Domhoff, 2013). These marketable assets, minus 
debt, in human terms translate to wealth. Domhoff (2013) contends that there are four 
identifiable tenants in the relationship between wealth and power:  
1. “Wealth can be seen as a "resource" that is very useful in exercising power. That's 
obvious when we think of donations to political parties, payments to lobbyists, 
and grants to experts who are employed to think up new policies beneficial to the 
wealthy.” 
2.  “Certain kinds of wealth, such as stock ownership, can be used to control 
corporations, which of course have a major impact on how the society functions.” 
3. “Just as wealth can lead to power, so too can power lead to wealth. Those who 
control a government can use their position to feather their own nests, whether 
that means a favorable land deal for relatives at the local level or a huge federal 
government contract for a new corporation run by friends who will hire you when 
you leave government.” 
4. “There's a fourth way that wealth and power relate. For research purposes, the 
wealth distribution can be seen as the main "value distribution" within the general 
power indicator I call "who benefits.”” 
      Although Domhoff’s (2013) assessment of wealth as it relates to power is 
conceptually obvious, the assessment does show a direct correlation between power 
gained through the accumulation of wealth, allowing a person to become an actor, and 
wealth being one avenue to obtain that goal.  Of course, there are other considerations 
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whenever we think humans and power. Other avenues exist for humans to become 
influential actors, such as education, political capital, and notoriety, yet the overriding 
concept remains.  Nations, like humans, compete for power and there exists a very human 
characteristic of envy in every nation-state. Therefore, a characteristic like envy or 
competitiveness should be identifiable in historical accounts of a nation.  How a nation 
becomes a great actor is no different from how a human becomes a great actor in society.  
The second assumption is that “each state possesses some military capability” 
(Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 79).  The concept is that each state could do harm to another 
through military force.  Within international relations, there exist numerous examples of 
nation-states with military capabilities to one degree or another. This concept of military 
capability is not limited to the nation’s internal capabilities but also extends to its external 
assets or allies. For example, although it is true that North Korea possesses a larger army 
than their Southern counterpart, the position of the South Korean improves via the 
support and alliance with the United States.  Few would argue that the North’s superiority 
in numbers translates to superiority over the South, as the North’s conventional military 
would offer little match for the technological and nuclear capabilities of the U.S.  
Humans also possess the capability to do harm to one another.  Throughout human 
history, there exist many examples of individual alliances, no different in reason or 
complexity than any nation-state alliance, for the purpose to mitigate this characteristic of 
human behavior. Again, a correlation from a political science theory exists when 
compared to human behavior.  There exists the potential in both, and both employ much 
of the same strategies to address the concept. 
65 
 
 
The third assumption of Structural realism is that “a state can never be certain about 
the intentions of other states” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 79).  No conditions in international 
relation or human behavior allow for 100% certainty regarding potential actions. Like 
humans, nation-states are unpredictable. However, the inability to obtain a perfect record 
of insight should not be a deterrent to increasing understanding and thereby improving 
models for predicting possibilities. This third assumption of structural realism is a 
fundamental statement of homogony for everything which humans have dominion over.  
States are unpredictable because humans are, and the behavior of the state is a direct 
reflection of the humans that control it.  This third assumption is a primary basis for the 
hypothesis that nations are measurable through the lens of human behavior 
characteristics.  
The fourth assumption may answer the questions created by the third, and is that “the 
main goal of states is to survive.  States seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the 
autonomy of their domestic political order” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 80).  This desire for 
survival is measurable in the nation-state, as historical accounts bear out actions of 
nations attempting to survive.  The main goal of humans is also survival.  Only in special 
cases, usually due to mental impairments or disease, is this primal behavioral 
characteristic masked in humans. Everything wants to survive.  A social systems survival 
is not a product of that system’s structure, as would be the case of building a structure to 
withstand natural disasters; in the case of a social system, survival is the goal whenever a 
civilization creates a social system.  No one actually creates social systems with the intent 
to fail. 
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This leads us to the final assumption of structural realism: “states are rational actors, 
which… are capable of coming up with sound strategies that maximize their prospects for 
survival” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 80). Of all the assumptions of structural realism, this is 
the most subjective.  It is upon the definition of “rational” which hinges the validity of 
this statement.  What is rational? Mearsheimer contends, “Great powers fear each other 
“and that “the level of fear varies from case to case… and can never be reduced to an 
inconsequential level” (Mearsheimer, 2010, p. 80).  Of all the human behavioral 
characteristics the structural realist would reject, assignment of fear as a motivating factor 
is the one undeniable human characteristic that cannot be based upon structure.  Fear is a 
product of the insecurities exhibited by humans, not inanimate structures. 
 The issue with using structural realism as a basis for explaining why nations act in 
the manner in which they do is the simple fact that structural realism does not specifically 
answer the why. The five fundamental assumptions of structural realism are in and of 
themselves generalities, albeit rational ones. It is one thing to claim that all nations 
primary goal is survival; few would argue against this statement because it is 
fundamentally obvious. What structural realism does not do is define what survival 
means to each individual state. Structural realism also fundamentally limits itself to 
addressing what it defines as world powers. Not every nation aspires to world 
domination. Not every nation works toward dominating world politics. Many nations 
have pressing domestic concerns that need addressing. Structural realism offers little 
insight into these domestic conflicts. This is not to say that there is not a place for 
structural realism in formulating understanding of national actions. However, it is clear 
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that the theory of structural realism, although relatively obvious, does have its limitations 
that the utilization of understanding nations from a behavioral perspective could address. 
Liberalism and Neoliberalism 
 
Liberalism is a theoretical model that examines pathways to peace from the 
foundation that people control nations and people will generally do the right thing. 
Liberalism has many proponents, such as John Locke, Hugo Grotius, and Immanuel Kant 
(Russett, 2010).  Immanuel Kant “believed that the natural process of self-interest could 
impel rational individuals to act as agents to bring a just peace” (Russett, 2010, p. 96).  
Whereas to the neorealist human nature has nothing to do with the motivations of nations, 
Kant’s framework was based on the belief “in the rational qualities of individuals, faith in 
the feasibility of progress in social life, and the conviction that humans, despite their self-
interest, are able to cooperate and construct a more peaceful and harmonious society” 
(Russett, 2010, p. 96).  It is through this concept of the power of human influence from 
which the hypothesis that examining nations through the lens of human behavior was 
conceived.  If, as liberals believe, human nature plays such an important part in the 
decision making of nation-states, why then would the cumulative influence of those 
individuals leave a personality fingerprint that would remain after the individual was 
gone?  Kant’s ideology indirectly promoted the concept of human behavioral 
characteristics being transferable to the identity of the nation-state.  The theory of 
liberalism proposed a concept of a historically perpetual condition of human self-interest.  
In addition, that same self-interest was in fact the controlling factor of nations. Therefore, 
would it not be feasible that the nation itself, over time, would develop its own perpetual 
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homogeny of ideology that would be a reflection of the human self-interest that has 
controlled it? 
If theoretical liberalism was correct, a case therefore exists that the behavioral 
characteristics and personality traits of humans are transferable to their social constructs, 
namely nation-states, and would therefore be interchangeable. Historical conflict 
behavioral profiling accepts this premise and proceeds according to the assumption that if 
it is human self-interest that is the driving factor of the nation-state, then examining the 
nation-state from the perspective of human behavior must then also be valid. In essence, 
if we treat the nation-state not as a social construct but rather as an organism with the 
potential to learn, possessing a potential to exhibit all of the behavioral characteristics of 
human beings, behavioral profiling, as would be done with humans, presents a new 
avenue to gain insight into the actions of that nation-state. Examining a nation-state from 
a behavioral standpoint is the key. Within Kant’s theoretical liberalist society, there 
existed theoretical constraints which are applicable to nations. Realist constraints include 
power ratio, where the argument by most deterrent theorists is that “conflict is best 
prevented by great predominance of power for one side and when that powers unbalanced 
in the outcome of conflict is predictable the weaker side generally will not fight” 
(Russett, 2010, p. 101).  This concept of deterrence is as equally appropriate to human 
behavior as it is to the behavior of nations. Few humans would readily engage in a one on 
one physical confrontation with an obviously superior opponent. Although the realist 
would contend that this common sense application of self-preservation was a construct of 
the nation, the liberalist might argue that this application of self-preservation is a 
reflection of the natural behavioral self-interest of the humans in charge.  
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As was presented earlier, one issue with realism is the theory’s propensity to 
attempt to separate national motivation from the people who run the nation.  However, 
recent events may call into question the liberalist self-preservation model, as intra-state 
organizations, such as Al Qaeda and ISIS, blatantly challenge the great powers to 
intervene in their areas of operation. Nevertheless, this study proposes that these terrorist 
organizations are in and of themselves constructs of society, and therefore would have the 
same behavioral characteristic potential as nation-states, the theory being that the size of 
the construct is not as important as the purpose of the construct. Therefore, if the theory is 
proven out in the research data, and nation-states as constructs of society do inherit 
personality traits over time from which they are conditioned to remain within the 
parameters those traits impose, looking at the terrorist organization from the same 
perspective might also be possible. This concept is also reserved for further research.  
Another realist constraint that enters into liberalism is the concept of allies. 
“Allies share important strategic security interests. If they have military disputes among 
themselves they risk weakening their common front against a country each perceives as 
an enemy” (Russett, 2010, p. 102).  Again, the concept of allies maintains a parallel 
reciprocity to the human concept of friends. As is the case with nations who share 
interests, common human behavior creates bonds between individuals who also have 
shared interests. Therefore, it makes sense that when examining a concept of analysis as 
it pertains to the nation, it is appropriate to apply behavioral characteristics normally 
found in human beings as it pertains to the human interaction between friends. National 
allies and human friends not only have a direct correlation in their behavioral interaction, 
but are fundamentally the same in their dynamic. With this in mind, if we were to 
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examine the concept and dynamic of allied states from the perspective of the interaction 
between human friends, a deeper understanding would be possible. 
The final realist consideration in the liberalism constraints is that of distance and 
size. “Distance makes it harder and more expensive to exert military power. Neighbors 
can readily fight, and are more likely to have competing interest for territory, control of 
natural resources, or common ethnic groups that may provoke conflict” (Russett, 2010, p. 
102).  In today’s world, linear distance is less a factor than it was in the 1950s, as 
technology now allows for easier traversing of greater distances more economically. 
However, the theory that proximity leads to potential competition is a very real 
consideration. Borders are arbitrary things. In addition, the shared border can lead to 
tensions, as has been exhibited between the United States and Mexico and the influx of 
illegal aliens. However, even this concept is not foreign to human behavior, as the 
argument has been made that “Good fences make good neighbors”.  The overriding 
concept of land and resource rights has been a common theme in many human conflicts. 
Russett (2010) makes an argument against realist constraints when he points out 
that “Liberal institutionalist, however, insisted the realist perspective does not exhaust the 
list of constraints on war over which states can and do exercise some control” (Russett, 
2010, p. 102).  Kantian theorist believed that other constraints also exist, the first of 
which is democracy. Kantian influence suggests “That democracies will rarely fight or 
even threaten each other. Democracies may also be more peaceful than all other kinds of 
states” (Russett, 2010, p. 102).  Although this concept may be essentially true, the issue 
with this constraint flies in the definition of democracy. In today’s world, numerous 
governments claim to be democratic. If we define democracy as a governmental structure 
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that allows its constituency to elect representatives to a parliamentary or congressional 
legislature that carries out the will of the populace, then there exists quite a number of 
democracies.  
The problem with defining democracy from the liberalist point of view is 
embracing a definition which encompasses the range of democratic values employed by 
the different democratic structures that exist today. The structure of the Russian Dumas 
and the Iranian parliament, and the way in which those bodies select representatives, bear 
a striking resemblance to the United States Congress and the British Parliament. 
However, the level at which the Russian Dumas and Iranian parliament legislate free of 
hindrance from other governmental bodies could be argued as an example of shadow or 
paper democracies. However, the two-party system utilized in the United States might 
create as great a hindrance through the gridlock it creates. Accurately defining democracy 
is a subjective exercise in attempting to define individual freedom. Within the context of 
both concepts, there exists a wide range of interpretations. For this reason, the Kantian 
constraint of democracies being generally peaceful toward each other may be a concept 
that requires more defined parameters and appropriate revision. 
Whereas Domhoff’s (2013) examples used in the structural realism section are 
catalysts for potential conflict, from the liberalist point of view, economics and trade 
“may result in greater mutual understanding, empathy, and mutual identity across 
boundaries” (Russett, 2010, p. 103). In addition, “Sustained commercial interaction 
becomes a medium of communication whereby information about needs and preferences 
are exchanged, across the broad range of matters ranging well beyond the specific 
commercial exchange” (Russett, 2010, p. 103). The concept that violence is bad for 
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business and has the potential to disrupt mutually profitable and beneficial commercial 
exchanges is a valid point. However, as Domhoff (2013) pointed out in his evaluation of 
the disparity of wealth distribution, potential disparities also have a destabilizing effect 
upon nations. Positive economic relations are reliant upon both parties believing that the 
relationship promotes parity. Once the concept of parity is breached, as has occasionally 
been the case between China and the United States, tariff wars, trade sanctions, and 
reduced cooperation can lead to strained relationships.  Fair play is equally as relevant to 
human behavioral as it is in Kant’s worldview. Although everyone wants to be dealt with 
in a fair manner, be they individual or nation-state, the definition of fair is the personality 
trait that is theorized as transferable in the study’s model. Both Russia and the United 
States want to be treated fair; however, their individual concept of the definition of fair is 
reliant upon the historic definitions transferred from their histories, and not some 
universal definition as Kant would like us to believe. 
The final Kantian constraint is that of international organizations. Although 
organizations such as the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund are designed 
to be mutually beneficial and accessible to all nations, they too are constructs of society, 
which in turn is a construct of human behavior. The constraint of international 
organizations has little correlation with the research study. It is presented here only for 
the purpose of completeness when listing the Kantian constraints.  However, if the 
theoretical model is proven, successful organizations, like the United Nations, might be 
examinable from the prospective of the study.  As in the case of Al Qaeda and ISIS, that 
examination would be for a later research study.  
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As stated earlier, liberalism attempts to define a pathway from which nations may 
coexist peacefully. Unlike realism and structural realism, which attempt to explain why 
nations act the way they act, liberalism attempts to define how nations should act. 
However, liberalism and its concepts have the same correlation to human behavior 
characteristics as does realism and structural realism. In fact, liberalism would probably 
embrace the parallel far more enthusiastically than proponents of the other two theories 
would. Liberalism promotes community, cooperation, mutual interests, and the 
recognition of the benefits of peaceful existence, all valid constructs in the ideology of 
human behavior. Liberalism looks at potential rather than explanation or predictions. 
Still, the concept of liberalism is still important to understand when in conjunction with 
the research being presented here. Historical behavioral conflict profiling is more about 
understanding, with understanding utilized to both explain and potentially predict. 
Nevertheless, the study seeks to offer an opportunity to realize the liberalism view of the 
potential through that understanding for peace. 
There might be those who would argue that the study is nothing more than an 
extension of liberalist views, that the study is based upon liberal idealism and the belief in 
human nature and that natures influence upon international events.  The study would 
counter argue that although the theory of human behavioral characteristics being an 
influencing factor is based on liberal ideology, the research does not accept the definition 
parameters liberalism sets upon those characteristics. As framed earlier, the bias of the 
study exists within the definition of the behavioral characteristics being searched for.  
The characteristics are a reflection of the researcher’s definition of the characteristics 
identified.  For this reason, the research limits itself to identification of behavioral traits 
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that are not broadly defined, such as goodness, which has the potential to be broadly 
defined, depending upon whom you ask.  Rather, the characteristic of organized, which 
has a more definitive value, would be a characteristics focus. Therefore, although the 
research may have underpinnings that exist within liberalism, such as the belief that 
human behavioral characteristics have influence in the international arena, the study is 
not limited to the liberal definitions or ideologies regarding those characteristics.   
Although neoliberalism is almost the diametric opposite of structural liberalism, 
neoliberalism also looks to structure and international institutions as the driving forces of 
international relations. “The central concern of neoliberalism involves how to achieve 
cooperation among states and other actors in the international system” (Folker, 2010, p. 
117). Within the concept of international institutions, neoliberalism embraces broad 
themes in which to explain how these institutions are capable of influencing international 
relations (Folker, 2010). Bargaining, deflection, and autonomy are areas in which the 
design of institutions forms their ability to work within the international arena.  
Once again, we are presented with a political theory which seems destined to 
ignore the fact that these international institutions, like nations, are constructs of society 
and thereby a construct of human beings. The neoliberal would seem to believe that once 
an international institution is created, it develops a life of its own removed from its 
creators. Also, as is the case with other political theory, neoliberalism is concerned with 
how these international institutions function rather than why. It is not enough to simply 
identify bargaining or deflection as tools for the international organization to navigate 
international relations, nor is it enough to embrace the overall concept of cooperation as a 
fundamentally basic characteristic in which the world of the neoliberal is realized. It must 
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be accepted that international institutions, like nations, do not act independent of those 
the control them. And, although cooperation is an honorable methodology for achieving 
goals, the ability to obtain cooperation must take into account the behavioral 
characteristics of those seeking cooperation and those of which cooperation is sought. 
Marxism and Critical Theory 
 
Within the theory of Marxism there exist a number of tenants which acknowledge 
the importance of the human behavioral characteristics when examining society. 
According to Rupert (2010), “Marx posited a relational and process oriented view of 
human beings. On this view, humans are what they are not because it is hardwired into 
them to be self-interested individuals, but by virtue of relations from which they live their 
lives” (p. 159). The study rejects this stringent view of the individual condition. Instead, 
the study believes that humans are hardwired to be self-interested individuals but are also 
products of their lived experiences. It is this combination of nurture and nature which 
makes human beings what they are. The thesis of this study postulates that nations are 
self-interested because the individuals that created them are self-interested, yet nations 
also exhibit characteristics that are a product of that nation’s experience and therefore 
embedded constructs into the nation’s identity. From the Marxist point of view, because 
these characteristics are not hardwired into the individual or the nation, there exists the 
possibilities for both to organize themselves differently into a utopian model. 
For the purpose of this study, Marxism and critical theory’s preoccupation with 
capitalism offers little more insight than the perception of the human condition mentioned 
above. However, Marxism, unlike other theoretical constructs within political theory, 
acknowledges at some level the participation level of human behavior with regards to the 
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political forces in which they are encased. Marxism and critical theory exist as significant 
critiques of the social systems in which modern society is presently designed. The 
purpose of this study is not to criticize the social system, but rather to understand in the 
behavioral level of the workings of that social system in which we live.   
However, Marxism may have relevance to the study, not in the venue of human 
behavior, but rather in its critique of social structures in which individuals live. If we 
transfer Marxist ideology from the individual and the class struggle in which the Marxist 
theory attributes all ills of society, “The history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of class struggle” (M. Spencer, 1985, p. 225), and apply them to nation-states and 
the social structure in which nations exist, then the struggles of the differing classes 
within the nation-state community might present a valuable component to the 
development of behavioral characteristics and personality traits the state might exhibit as 
a result of its experiences. The study concedes that the position a nation-state occupies 
within the community of nations is a potentially influential factor for identity 
development. 
Constructivism and Rationalism 
 
One of the fundamental concepts of the study is that the nation state is itself a 
construct. “The idea that international relations is a social construction can be thought 
about in quite simple terms. To construct something is an act which brings into being a 
subject or object that otherwise would not exist” (Fierke, 2010, p. 179). Without human 
beings to construct it, the nation-state would not exist. Where constructivism diverges 
from the theoretical basis of the study is the value of the individual to its context, as 
“Once constructed, each of these objects has a particular meaning in use within the 
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context. They are social constructs in so far as their shape and form is imbued with social 
values, norms, and assumptions rather than being the product of purely individual thought 
or meaning” (Fierke, 2010, p. 179). The study would contend that social values, norms, 
and assumptions are the products of individual thought, the thought of the individuals 
who construct them. The definition of meaning is understood by the construct and is 
parallel to the definition of the meaning of the entities that construct it.  
“Constructivists have highlighted several themes. First, the idea of social 
construction suggests difference across context rather than a single object reality. 
Constructivists have sought to explain and understand change at the international level” 
(Fierke, 2010, p. 179). However, from the constructivist point of view, the explanation 
and understanding of change lies within the construct itself rather than the society from 
which it was designed. “Constructivists have emphasized the social dimensions of 
international relations, and have demonstrated the importance of norms, rules, and 
language at this level” (Fierke, 2010, p. 179). The concept that constructivists 
acknowledge social dimensions in international relations and the importance of facets of 
norms, rules and language bring into question where constructivists believe these facets 
emanate from, if not from individual thought and perceived meaning.  
For the purpose of this study, the general hypothesis is that the ontology of the 
state cannot be separated from the ontology of the human being and therefore the state 
will exhibit the behavioral characteristics of the humans which constructed it. “Ontology 
is a word originating with metaphysics, which refers to the nature of being in focuses on 
the types of objects the world is composed of. Rationalists theories of international 
relations have an individual ontology insofar as the basic unit of analysis is the individual 
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(whether human or state)” (Fierke, 2010, p. 180). This rationalist view is partially in line 
with the study’s thesis. However, the rationalist would seem to make the delineation 
between the human and the state. “Constructivists have questioned the individual 
ontology of rationalism and emphasized instead a social ontology. As fundamentally 
social beings, individuals or states cannot be separated from the context of normative 
meaning which shapes who they are and the possibilities available to them” (Fierke, 
2010, p. 181). Again, in some ways, the constructivist’s ideology is in line with the 
study’s ideology. The diversion comes from a constructivist’s attitude that there is a 
difference between social ontology and an individual ontology.  
The study does not deny the importance of interests, but rather believes that 
interests help shape the behavioral characteristics of the individual and thereby the state. 
“Rationalists assume a static world of asocial egotists who are primarily concerned with 
material interests” (Fierke, 2010, p. 182). “While constructivists would not deny the 
importance of interests, they would tie them more directly to the identity of the subject. 
Neither identity nor interest can be detached from a world of social meaning” (Fierke, 
2010, p. 182). Therefore, these interests can be discovered through the examination of the 
behavioral characteristics of the subject. To clarify, the study makes no delineation 
between the individual, the state, or the subject. Thus when reference is made to the 
subject in regards to behavior characteristics, there is no separation between the 
individual and the state.  
“Many constructivists… Refer to the hermeneutic theme that action must always 
be understood from within, and thus, that social meaning is a function of what is in 
people’s heads” (Fierke, 2010, p. 183) (Adler, 1997, p. 326). Again, constructivists seem 
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to muddy the waters as to where they believe meaning actually comes from. On one 
hand, they claim that meaning is a product of social identity and therefore within the 
purview of society. On the other hand, they claim that social meaning is a function of 
what people think. It is important for us to understand where social theory makes these 
delineations. If in fact as the study postulates no delineation can be made, then it is 
logical to assume that the characteristics of human beings can be used as a basis from 
which to define the characteristics of the state. The study seeks understanding at the 
behavioral level. This concept exists within the German term verstehen. “The emphasis 
on verstehen (understanding) highlights a similarity and difference between the 
rationalists and constructivists. The difference is the former emphasize the individual of 
the letter emphasizes the social” (Fierke, 2010, p. 183). Within this delineation, it would 
be appropriate to assume the study follows more the rationalist point of view than that of 
the constructivist. However, in reality, the study’s point of view makes no separation 
between the individual, the social, and the state. 
Post Structuralism 
 
Post-structuralism provides little constructive discourse to the debate between the 
validity of political theory as a vehicle for better understanding of international relations 
where the potential of new models designed to highlight behaviorism is a foundation for 
studying national motivations. “Every way of understanding international politics 
depends upon abstraction, representation, and interpretation” (Campbell, 2010, p. 214).  
The application of historical conflict behavioral profiling is an exercise in utilizing the 
abstract to a social construct represented by the state and the interpretation and 
understanding of that construct through the eyes of the previously abstract. “Political 
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leaders, social activists, scholars, and students are all involved in the interpretation of the 
world whether they engage in the practice, theory, or study of international relations” 
(Campbell, 2010, p. 214). The study proposes a new methodology and new perspective 
from which those who are attempting to interpret the world may make new 
epistemological models of understanding. “The dominant interpretations of the world 
have been established by the discipline of international relations, which traditionally talks 
of states and their policymakers pursuing interest in providing security, of economic 
relations and the material effects, of the rights of those were being badly treated” 
(Campbell, 2010, p. 214).  
“International relations as discipline map the world. However, it is only the 
critical perspectives and post structuralism in particular which make the issues of 
interpretation and representation, power knowledge, and the politics of identity central” 
(Campbell, 2010, pp. 215 - 216). Somewhat in line with this structuralism perspective, 
the methodology of the study seeks to present the identity of the state is central, the 
difference being that the employment of the theoretical principles of the study believes 
that the identity of the state can be discovered, and that identity exists within the 
identities of the people who created it.  
Russia within the Structure of International Society and Unbalanced 
Influence 
 
The structure of civil society has changed little over the past millennium.  Arbitrary 
nation-states exist with a neo-realistic desire for survival (Mearsheimer, 2010, pp. 77 - 
92). The type of geopolitical structure in which society resides lends credence to a world 
that experiences conflict, as nations compete for resources, influence, and power. Within 
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this system of nation-states with their arbitrary borders that are the sole creation of 
society, there exists a group of influential actors, otherwise known as world powers or 
superpowers.  These powerful nation-states command significant and arguably 
disproportional influence upon international affairs.  Today’s world is one in which there 
exists those nations that have and those that don’t. Disproportionality of influence is an 
unfortunate yet present factor in international relations. The disproportional amount of 
influence that perceived world powers have, and their ability to exert it in cases of 
international conflict, is a factor that drives our need to understand their motivations. 
Even in political systems designed to give voice to all nations, such the United Nations, 
the permanent members of United Nations Security Council by charter receive 
disproportional influence.  “The Security Council, while formally equal to other principal 
organs of the UN, bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security” (Malone, 2007, p. 117).  
The five permanent members, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
and Russia, are the key representatives with the power to each unilaterally determine the 
course of the world diplomatic body’s responses, or lack thereof, in any of these 
conflicts.  Any one of these five nations within the United Nations can unilaterally 
influence the actions of the entire U.N. Through their assent and cooperation, within this 
group exists the ability to effectively tackle almost any conflict situation. However, using 
their unchallengeable veto prerogative, these same nations can become a roadblock to 
any effective United Nations response (Malone, 2007).  Some would argue that it is this 
unbalanced system employed by the United Nations negates its abilities, thereby reducing 
its importance. Few would argue against the claim that the current system of governance 
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within the United Nations grants a minority of nations or a single nation the power to 
decide policy, and control actions in a unilateral manner, which at times has caused a 
contentious relationship with the General Assembly (Malone, 2007, p. 117). Because of 
the power of the veto, a power that extends above the desire of the majority, the United 
Nations is a body with a limited ability to deal effectively with the pressing issues of 
international conflict.   
The purpose of this dissertation is not to argue the merits of the United Nations 
system, but rather to accept the precept as a given undisputable fact of current society 
within which conflict scholars must work. Disproportionality exists. The study accepts 
the principle as fact that within the international community there exist certain nations 
with unbalanced influence over world events.  Since the premise of unbalanced influence 
exists within international relations, potential proactive and reactive engagement of 
conflict resolution requires scholars to gain greater understanding of the motivations of 
those nations with the most influence. The example of the United Nations presented here 
exists to both identify Russia’s position in the international community and provide an 
international body in which Russian responses to international conflict is measurable. 
Russia, the nation-state of which the study shall focus, is one of the permanent members 
of the Security Council. It is also presented as an example of the structure of the 
international society in which we live, a structure with a dynamic not unlike many social 
dynamics existent in individual interactions. It is these factors that the study believes are 
influencing factors contributing to the behavioral profile of a nation-state.   
It is Russian international relevance and its position of a counterbalance to western 
ideologies that are the primary factors making understanding Russian foreign policy an 
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important topic for conflict scholars. There is no evidence to suggest that either of these 
conditions will change in the near future. Therefore, entering into a study which could 
potentially give new insight to Russian foreign policy motivations, is a worthwhile 
endeavor.  By utilizing that information, it may become possible to predict the potential 
obstacles to peace in a world facing a plethora of international conflicts. 
Those that measure influence in military terms might point to the Russian military’s 
loss of many of the resources controlled by the old Soviet Union, including a portion of 
their nuclear arsenal, forfeited in the disbanding of the Union, as a signal in a reduction of 
influence.  This reduction in military power has led many to signal a decline in regards to 
Russian international influence and power (Bennett, 2012). The perception that the 
current Russian Federation’s military ability is inferior to the old Soviet Union, and 
therefore no match for the remaining superpower, the United States, is also a subjective 
opinion. Facts are that Russia maintains a formidable military presence, and although 
reduced in numbers, a potentially devastating nuclear arsenal (Bennett, 2012). Measuring 
world influence through the lens of a nation’s military capability does not always 
translate proportionally to political influence.   
Like military strength, economic strength is not a good unit of measurement for the 
argument that proportionally equates to influence. To determine a nation’s influence, we 
must examine their ability to affect world events. The extent to which other nations react 
is proportional to the amount of influence a nation-state has. The loss of a subjective 
classification, such as the perceived vulnerability of the current Russian economy or the 
reduction of nuclear capability, cannot diminish Russian importance in world politics. 
Following the break-up of the Soviet Union there have been acknowledged difficulties in 
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Russia’s transition to a more democratic and capitalistic social structure.  However, 
Russia continues to evolve. This evolution process possibly contributed to Russia losing 
the classification of world superpower. Nevertheless, this is a subjective classification 
from the Cold War, and its subjectivity is dependent upon the criteria of the discipline 
making the classification.  
The presentation of Russia as an influential player in the social structure of world 
politics is presented here as further clarification of the hierarchal structure of world 
society.  A nation’s position within that structure as higher or lower is hypothesized as 
having a direct influence upon a nations behavioral characteristics. Therefore, if the 
world is to maintain any hope of experiencing any resemblance of long lasting peace, 
conflict scholars must understand the major players in world politics.  It is not enough to 
focus and understand the region or the direct parties involved in the conflict; the greater 
society of nations must be factored in. Scholars and practitioners must also be cognizant 
of those outside forces that have sway over international politics. The current structure of 
society necessarily directs the efforts of conflict analysis scholars interested in mitigating 
world and intra-state conflict on a macro scale to examine the source of the conflict.  
However, to be fully successful, conflict scholars must also concentrate their efforts 
beyond the actors directly involved in conflict and dedicate efforts to understanding 
external actors and their motivations.  The motivations of external influences are an 
important secondary concern regarding the overall conflict, yet it is a necessary 
component if we are to reach full resolution. Increasing our understanding of those 
nation-states with the most influence on potential conflict creates new pathways to 
resolution.  Increasing our understanding of all factors with the potential for influence 
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upon a conflict further assists conflict analysis scholars and resolution practitioners 
through a more global perspective.  From the proactive conflict mitigation perspective, 
taking a more global approach lends to the recognition of areas where the potential 
preambles of conflict exist.  
Throughout history, political scientist, sociologists, conflict and peace study experts, 
and a myriad of scholars from other disciplines from within the social sciences have 
offered theories to explain socio/political behavior (Dunne et al., 2010).  Some have 
utilized history as a basis for their hypothesis; this dissertation is a continuation of that 
endeavor. Russia and her continued prominence on the world stage make it vital for 
conflict scholars to study and understand Russian motivations and historical homogeny, if 
this homogeny exists.  Russian foreign policy, not unlike the foreign policies of other 
nations, is a product of these motivations and this study will examine and postulate a 
theorized national political homogeny of ideology, which Russia consistently employs.   
Russia has historically provided an ideological counterbalance to the western areas of 
Europe and the United States throughout the 20
th
 and 21
st 
centuries.  From the overthrow 
of the Czarist monarchy and the beginnings of the communist system in the beginning of 
the 20
th
 century (McCollum, 2010), to the uneasy alliance with the west against the Nazis 
during World War II, to the propagation of the Cold War following World War II, Russia 
has proved an enigma for foreign policy experts to decipher. Today, a new Russian 
Federation has emerged from the ashes of the old Soviet Union, begging the question if 
the new Russia will be different from the old. 
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Russian foreign policy can be an enigma to observers looking in from outside the 
halls of Russian power. Correctly determining Russian motivations for their actions in 
world events has been an ever tantalizing, and more often than not, occasional source of 
frustration for western nations and policy makers, as is evident with the current Ukrainian 
conflict. To understand current Russian foreign policy, the study postulates that rather 
than rely upon speculation based upon subjective opinions of diplomatic experts and 
pundits, it would be advantageous to examine Russia’s motivations from the past. 
Examination of the past in an effort to determine if a consistent theme exists may offer a 
motivational pattern and thereby a clearer picture to the events of today.  This 
examination looks to offer the advantage of potential insight into Russian actions in the 
future.   
However, it is necessary to frame the concept of unbalanced influence as a matter of 
example. Russia is one of a few select nations that continue to maintain a prominent 
position in world affairs.  Russia’s ability to influence world politics has cemented her 
position of importance on the world stage.  Russia’s influence extends to all aspects of 
international relations, including the ability to sway, negate, or create international 
conflict. Understanding Russian foreign policy and identifying those dynamics that 
influence the decisions of the current Russian government is a vital component for 
developing proactive and reactive strategies to address world conflict.  Conflict scholars, 
political scientists, and diplomats must accept that today’s Russian Federation is as 
equally relevant to present day world events as was the Soviet Union prior to its break-up 
in the 1980’s.   
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Political importance is arguably a matter of perception.  How opponents in 
international relations perceive each other determines a nation’s status and potential 
influence upon world affairs. The exercise of collaborating and partnering with other 
nations is, in many cases, a sign of mutual respect and a perceived potential for mutual 
benefits.  Therefore, an example wherein an elite group of nations extends the hand of 
cooperation to another nation whose current condition would almost seem to disqualify 
its inclusion in the elite groups ranks, speaks volumes as to the respect that elite group 
holds the invitee and the influence the nation has.  The Russian inclusion in the former 
G8 speaks to that power and respect. 
In the discipline of economics, some economists might contend that following the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, the lackluster performance of the new capitalistic Russian 
economy has reduced Russian influence (Shaolie, 2014).  Although current Russian 
exports and the development of sustainable industry lag behind expectations, during the 
Soviet period the demand for the export of Russian goods never rivaled the industrial 
powers. Russian economic influence continues today, not because of what it offers the 
world in exports, but because of what it requires of the world in imports. This import- 
export imbalance retains Russian influence to the rest of the world’s economies.  
 It is arguable that the lackluster Russian economy may not have warranted its 
inclusion into the former G7, which would later become the G8; however, respect for 
Russian impact and standing in the world did. This influence allowed for Russian de-
facto inclusion in the elite club, and the expansion of the G7 to the G8.  Only recently did 
the G8 revoke Russia’s honorary membership into the working group of the largest 
economies.  Russia’s removal from the elite G8 took an international crisis. Following 
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the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the violation of that nation’s sovereignty, the other 
members of the G8 still required careful consideration and a united front before deciding 
on Russia’s ouster. In 2014, the other members of the G8, the United States, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, France, Japan, Canada, and Italy, unanimously revoked Russia’s 
membership, in protest of Russian involvement in the destabilization of the Ukraine 
(Cohen, 2014). This expulsion does not negate that Russia, whose economy might not 
have warranted inclusion into this elite club, was still invited.  During Russia’s period of 
inclusion, she was an influential member, regardless of a struggling economy.  The 
importance of this section will become clear following the conclusions of chapter 5.  
Inferences for Forthcoming Study 
 
The political theories which have been examined in this chapter are presented as 
examples of the parallels of many of the concepts that exist within these theories to the 
concepts of behavioral science as is utilized in the methodology of profiling. The study 
embraces the premise that if political theories, which are designed to explain, predict, and 
in some cases promote the actions of nations, have a correlation with the characteristics 
of human behavior, the methodology of profiling is therefore appropriate for its 
application to increase the epistemology of international politics. Many of the theories 
presented in this chapter make an explicit distinction between the nation and its people. 
The study contends that this delineation is far less defined than political theorists 
would have us believe. A nation is a human construct. It is created by human beings for 
the purpose of stabilizing the current definition of social order. As a human construct, it 
therefore also possesses many of the characteristics of the humans that created it, 
administer it, and live within it. There can be no full understanding of a nation’s action 
89 
 
 
without the acceptance of this fundamental principle. Therefore, is we accept the nation 
as an outgrowth of the human condition; it consequently stands to reason that the nation 
can be evaluated under the guidelines of the characteristics of human beings. Nations as a 
structure do not have the ability to act unilaterally without the directions of the people 
who control them. The study further infers that a nation, like a human being, is a product 
of his/her historic experiences, and that those experiences can create homogeny, deeply 
embedded within the nation’s culture, that is resistant to the effects of transition or the 
current governance structure. If we thus examine the nation from the perspective of 
human behavior, creating homogeny, we can obtain greater epistemology. Only through 
the utilization of behavioral characteristics normally assigned to the human being can this 
deep understanding be obtained. 
Although the theorists of political science might argue that the theories they 
present are a reflection of the greater complexity of the nation and are therefore too 
diverse to allow for simple human behavioral characteristics to be applicable, when we 
examine almost every portion of their theory, the reciprocity of application becomes 
obvious. It is subsequently the researcher’s intention to treat the nation-state as an 
individual, consider transitions and conflicts as individual life events experienced by that 
individual, and create a behavioral profile that, if used in conjunction with current 
political theory, offers the potential for a deeper understanding of our global society. 
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework for Forthcoming Study 
 
This research will focus upon the nation-state of Russia as the general subject, in an 
effort to discover if the designed methodology can identify behavioral characteristics.  
The study’s application of the proposed methodology on the subject of Russia is 
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deliberate, as Russia is primarily influential in international conflict. Russia also has a 
diverse history, which presents a plethora of data extractable through historical accounts.  
This diverse history, through close examination, permits for the application of national 
behavioral profiling.  The methodology will focus upon a historiography case study of 
Russian foreign and domestic policy in times of conflict. The study design looks at those 
elements of Russian political and social society which influences it, in the hope that the 
approach can identify behavioral characteristics, previously unknown, and that correlate 
to actions taken during conflict situations.  
The proposed qualitative research methodology of nation-state behavioral profiling is 
designed to discover these characteristics from a perspective not traditionally employed 
by international conflict analysis scholars or political scientists. The perspective is one of 
identifying those behavioral and personality characteristics traditionally associated to 
human behavior existent within the nation-state. The methodology examines the subjects 
from the lens of traditional human behavioral and personality characteristics. Finally, the 
sum of the data findings presents a behavioral characteristic profile of the subject. It is 
therefore this study’s approach to engage in this different scientific methodology.  The 
study will measure the theory’s validity through conclusions derived from historical 
evidence and comparison to human behavioral and personality characteristics.  
First, a subject nation needed selection.  For the purpose of this study, Russia is the 
selected subject nation.  Secondly, parameters of history in which a comparative study 
could be conducted required selection.  Foreign and domestic conflict situations, under a 
consistent set of parameters which included a period of significant historic transition, 
were selected.  Finally, a separate set of hypothetical questions from which the 
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methodology could focus its inquiry and that were directly relatable to the subject nation 
required creation.  These secondary hypotheses will be labeled as benchmark hypotheses, 
which exist to provide the research inquiry with direction. These secondary research 
questions are not the main focus of the study; they do, however, set the parameters of the 
line of inquiry from which the research is conducted.   
1. Major social/political transitions should disrupt, in a measurable way, existing 
homogenies. During periods of conflict, social and political transitions have 
historically exhibited influences upon other nation’s ideologies undergoing the 
same relative transitions. 
2. Unlike other nations that have experienced disruption of their ideological 
homogenies during transitional periods, within Russia, transitions historically 
exhibit no lasting influence on this ideological homogeny. Russia has exhibited no 
parallel impact upon the proposed Russian homogony, and conflict has not altered 
this homogeny.   
These benchmark hypotheses are based upon the fact that despite the political 
transition following the Soviet Union collapse, Russia continues to show considerable 
influence upon world events, and a consistent utilization of this ideological homogeny.  
To identify the existence of any ideological homogeny that influences Russian policy 
and actions, we must identify and study any social and political phenomenon that might 
disrupt this homogeny.  This study postulates that periods of political and social transition 
traditionally exhibit the greatest potential to influence and change a nation’s ideology.  
Transitions therefore should have the greatest potential to affect the ideology or disrupt 
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homogony of national policies utilized when dealing with the international community.  
The effect of transitions should be most evident on a national foreign policy ideology, 
specifically during periods of conflict.  This dissertation will study cases from historical 
periods that exhibited specific transitions in social and political events in Russia.  The 
transitions examined have historical parallels and have resulted in policy shifts when 
similar transitions occurred in other nations. Therefore, if a homogony exists and the 
methodology can identify it, even during periods of transition which should potentially 
disrupt the homogony, then the existence of the homogony is valid and the methodology 
is likewise valid.    
1. Nation-states possess behavioral characteristics. These characteristics exist and 
are discoverable through a comprehensive profile examination of the elements of 
the nation-state and its consequential actions. 
Unlike the claim proposed by many of the political theorists, there is no 
conceptual division between a nation and human beings. Nations act the way they do 
because human beings tell them how to act. Because this condition exists, nations 
possess personalities in the same manner as human beings do. and over time, those 
personalities become an integral part of the nation’s identity, which it is difficult for 
the nation to diverge from. The personalities of nations will exhibit behavioral 
characteristics that are measurable through profile examination in the same manner as 
human behavioral characteristics. 
2. Transitions to a nation-states political, social, and/or economic system directly 
affect that nation’s foreign policy ideology.  Major political, social, or economic 
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structure transitions make nation-states vulnerable, or susceptible to ideological 
shifts. 
The theoretical premise is that when a nation-state undergoes a major shift in 
domestic, political, and or economic structure, the nation’s foreign policy should shift 
ideologically facilitate this transition. Therefore, theoretically, a nation that shifts from a 
dictatorship to a democracy should exhibit an ideological change in foreign and/or 
domestic policy.  The theory garners its basis from the perception that the ideology of a 
dictatorship is inherently different from the ideology of a monarchy or democracy, and 
that these differences in ideology directly correspond to policy dissimilarities. Although 
the study will concede that shifts in political, social or economic ideology might 
influence the methodology of a nation’s approach to foreign or domestic policy or 
conflict situations, these transitions do not necessarily have a universal effect upon the 
ideology of conflict engagement. The dissertation proposes that transitions can, in some 
cases, exhibit no effect upon the overall ideology of the state’s international motivations 
or approach to conflict.   Transitions in politics, society, and economics may or may not 
influence how a nation-state engages internationally. Therefore, what influences that 
nation to action, the core ideology of the state, in some historic cases is immune to 
transition and thus can remain the same, even in cases of dramatic social, political, and 
economic transition.  
3. International and domestic involvement and the motivational drivers that 
influence those actions directly relate to the system of governance the nation-state 
employs. 
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The type of government employed by a nation-state is directly relatable to the state’s 
foreign policy and domestic actions.  The foreign policy ideology of a democracy, 
therefore, would be different from that of a dictatorship.  How a state engages conflict is 
directly relatable to these ideologies, thus conflict resolution and foreign policy is directly 
influenced by the system of governance the state employs.   
The study rejects this premise, as a democracy and a dictatorship could both engage 
in colonialism as a foreign policy. The needs of the state are a more accurate indicator of 
foreign policy ideology than the governance system a state uses, and even as the state 
changes governing systems, the overall needs of the state remain generally constant.  A 
state lacking access to a port, for example, still lacks that access, regardless of the system 
of government employed. The availability and need for resources will not necessarily 
directly affect the government structure. Although changes in economic priorities 
engaged by a new governing system could directly influence the level of need for 
different resources and thereby foreign policy concerns, economic needs rather than 
government structure hold direct influence over this.   
Domestically, both the democracy and dictatorship might engage a similar ideology 
of governance.  Both the democracy and the dictatorship might be based upon a 
theocratic system of governance.  In domestic matters, the prevailing issue is the 
conceptual theory that in democracies, citizens are afforded inherently more freedoms.  
The issue with this theory is in the concept of freedom and the definition of what 
constitutes that freedom. This study challenges the opinion that the inherent freedoms 
that exist in a democracy are greater than those in a monarchy or dictatorship. All forms 
of government can engage in repressive behavior against its populace to equal degrees.  
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Voting rights of the constituency are not parallel to the level of repression exercised by a 
government. 
All governments use force to address conflict, either domestic or foreign.  The level 
of force, and the concept of proportionality of force, is subjective, and thus a poor litmus 
test for identifying a governing structures ideology.  However, the concept of 
proportionality in dealing with conflict is not the issue; what is at issue is the 
methodology of conflict engagement.  
4. The leader of a nation –state, monarch, dictator, or president can independently 
change the domestic and foreign policy ideology of the state. 
The personality of the person in charge of a nation-states government can override the 
historic ideology of a state.  Who is in charge does matter. However, the study proposes 
that when there exists an embedded personality and associated behavioral traits within a 
nation-state, these traits limit the extent to which the head of state can influence policy, if 
that policy is in direct opposition to the national personality.  
A profile will be complied utilizing similarities to the common profiling techniques 
accepted by behavioral science and law enforcement.  These techniques, when applied to 
historical case studies, examined the behavioral aspects of a nation exhibited during 
specific periods that contain social, economic, and political, transitions. The transitional 
periods were the focal point of case selection, studying the behavioral reactions to these 
events.  Focusing on periods of transition garnered its foundation from the theory that 
Russia’s transition following the fall of the Soviet Union and rejection of communism is 
a transition of such magnitude that if there would be a change in Russian international 
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and domestic policy, that would have been the time it occurred. The selection of 
transitional periods was also based upon the theory that, as is the case in human 
behavioral characteristics, transitional events have the greatest potential to elicit change, 
as those events potentially have the greatest influence.  However, this does not suggest 
that discovery of personality or behavioral characteristics require a major transitional 
period in the life cycle of a nation.  In fact, the hypothesis of the study firmly believes 
that in this case, these transitional periods, selected as major historical events from the 
subject nation’s history, will have little or no effect upon the characteristics of the nation. 
Fundamentally, personality characteristics born from experience will overcome 
transitional events effects.  
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Chapter 3 : Research Design and Methodology 
 
Methodology 
 
The research methodology that will be used in this study is qualitative comparison 
historical analysis.  Qualitative data will be gathered through an examination of historical 
accounts, otherwise known as a historiography. The data collected will then be applied to 
profile templates, similar to templates used in criminal profiling, each specific to the 
subject group being examined. For the purpose of this study, templates are designed to 
determine if a correlation of behavioral characteristics exist, and if so, measure them 
against traditional behavioral science criteria that are normally reserved for an individual.  
The research templates are designed to be subject appropriate to each individual group. 
When examining for characteristic traits of historical figures, the templates are 
appropriate for human beings.  
The overall structure of the research is to apply and measure characteristics 
generally reserved as human traits.  Therefore, all characteristic templates will utilize a 
behavioral science design traditionally reserved for human subjects.  Case study will be 
the qualitative method used, as   
 “Qualitative case study is an approach to research that facilitates exploration 
of a phenomenon within its context using a variety of data sources. This 
ensures that the issue is not explored through one lens, but rather a variety of 
lenses which allows for multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and 
understood” (Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 544). 
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    In the case of this research, the study will deviate from this multi-dimensional 
approach, as the focus of the study is primarily personality and behavioral characteristics.  
Whenever engaging in a historiography, the research must accept and embrace one 
school of historiography (Thies, 2002). Although this approach is counter to the approach 
proposed by Baxter and Jack, we must remember that the qualitative comparative 
historical research methodology is only one facet of the overall research. The research 
design also has element similar to other qualitative research methodologies, including 
case study.  The conducting of a historiography using the separate historical events and 
participants as “cases” requires a modification from the traditional case study 
methodology. According to Yin (2003), a case study design should be considered when: 
(a) the focus of the study is to answer “how” and “why” questions; (b) you cannot 
manipulate the behavior of those involved in the study; (c) you want to cover contextual 
conditions because you believe they are relevant to the phenomenon under study; or (d) 
the boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and context (Baxter & Jack, 2008, 
p. 545).  This study is conducted under all four of these pretexts. The study is looking 
into “how” and “why” Russia reacts to conflict.  Because it is based on historical data, it 
cannot be manipulated by the researcher, beyond the selection of the historical school of 
thought. The study looks to discover contextual conditions and measure their relevance to 
the phenomenon.  Do nation-state personalities exist, and if so, to what extent are they 
obvious to the events? The boundaries between context and phenomenon are unclear, as 
there is no reference to the amount of influence the trait might have upon the actions.  It 
could be argued that deliberate selection of periods of history, in which significant social 
and or political transition is being experienced, is in fact a manipulation of the study.  
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However, the study would counter-argue that the selection of these periods of transition is 
instead a component which is designed to potentially disprove the study’s hypothesis 
through its historical effects upon other nations undergoing the same transitions.  
The application of a case study as defined by Creswell (2007) and Stake (1995) is 
not the reasoning behind the model being employed in this study.  Creswell and Stake 
qualify that the decision for the employment of the case study methodology “is a good 
approach when the inquirer has clearly definable cases with boundaries and seeks to 
provide an in-depth understanding of the cases or comparison of several cases” 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 74; Stake, 1995). Although this is a secondary goal of the research, 
the use of a case study qualitative approach is designed more as a means to an end, with 
the end of testing for the existence of the theoretical characteristics. Any resulting 
epistemology or hypothesis conformation beyond the hypothesis relating to the 
application of the methodology is only a secondary, yet positive consequence. 
The analysis of the cases does fall under Stake’s (1995) definition. “Through data 
collection, a detailed description of the case emerges in which the researcher details such 
aspects of the history of the case, the chronology of the events, or a day-to-day rendering 
of the activities of the case” (Creswell, 2007, p. 75; Stake, 1995).  For the purpose of data 
collection in which to validate the methodology, the study will follow a structure for the 
collection of data to be utilized. “In the final interpretive phase, the research reports the 
meaning of the case, whether that meaning comes from learning about the issue of the 
case (and instrumental case) or learning about an unusual situation (an intrinsic case)” 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 75; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In the final phase, the application of the 
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case studies will be measured against the secondary and tertiary hypothesis in any 
resulting epistemology will be noted. 
Merriam (1988) contends that “there is no standard format for reporting case 
study research” (Creswell, 2007, p. 195; Merriam, 1988, p. 193). This is one of the 
primary reasons that case study was selected as the methodology for the study. Creswell 
(2007), on pages 195 and 196, presents a general rhetorical structure for the case study 
methodology. Creswell (2007) further credits Stake (1995) for the general outline he 
presents. Of that presented rhetorical structure, the study will follow a more holistic 
design rather than the alternative of an embedded one. However, different the design the 
study uses for its case, evaluation of the primary tenants of case study methodology 
remains.  
The conducting of this case study is intrinsically different than the traditional case 
study methodology documented by other qualitative researchers. Although the secondary 
goals of the study do have roots in the traditional application of case studies, including 
data collection and analysis, the application of the methodology of case study for the 
purpose of validating the existence of a theoretical principle which can be used in 
conjunction with other qualitative and quantitative methodologies access application is 
unique.  
The study also implies elements of the qualitative model of phenomenology. The 
case is defined by Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 25) as “a phenomenon of some sort 
occurring in a bounded context. The case is, “in effect, your unit of analysis” (Baxter & 
Jack, 2008, p. 545).  Both sets of authors go on to suggest questioning what it is you wish 
to analyze, such as an individual, program, process, or differences between organizations 
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(Baxter & Jack, 2008, p. 546). In this study, the methodology looks at not only one of 
these analytical perspectives, but a number of them in conjunction. Analyzing the 
individual, group of individuals, the government structures, transitional events, and the 
relationship each has their affects upon the potential phenomenological homogony 
hypothesized. 
A historical account, or case, will be used to supply data to the characteristic 
templates available for each subject. The data evaluation of this information will be 
evaluated to determine if any phenomenological condition exists. If the findings are 
positive, then the phenomenon will be compared to the other subjects of the same group 
to determine if a common group phenomenological condition exists. Once a decision is 
made upon the existence or nonexistence of commonality of the group subjects, each 
subject’s reaction to events shall be measured in a separate characteristic template to 
determine if the homogeny or lack thereof is an influential factor to the event or decisions 
made regarding the event. 
The sheer number of differing historical accounts, and the plethora of bias which 
could be injected into the study from the differing schools of historiography, must 
therefore be minimized. However, not discounting any other historiography school of 
thought, or claiming that the adherence to one school or even multiple schools would 
invalidate the results, conforming to a single school of thought is an exercise in 
bracketing the study’s approach through the confinement of the foundational lens of case 
selection.   
The study contends that there is also a benefit to restricting the historiography to 
one school of thought.  If the theoretical foundation is confirmed, and nation-states do 
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exhibit personality traits which are independent of current ideologies and situational 
events, then the methodology could be applied using a different, yet consistent, 
historiographical school, from which the results from the two different schools of thought 
could be compared. This comparative examination of data from two different schools of 
historical thought could produce new information or confirm the original evaluation of 
the data, which would be valuable to the overall epistemology of the subject.  
Creswell (2007) contends that when researchers select the qualitative 
methodology, they are also making certain philosophical assumptions which consists of 
stances in the nature of reality (ontology), how the researcher knows what he knows 
(epistemology), what role values play in the research (axiology), the language of the 
research (redbrick), and the methods in the process of research (methodology) (Creswell, 
2007, p. 16; Creswell, 2003). In regards to the study being conducted, the methodological 
philosophical assumption and its implications would be most appropriate. As presented 
by Creswell (2007), in the methodological approach “research use inductive logic, studies 
the topic within its context, and uses emerging design” (Creswell, 2007, p. 17 Table 2.1). 
Research Procedures 
 
The research procedure utilizes four separate elements from which conclusions are 
drawn.  The general data collection will be conducted using the first element, qualitative 
comparative historical analysis, with the foundation of the qualitative historical analysis 
design being guided by Cameron Thies (2002).  Thies addresses a main issue in which 
the research design must be aware, source material bias or the proper conducting of the 
designs historiography.  “Researchers using qualitative methods, including case studies 
and comparative case studies, are becoming more self-conscious in enhancing the rigor of 
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their research designs so as to maximize their explanatory leverage with a small number 
of cases” (Thies, 2002).   The common issue with any qualitative historical analysis exists 
within the historiography.  “How one chose from the historical record the materials that 
will best help one to develop or test theory, or even simply describes a set of events, in a 
particular case or small set of cases” (Thies, 2002, p. 351). It is in source material 
selection that the bias cannot be eliminated, only mitigated, and that the conduction of 
any historical based analysis it is the historiography which receives most of the criticism. 
“The most notorious problem that persistently face qualitative historical analysis, namely, 
investigator bias and unwarranted selectivity in the use of source material” (Thies, 2002, 
p. 352).  Historical accounts are inherently biased by the authors of the histories. 
However, in this study’s case any author bias is believed to be minimal, as the study 
seeks to collect factual data regarding elements of history rather than author opinion on 
the causes of the historical event. The questions posed for the conclusions being drawn 
for the secondary methodology used in this research, behavioral profiling, are specific to 
confirmable events.   
To further limit any unintentional bias, the historiography data will be selected “by 
identifying one school of historiography that (the study) will stick with as the historical 
record against which (the study) test your (its) theories” (Thies, 2002, p. 365). The 
researcher acknowledges that to accomplish this, commitment to one school of 
historiography the researcher is required “to become familiar with general trends in 
historiography, as well as developments in historical inquiry” (Thies, 2002, p. 365; 
Iggers, 1997; N. Wilson, 1999).  
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Lustick (1996) also envisioned a bias that is cumulative in nature, called “selection 
bias”:  
The first concern is the bias of the historian who may draw on some 
primary sources to the exclusion of others, such that he produces distorted 
account of some historical event. The second concern is the selection 
effects introduced by the political scientist when he chooses to focus on a 
particular historians work and consciously or unconsciously excludes 
others. The worst-case scenario for Lustick, but he seems to me when he 
describes “selection bias” is when these two problems are conjoined. In 
this scenario a political scientist with a particular theoretical and 
conceptual disposition purposefully selects certain historians who share 
this bias, and whose work is already tainted as such leading to a 
misleading historical account, and therefore mistaken confirmation of the 
political scientist theory. (Thies, 2002, p. 359; Lustick, 1996).  
Although the potential for bias in the historiography is a concern in which the 
research must acknowledge and address, the data being extracted from the historical 
accounts is of general and limited scope. As an example, if one record indicates that Peter 
I was six feet five inches tall and another records his height as six feet seven, the 
discrepancy is of little concern if the conclusion, being made from the data, is to decide if 
he was tall for the period. There will always be minor factual inconsistencies that exist 
within historical accounts.  The studies response to this issue is to create a series of 
questions which seek general answers in which the facts being applied are general in 
nature. 
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For the purpose of this study, the historiography school of thought to be utilized 
will be political history. This school of thought analyzes political events, ideas, 
movements, and leaders. It is usually structured around the nation-state. It is distinct 
from, but related to, other fields of history such as social history, economic history, and 
military history. Generally, political history focuses on events relating to nation-states 
and the formal political process. According to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, the late 
18
th
 and early 19
th
 century historian and political philosopher, political history “is an idea 
of the state with a moral and spiritual force beyond the material interests of its subjects: it 
followed the state was the main agent of historical change” (Morris, 1892; O'Brien, 
1975). 
From the identified characteristics, the study is designed to create a characteristic 
tree of variables which can be compared and from which a common homogony can be 
either confirmed or rejected. Utilizing basic behavioral coding methods common in 
behavioral science personality tests, the historical data will be examined for indication of 
behavioral traits in each secondary element, head of state and governance structure.   
Those traits shall then be evaluated against the event traits of the transitional and 
conflict events to determine any variations. Common event behavioral characteristics, 
which are found common both periods, despite the differences which time period and 
social/political differences present, and are a factor designed into the research to mitigate 
homogony, will be evaluated as an ingrained personality characteristic of the nation-state 
(see figure 3-1).    
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Figure 3-1  
 
As illustrated in the example, the determination of a behavioral characteristic is 
dependent upon its existence in both study periods.  Those characteristics which only 
exist in one period will be identified but not classified as a homogony element.     
 The qualitative comparative historical analysis is not directly about the heads of 
state identified as title elements in the research design.  Referencing the examination 
period by directly acknowledging the head of state during the period gives the study its 
period reference.  Although the study will examine the head of state for characteristics, 
which the research contends attributes to the nation-states cumulative personality, the 
focus is upon the transitions and conflicts from the period and how the secondary 
elements, such as governance structure and head of state, addressed these events (see 
figure 3-2).  
The structure of the research’s qualitative comparative historical analysis will be 
the same for each time period examined: 
Characteristics 
of Study Period 
1 
Characteristics 
of Study Period 
2 
Theorized 
Homogony 
Characteristic 
Shared 
Phenomenon 
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1. A brief synopsis of the period and the research subjects place within the 
timeline. 
2. A brief historical biography focused upon the head of state during the period. 
The study will pay special attention to the leader’s behavioral characteristics 
and personality. 
3. A brief synopsis of the governance structure and any pertinent behavioral 
characteristics generally attributed to them at the time. 
4. A brief history and description of the transitions that affected the state and 
occurred during the period 
5. A brief description and history of the domestic conflict in which the state 
engaged during the period 
6. A brief description and history of the international conflict in which the state 
engaged during the period 
7. An examination of how the secondary elements (Head of State and 
Government) engaged the conflicts and transitions.   
8. A chart identifying discovered personality or behavioral traits found in the 
engagement by the secondary elements. 
The brief history outlined as the first step of the research design is presented in 
the research as a reference point into the different social environments that were present 
at the time. It is not meant to be an all-inclusive historical account, but rather brief 
examples of society during the time being researched. The procedures show that the 
research will be conducted in a step-by-step methodology that promotes consistent data 
collection and coding across all components of the research. None of the elements 
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explored in the qualitative comparative historical analysis are designed to be all inclusive 
historical accounts, but rather a search of historical records for a consensus, within the 
historiography parameters, which answers the specific questions designed into the 
research.  
The first step in the research, general historical background data collection, 
although extremely limited in its scope, will be examined for any characteristics factors 
of the general society which continued throughout the study’s historical perspective.  For 
instance, is the society as a whole xenophobic, repressed, submissive, aggressive, or 
rebellious?  Is the society prosperous, educated, or technologically proficient?  This data 
will present the research with a framework in which the behavioral characteristics, if 
existent, were influenced by general society (see table 3-1).  
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Table 3-1 
Subject Element Characteristic Option 1 Characteristic Option 2 
Leadership Biography Organized/Deliberate  Disorganized/Impulsive  
Governance Structure Organized/Deliberate  Disorganized/Impulsive  
Transition Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
Leadership Response 
to Transition 
Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
Government Response 
to Transition 
Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
Conflict Domestic Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
Leadership Response 
to Domestic Conflict 
Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
Government Response 
to Domestic Conflict 
Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
Conflict International Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
Leadership Response 
to International 
Conflict 
Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
Government Response 
to International 
Conflict 
Organized/Deliberate Disorganized/Spontaneous 
 
The second and third data collection points will address the head of state and the 
governance structure during the period of the study. Both of these sections are brief in 
scope but specific in the characteristics sought. The study seeks to determine if the 
leadership and the governance structure exhibited habitual personality characteristics.  
Are they organized or disorganized in their approach to governing?  Do they act on 
impulse, or are their actions calculated?  Are they rigid in their thinking, or do they 
display flexibility?  In the case of the biographical data of step two, the focus will be 
upon the personality of the head of state being examined to determine any potential 
characteristics which may have attributed to the cumulative identity of the state as 
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theorized, and to compare that personality to the methodology employed during 
transitions and conflicts. The same is true of the synopsis of the governance structure.  
What the research is looking for is the personality of the government, including its 
motivations and ideologies, as a benchmark to determine if during periods of transition 
and conflict those ideologies presented any influence upon the events as they unfolded.  
The following template (see table 3-2) is representative of the study’s designed 
template. This specific template will be used to determine the overall characteristics of 
the government and the leadership characteristics as well as situations not dealing with 
this specific transitions or conflict. Each subject period will contain two of these 
templates, one template specifically evaluating the government and one evaluating the 
head the state.  The template is designed to elicit the stability and organizational 
coefficient of both the government and its head of state. The study understands that in 
some government structures, it is difficult to differentiate between a strong head of state 
and the government that the head of state controls. However, the study contends that 
although a state may exhibit a strong single leader, this does not automatically translate 
into an organized or structured governmental system. It is for this reason that the 
government and head of state have been separated by two separate templates asking the 
same questions. As stated earlier in the summary of methodology, these templates are 
only designed to elicit the most rudimentary of findings.  
The data of the qualitative historical analysis will next be applied to the second 
stage of the research design, profiling templates. As exampled in the following table (see 
table 3-2), the data will be code through the application to a series of questions which 
will allow for conclusions addressing each element of the profile. Once completed the 
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final determination, in the case of the template design will be if the element being coded 
was organized or disorganized.  Conclusions regarding the final organizational structure 
will require a seventy percent score.  A template that exhibits neither column presenting 
with the seventy percent threshold will be deemed mixed. 
Table 3-2 
Organized Disorganized 
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy  Rejected Hierarchy  
Planned economic policy  Obscure economic policy  
Planned foreign policy  Obscure foreign policy 
Planned social policy  Obscure social policy  
Adherence to economic policy  Abandoned economic policy  
Adherence to foreign policy  Abandoned foreign policy 
Adherence to social policy  Abandoned social policy 
Internal harmony  Internal Conflict 
Positive Diplomatic Relations  Negative Diplomatic Relations  
Positive constituency opinion  Negative constituency opinion 
 
As can be seen by the template, presented answers to the affirmative signal an 
organized structure, while those to the negative suggest disorganization.  To better 
understand the rationale of why these questions were selected, let us examine each one 
individually. 
 Existent and Adhered to hierarchy – Did the study period exhibit an 
accepted political structure, which was accepted by the governance 
structure, head of state, and the constituency. Although hierarchies may be 
accepted and exist within the government structure, this question seeks to 
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determine if elements in fact adhered to the expectations of that structure, 
or exhibited resistance. 
 Planned economic policy - each timeframe being examined exhibits 
different economic factors the state must accept and adhere to. This 
question seeks to determine if such a policy existed and was in fact is 
practical. 
 Planned foreign policy - as in the case of the economic policy, each 
timeframe also exhibits different political factors to which the state must 
accept and adhere. This question seeks to determine if such a policy 
existed and in fact is practical. 
 Planned social policy - this question seeks to determine if the government 
or the head of state actually exhibited a planned social policy with regards 
to the constituency. This question is not to evaluate the social policy or its 
merits, but rather to determine if in fact a consistent social ideology was in 
place. 
 Adherence to economic policy - having an economic policy is not the 
same as implementing one. The study acknowledges that certain economic 
changes can occur during the tenure of a government, and those changes 
must be addressed, which may require adjustment of an original economic 
policy. However, any adjustment in response to economic factors would 
be considered part of an organized economic structure. The question seeks 
to determine if an economic policy existed, and did the government and/or 
the leadership adhere to this policy? 
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 Adherence to foreign policy - same rationale as adherence to economic 
policy. 
 Adherence to social policy - same rationale is adherence to economic 
policy. 
 Internal harmony - the internal harmony between government agencies 
and structures and the head of state is inherently proportional to the 
stability of the organization of the government. Although there will always 
be disagreements between heads of state and elected or appointed 
legislative branches of government, these disagreements do not signal 
disharmony. The answer to this question will be determined by historically 
evaluating the internal cooperation between the divisions of government. 
 Positive Diplomatic Relations – the study acknowledges that to expect 
the nation has good diplomatic relations with all neighboring states is 
unrealistic. However, in cases where states may be in disagreement, even 
to the extent that there is a potential for open conflict, the answer to this 
question will be determined by the open dialogue that was maintained 
with those states that were allies as well as those states in which there was 
a conflict potential. The study contends that states with poor diplomatic 
relations, those that do not engage diplomatic dialogue, are inherently 
disorganized. 
 Positive constituency opinion - although the opinion of the government 
by the constituency will undergo significant peaks and valleys throughout 
the tenure of the government or a head of state, the opinion of the nation’s 
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largest population not only signals the stability and organizational power 
of the government, but is also a good precursor to determine the potential 
of internal domestic conflict. The question seeks to examine an overall 
opinion of both the head of state and the government separately. 
Following identification of the characteristics of the government structure and the 
leadership, the same process is used in the period’s transition dynamic, and the selected 
international and domestic conflict experienced during that time period. The study seeks 
to determine if the transition and international and domestic conflicts were conducted in 
an organized or disorganized manner. Were these conditions deliberate, planned, and 
executed with a systematic approach, or is it the case that these events were spontaneous 
outcrops, with no deliberate preplanning and exhibiting no systematic forethought? It is 
theorized that in the case of deliberate and planned events, these events progress over 
time, and through their deliberate systematic approach develop more slowly. In the case 
of the spontaneous event, where there exists no preplanning identifiable systematic 
approach, these events are theorized to exhibit impacts more quickly than if deliberate.  
The next template (see table 3-3) will be used in determining the organized 
coefficient of the transition, government reactions, head of state reactions, and the 
structure of the identified domestic international conflicts from each period.  It is noted 
here that the study recognizes the questions being asked and the level of organized 
homogeny being explored is of the most rudimentary of levels. There can be no doubt 
that increasing the number of questions would further strengthen the existence of any 
political ideological homogeny. The study recognizes its limitations and is not in any way 
claiming to be an all-inclusive examination of any of the subjects in which the templates 
115 
 
 
are applied. However, as we shall see in chapter 6 in the section regarding future research 
potentials, there will be an acknowledgment that this rudimentary study is but the first 
building block to a comprehensive future epistemology. The data trees created in this 
study could potentially be added upon by future researchers, examining either the overall 
subject of the research or individual components used to structure the study. Future 
research could also develop more questions to continue the research presented here. The 
overall success of the methodology model is dependent upon the ability of future 
researchers employing the same methodology utilizing more specific questions to the 
templates that would create greater statistically accurate findings with each subsequent 
study employed. Although there is a possibility of epistemology saturation at some point, 
regarding a specific research topic, that eventuality is not a consideration here.  
It should be noted that not all element of the template will be applicable to all 
conflicts and transitions.  Elements which are not relevant to the event being research will 
remain blank.  However the criteria for conclusion will remain at seventy percent, of the 
categories determined applicable for the research to determine the event exhibits the 
organizational classification concluded.  
Table 3-3 
Organized Disorganized 
Reaction/Event Planned  Reaction/Event Spontaneous 
Reaction/Event Measured  Reaction/Event Disproportional  
Reaction/Event Coordinated  Reaction/Event Coordinated No 
Offense Planned  Offense Reactionary 
Defense Planned  Defense Reactionary 
Reaction/Event: Peaceful Reaction/Event: Aggressive 
Reaction/Event: Targeted Response Reaction/Event: General Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective  Lost Ideological Perspective 
Reaction/Event Goal Orientated  Reaction/Event Lack of Goal  
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The template above (see table 3-3) represents the evaluation of events, such as 
transitions and domestic and international conflicts, for their consistency of structure.  
From the reaction standpoint, the template is designed to determine if the response to the 
event was conducted in an organized systematic fashion, or if there was a spontaneous, 
disorganized response to a crisis.  
 Reaction/Event Planned  
o Reaction – Was the response to the event by the government or 
head of state pre-planned? Or was response to the event by the 
government or head of state was reactionary and therefore driven 
by the event? 
o Event – Was the event pre-planned? In regards to the event, this is 
actually questioning whether or not the event was a creation of a 
situation that existed for an extended period of time, or in fact was 
in response to conditions that were relatively recent. 
 Reaction/Event Measured 
o Reaction – this question seeks to determine if the government or 
head of state response to the event was proportional to the 
conditions created by the event. 
o Event – the concept of measured for the event is with regards to 
the transition or the conflicts appropriate level of application 
regarding the event or conflicts goal in a consideration necessary 
regarding the potential responses from the government or head of 
state. 
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 Reaction/Event Coordinated 
o Reaction – did someone control the response, and if so whom? 
o Event – did the event or conflict have an established leader, and 
did that leader in fact coordinate the conducting of the event? 
 Offense Planned 
o Reaction -was any offensive action taken by the government or a 
head of state was that action preplanned? 
o Event -was any offensive action taken by the event participants and 
its leadership was that offensive action preplanned? 
 Defense Planned 
o Reaction – was any defensive action taken by the government or a 
head of state was that defensive action preplanned? 
o Event –was any defensive action taken by the event participants 
and its leadership was that defensive action preplanned? 
 Reaction/Event: Aggression 
o Reaction – did the government or head of state address the event in 
aggressive or otherwise violent manner? 
o Event -was the conducting of the event by the participants or the 
leadership of the event conducted in an aggressive or otherwise 
violent manner? 
 Reaction/Event: Targeted 
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o Reaction – was the reaction by the government or head of state a 
focused and targeted response to specific elements participants of 
the event? 
o Event – was the conducting of the event or conflict specifically 
targeted at any direct element of the social or political mechanism 
within the state? 
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o Reaction – did the government or head of state maintain the 
political ideology in its response to the event? 
o Event -considering that most events have a political or social 
ideology, did the event participants in its leadership maintain that 
ideology through the conducting of the event? 
 Reaction/Event Specific 
o Reaction – was there a specific goal in the reaction to the event or 
transition in the conducting of the response by the government or 
the head of state? 
o Event -did the event, conflict, or transition have a specific social, 
political, or ideological goal that the event participants and/or its 
leadership wished to promote? 
It would be reasonable to expect the response to these events by the leadership or 
government would exhibit the same characteristic consistent with each. Therefore, the 
next set of data examination points examines the responses to the events and evaluates 
the government and leadership response to these events to search for a homogony 
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consistent with their discovered characteristic trait.  Does the characteristic of the event 
change the characteristic of the respondent? Or is it the case that regardless of the event 
characteristic, the respondent’s response is consistent with their behavioral traits?  
The study first examines the characteristics of the leadership in the government to 
determine if it is the general propensity of each to be either organized or disorganized. 
The question is, do the government and its leaders have the tendency to act in a deliberate 
and organized manner, or in a more prone disorganized and spontaneous action? Some 
might argue that it is potentially possible to be organized and spontaneous or 
disorganized and deliberate. It is also arguable that both the government and 
government’s leader can exhibit both organized and disorganized traits which are solely 
dependent upon the issues in which they are presented.  
The study acknowledges that this possibility is not only valid, but completely 
consistent with normal human behavior. The application of the characteristic template to 
the government structure and the leadership is designed to make a general impression 
from which comparisons to the other elements can be made. If the data presents the study 
with a condition in which the leadership exhibits disorganized or spontaneous 
propensities, yet the government system is found to exhibit organized or a deliberate 
approach, a disassociation between the two has been found. Identifying this 
disassociation, we can look to the responses to the transition and international and 
domestic conflicts, and see if the responses to those incidents were either organized or 
disorganized, thereby potentially identifying which factor, government or leadership, was 
most influential. 
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It must be understood that the questions presented in these two templates are only 
a sample of potential questions which may be asked in the final templates that are created 
for the study. The actual questions that will be asked will be determined following the 
research gathering of the first study time period, the monarchy period of Peter the Great, 
as these historic cases will form the benchmark control for the remainder of the study. 
Following the gathering of the historical data for all the anticipatory elements that the 
study shall use for that era, the actual questions will be created and applied to the control 
to determine the benchmark conditions for which the other eras shall be measured.  The 
study does expect that the questions being presented in this chapter are in fact a 
reasonable representation of the questions that will be actually used in the conducting of 
the study. However, the study does reserve the right to alter questions to better facilitate 
formulating practical and appropriate questions which are in line with a historiography 
school of thought, which will be the source of the data. Since research cannot be 
conducted until after proposal defense and IRB approval, the ability of this study to 
solidly formulate any questions that would be appropriate to the chosen school of 
historical thought cannot be accomplished, as it may be considered data collection prior 
to approval. 
In this study, each characteristic template is designed to discover only one 
overriding characteristics of the subjects in question, which is organization. The 
application of the data in an orderly and systematic manner to the template presents the 
study with results that exhibit either a positive or negative finding. For the purpose of this 
study, each template is designed to elicit a rudimentary characteristic phenomenon, 
organized or disorganized, response from each specific element of the overall study.  This 
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theoretical model is designed under the dichotomy of behavioral science profiling, 
because “If a crime scene has organized characteristics (determined by a group study of 
shared scene traits), it is reasoned that the offender must also be organized and share the 
characteristics of other organized offenders (determined by group study examining shared 
offenders)” (Turvey, 2008, p. 85).  Relating this theory to the study’s components, if the 
conflict (crime scene), either domestic or international, is deliberate and or organized, 
then either the leadership or governance (offenders) or both should be organized. 
The collective historical data will then be applied to individual templates which 
are specific to the group elements being evaluated. The overall structure of the templates 
and general design was taken from Turvey’s (2008) criminal profile manual (p.85), and 
subsequently credited to Ressler and Burgess (1985). A copy of these templates (see table 
3-5) is represented below (Turvey, 2008, pp. 84 – 85; Ressler & Burgess, 1985): 
 
Table 3-4 
Psychopathic (Organized) Crime Scene 
Characteristics 
Psychotic (Disorganized) Crime Scene 
Characteristics 
Offense planned Offense Spontaneous 
Victim is a targeted stranger Victim or location known 
Personalizes victim Depersonalizes victim 
Control conversation minimal conversation 
Crime scene reflects overall control crime scene random and sloppy 
Demand submissive victim sudden violence to victim 
Restraints used minimal restraints used 
Aggressive acts before death sexual acts after death 
Body hidden body left in plain view 
Weapon/evidence absent evidence/weapon often present 
Transports Victim Body Left at the Scene 
 
The study will clarify here that findings which support either organized or 
disorganized are not intended to infer that the subject is either psychopathic or psychotic.  
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These psychological terms are used in criminal profiling and are of no consequence to the 
research being conducted in this study. Instead, the study will focus upon the 
classifications of organized versus disorganized as the rudimentary behavioral 
characteristic that is being explored.  No inference should be made regarding any subject 
component of the study to the criminal profiling technique of combining organized 
offenders or crime scenes with psychopathic offender characteristics, or that a finding of 
disorganized in any way refers to the subject matter as psychotic.  The template presented 
here is done so in its original form, without alteration, as an example of the design, not as 
a contention that the study will attempt to make any psychological evaluations or 
comparisons of the subject of the study. 
It should be noted here that Turvey (2008) does not agree with the 
inductive/nomothetic profiling approach: “The author does not agree with or advocate the 
use of the organized and disorganized dichotomy. That is because it is a false dichotomy, 
arising from mistaken ideas about the developmental nature of criminal behavior and the 
role of crime construction” (Turvey, 2008, p. 85). For the purpose of criminal profiling, 
the study agrees with this statement. The organized and disorganized dichotomy for the 
purpose of being an all-inclusive identification of a person’s psychic makeup is too 
rudimentary to provide valid results. In this context, behavioral science, organized versus 
disorganized characteristics, are divided into the more clinical psychopathic versus 
psychotic categories. However, as it is used in the study, the determination of whether or 
not the government or a leader of a nation can be characterized by actions as organized 
and disorganized is not an attempt to elicit or propose an overall psychiatric profile. As 
presented in the study, the delineation between organized and disorganized speaks more 
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to the methodology of the subject, in the broadest overall context, in which the study is 
able to measure, gauge the actions of the subject in response to events. 
The study continues with the templates being individually evaluated for 
homogony, through the evaluation of the template findings for a preponderance of 
characteristic responses will point to a specific characteristic in each individual case.  
This homogony, if existent, will be evaluated across the common subject groups, 
leadership, governance, and social/political transition events, to evaluate and discover if 
any group homogony that may exist.  The specific groups will be assigned a statistical 
representation of characteristic homogony, or lack thereof, through a comparison of 
template data and the evaluation of correlating responses.  A quantified percentage value 
will be assigned to any discovered homogony as reflected in the data from both 
individual subject data and common group data. The higher the percentage of 
homogenous data found, the higher the homogony value, or the characteristic strength, 
within the subject or subject group. This methodology is being employed to discover one 
specific characteristic trait of each of the study’s individual components as a 
methodology to employ behavioral science characteristics to governance structures and 
transition events, with the leadership group as a control. The data from the individual and 
group evaluations will then be measured for correlation against the second data sets, 
which will evaluate the response by the individual subjects and subject groups, to 
determine if homogony of responses exist and if there is any correlating characteristic 
which may have an effect upon the response to the events presented.  
The study also recognizes that the theoretical culmination of behavioral traits did 
not begin with the Monarchal reign of Peter I, the point at which the data collection 
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begins.  For the purpose of the study, this period selection as a starting point offered a 
period with transitional, conflict, and structural conditions from which to observe 
behavioral characteristics and compare them to the other periods of the study.  The study 
does not contend that behavioral characteristics or the culmination of event experiences 
theorized as cumulative began in this period.  Nor does the study, through its exclusion, 
propose that periods in between the eras selected possessed no influencing factors from 
which the Russian identity evolved. The period selection was deliberate and conditioned 
upon certain elements of the period which met the criteria of the study’s design. 
The study continues with the third element of the research design, comparative 
historical analysis.  Templates from both periods will be compared to the templates of 
like elements.  Head of State v Head of State, Transition v Transition, etc.  The 
comparison of templates designed to determine any similar characteristics that are 
exhibited in both periods. This side by side comparison seeks to also evaluate causal 
mechanisms that may have been identified in the historical data collection. The 
predominant basis for the conclusions will be garnered from this step of the research 
design.  The cumulating of data found in all previous steps of the research will be 
evaluated for homogony, personality characteristics consistently seen in both periods and  
behavioral characteristics also exhibited in both periods. 
To better illustrate characteristic relationships between elements of each study 
era, the research will also employ a modified version of the big five personality trait 
model (see table 3-4). In the 1980s Lewis Goldberg reintroduced the big five personality 
trait model (Goldburg, 1981). Although the big five model does not address the factors 
that cause personality traits in humans, for the purpose of the study, the modified version 
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that will be employed simply looks to identify characteristics which could be considered 
consistent throughout each era. The study recognizes that when the big five personality 
trait model is employed with regards to human beings, different factors such as age, 
gender, and education, to name a few factors, will have influence upon the model’s final 
results. However, since the modified model being used by the study is being employed to 
simply show relational values to generalized traits exhibited by the elements examined, 
the study finds the use of the modified model is a helpful tool to illustrate similarities 
during the studies historical periods. 
Table 2-5 
Trait Openness to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Char. Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs.  
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
Compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
 
The methodology in this study follows the progression of different research 
questions framed in chapter 1 and is based upon the research hypotheses. However, the 
success of the research is not dependent upon the validation or rejection of any proposed 
hypothesis. Validation or rejection of the study’s hypotheses is considered only a 
byproduct, although a potentially beneficial byproduct, of the methodology validity 
process.  The success of the research is based upon the study’s ability to progress through 
the research questions and evaluate the effectiveness of the methodology of nation-state 
behavioral profiling.  Therefore, the process under which the conducting of the research 
is designed was created in such a manner that the research only moved forward to the 
next research question following the successful answering of the previous question.  
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In this study, validating the application of the methodology’s appropriateness as a 
tool for identifying new information regarding the subject is the first goal.  As indicated 
in the first research question, is historical behavioral profiling a valid methodology that, 
when employed, creates deeper understanding of the conflict?  In basic terms, is the 
method valid and does it actually work?  In the context of the question, although the 
application of almost any methodology is theoretically possible to any problem, in a 
qualitative case study the goal is to elicit answers that are practically useful.  Algebra as a 
methodology could be theoretically applied to making a ham sandwich; however, the 
application of algebra to the construction of the sandwich would probably not create any 
useful or practical information. The key to the first research question is if the application 
of forensic analytical conflict profiling creates a deeper understanding of conflict with 
practical application value. 
The determination of success or failure of the methodology’s application validity 
to elicit practical useful data, in this case and with this specific subject, is therefore first 
gauged by the second research question; is the application of historical behavioral 
conflict profiling valid in determining national homogony in conflict?  The study 
hypothesizes that such a homogony exists; however, the validity of the application of the 
methodology is not contingent upon the existence of this hypothesized homogony, but 
rather if the methodology has the ability to reasonably confirm or deny the homogeny’s 
existence.  The hypothesis is only a benchmark in determining the methodology’s 
validity. The positive finding of a homogony is necessary for the study to consider 
research questions 2-4, as these questions are created to further explore the phenomenon 
if a positive finding of homogony is found.   
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If in the event homogony is discovered, questions 2-4 are intended to elicit deeper 
understand of the phenomenon and its effect on the subject. Question 3 looks to 
determine if the methodology is capable of defining characteristics of phenomenon. If 
Russia, over the course of its history, has maintained a historically observable ideological 
homogony, thereby exhibiting a consistent national ideology toward international and 
domestic relations and conflict engagement, even during times of social/political 
transitions, then what characteristics does this homogony exhibit?  Designed into the 
methodology are behavioral measures tailored and redefined to be appropriate to large 
groups rather than the individual, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter. It is 
believed that if this specific phenomenon’s traits can be determined through the 
methodology’s exploratory techniques, the other phenomena’s traits could also be 
susceptible to the methodology. 
Question 4 looks to measure the methodology’s ability to gauge the discovered 
homogeny’s relationship to a separate hypothesized theory, which is that major 
social/political transitions should disrupt existing homogenies, during periods of conflict 
that historically social and political transitions. The question asks if periods of transition 
affect a nation’s homogony toward conflict. Do periods of transition affect a nation’s 
homogony toward conflict, if such a homogony exists?  In this case, the study utilizes the 
primary template findings and measures them against the secondary template related to 
transition to discover if a correlation exists. This is the first application of two template 
findings in a comparative function to determine if the existence of a homogeny is affected 
by the transition. With a diverse set of transitions being studied over the time periods of 
the study, this comparative dynamic could determine mathematically if a specific type of 
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transition has more influence upon the discovered homogony, or if all transitions exhibit 
the same level effect on the homogony.  
Question 2 looks to determine if the social political structure of the Russian 
government or historic era the study is examining exhibits any effect upon any existing 
homogeny that has been discovered.  The study recognizes that each of the participants in 
the research maintain different social and political structures within Russia and its 
government. Do these factors have any influence over the hypothesized homogeny, or do 
in fact the homogeny continue to maintain its ideology regardless of these factors? 
Another research question queries the same response in regards to the social transition to 
determine its effects on Russia’s conducting of international and domestic affairs. Does 
social transition exhibit any influence over these two separate policy areas, or is no 
influence found? 
The final four questions, can the identification of this homogony contribute to a 
more detailed model with which to predict future Russian actions and can this new 
information be used to create proactive conflict mitigation, will be a subjective 
assessment of the studies ability to produce practical information regarding the subject. 
Ethics Precautions 
 
The ethical considerations and precautions in the study are fairly straightforward. 
Since this is a historical case study in which we utilize accepted historical accounts of 
events and the subjects that participated in those events, and considering that of the two 
human subjects the study examines, one is a historical figure long since deceased, so 
there is no fear of an ethical violation regarding this human subjects. In the case of the 
second human subject, Vladimir Putin, the current president Russia, biographical data 
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and responses to events will be gathered from published biographical text and current 
immediate reports. From the standpoint, the only remaining living human subject also has 
little or no potential to create an ethical dilemma for the study. Nevertheless, as with all 
new theoretical models of data analysis, there is a consideration of the unethical use of 
the methodology. This consideration, however, is not proprietary to this or any other 
study which attempts to elicit new data regarding subjects. It is therefore the researcher’s 
opinion that the conducting and methodology of the study presented offers little or no 
ethical dilemmas which must be guarded against. 
There is, however, one area of concern regarding ethics and the conducting of the 
study. Since the study’s primary goal is to determine the validity of the methodology and 
if it is an acceptable procedure for garnering new information, the study must guard 
against finding validity where no validity exists. It is the researcher’s responsibility to 
gauge and objectively subject the methodology’s validity to a rigorous litmus test before 
validity can be acknowledged. The study must remain conscious and vigilant of claiming 
relationships. Therefore, with regards to determining the validity of the methodology, the 
study will engage in what is commonly considered in legal proceedings as the reasonable 
man test.  Res ipsa loquitur, or the concept of “the thing speaks for itself,” will be the 
guiding principle for the analysis of the methodology’s validity. 
The study believes that it has already addressed the potential of bias being 
introduced into the research to the writings of this historians from which the case studies 
will be conducted. By embracing one school of historical thought, and ensuring that the 
historical data from which the study will conduct its examination presents the most 
unbiased and factual account of the events and subjects within the inquiry, this presents 
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the best method for the research to eliminate any ethical dilemmas in regards to the data 
collection and subsequent analysis. 
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Chapter 4: Research Data 
Introduction 
 
The first historical period the study will begin its case study with is the monarchal 
period during the reign of Peter I, otherwise known as Peter the Great.  The 
historiography is not directly about Czar Peter I, nor the other heads of state identified in 
the research design.  As is the case with the other periods examined, referencing the 
examination period by directly acknowledging the head of state during the period gives 
the study its period reference.  Although the study will examine the head of state for 
characteristics that attributed to the nation-states cumulative personality, the focus is 
upon the transitions and conflicts from the time period and how the secondary elements, 
such as governance structure and head of state, addressed these events.  
The structure of the research historiography will be the same for each time period 
examined: 
1. A brief synopsis of the period and the research subjects place within the 
timeline. 
2. A brief historical biography focused upon the head of state during the time 
period. The study will pay special attention to the leader’s behavioral 
characteristics and personality. 
3. A brief synopsis of the governance structure and any pertinent behavioral 
characteristics generally attributed to them at the time. 
4. A detailed history and description of the transitions that affected the state and 
occurred during the period 
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5. A detailed description and history of the domestic conflict in which the state 
was engaged during the period 
6. A detailed description and history of the international conflict in which the 
was state engaged during the period 
7. A detailed examination of how the secondary elements (Head of State and 
Government) engaged the conflicts and transitions.   
8. A chart identifying discovered personality or behavioral traits found in the 
engagement by the secondary elements.  
The brief biography and synopsis outlined in 1-3 are presented in the research as a 
reference point into the different social environments that were present at the time. They 
are not meant to be all inclusive historical accounts, but rather brief examples of society 
during the time being researched.  In the case of the biographical data, the focus will be 
upon the personality of the head of state being examined to determine any potential 
characteristics which may have attributed to the cumulative identity of the state as 
theorized, and to compare that personality to the methodology employed during 
transitions and conflicts. The same is true of the synopsis of the governance structure.  
What the research is looking for is the personality of the government, including its 
motivations and ideologies, as a benchmark to determine if during periods of transition 
and conflict those ideologies presented any influence upon the events as they unfolded.  
The study also recognizes that the theoretical culmination of behavioral traits did 
not begin with the Monarchal reign of Peter I.  For the purpose of the study, this period 
selection as a starting point offered an era with transitional, conflict, and structural 
conditions from which to observe behavioral characteristics and compare them to the 
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other periods of the study.  The study does not contend that behavioral characteristics or 
the culmination of event experiences theorized as cumulative began in this period.  Nor 
does the study, through its exclusion, propose that periods in between the eras selected 
possessed no influencing factors from which the Russian identity evolved.  As outlined in 
chapter 3, the period selection was deliberate and conditioned upon certain elements of 
the epoch which met the criteria of the study’s design. 
It should be further understood that the historical data is examined for the purpose 
of forming a conclusion that can be applied to the study’s templates. The research data 
section of the study is not designed to be an all-inclusive historical account of any subject 
contained herein. Rather, the study looks to specifically answer personality questions as 
presented in the study’s templates for which a conclusion is sought to be drawn. All 
attempts have been made to mitigate the historical author’s personal opinions from the 
data being considered.  
The Monarchal Period (Peter I: 1696 – 1725) 
Profile of the Period 
 
Prior to the reign of Peter I, Russia presented to the rest of the world the land 
which the renaissance had forgotten.  Despite its vast land mass, innumerable natural 
resources and indomitable terrain, Russia, in the eyes of the powers of Western Europe at 
the time, presented a poor backward nation with little influence in world affairs and even 
less potential for change. As Voltaire wrote, speaking of the Russians pre- Peter I, “They 
were in possession of the most extensive dominions in the universe, and yet everything 
was wanted against them. At length Peter was born, and Russia became a civilized state.” 
(Voltaire, 1845, p. 48). Russia lagged behind the rest of “civilized” Europe in technology, 
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trade, education, and the accepted social fashions of the times. With consideration to 
Russia’s great land mass and geographic location, cultural and societal comparisons to 
China and India, the ancient and established societies of Asia, were the norm.  
Comparisons to Europe were less common, as the cultural differences between Russia 
and Europe were believed too dramatic.  This notion dominated provincial thinking and 
was as much a product of the xenophobic isolation Russia maintained as it was European 
arrogance. To its contemporaries, Russia was more a mystery of Asia than a European 
cousin.  
Russian xenophobia was evident as “most Muscovites, from the conservative 
boyars who rubbed shoulders with them to the peasants who rarely encountered one, 
regarded foreigners as dangerous heretics, and viewed four novelties and fashions with 
intense suspicion even terror.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 4). This xenophobic attitude would 
become an important factor when we consider the major transition experienced during 
this era of Russian history. Much of this backwardness attributed to an almost prejudiced 
attitude toward the outside world.  “During the reign of Peter’s immediate predecessors, 
foreigners were still in Russia on sufferance, tolerated as a necessary evil.” (Hughes, 
1998, p. 4).   Russia remained steeped within its tradition, wary of new concepts and 
ideas. So influential was this intolerant ideology that the Russian government enacted 
laws to prevent contact by its people through travel. “Russian culture was prevented from 
falling further under foreign influence by strict controls. For example, publishing and 
printing remain firmly in the hands of the church.” (Hughes, 1998, pp. 4-5).  The 
propagation of the xenophobic attitude that the Russian people adopted toward foreigners 
was as much a product of the Russian Orthodox Church as it was the government 
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hierarchy. The church was so dominant in internal Russian affairs during this era that “it 
is a striking statistic that in the whole of the 17
th
 century fewer than 10 secular titles came 
off Muscovite presses, which were devoted mainly to the production of liturgical and 
devotional text.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 5).  
 “The more civilized a country is, the better it is peopled. Thus China and India 
are more populous than any other empires, because, after a multitude of revolutions …, 
these two nations made the earliest establishment of civil society…” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 
33).  Voltaire’s evaluation of the Russian people and their society reflects the dismissive 
attitude regarding Russia that prevailed in the courts of Europe. “The most valuable 
service that Peter performed for his country was to transform it from a maligned nation… 
engaged in mainly fending off the attacks of its neighbors, to a world power with a pro-
active role in international politics.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 21).  The Russia prior to the 
period studied, in the contemporary world’s view, was in many ways very different from 
the Russia that would follow.   
This is the nation-state of Russia as it was prior to the conflicts and transitions 
which the study will examine. Russia presented a technologically backward, socially 
inept, relatively poor nation in comparison to the rest of the world.  All the advantages 
offered in the arts and sciences of the renaissance period, including technological, 
economical, and social, were relatively ignored within the Russian nation-state. “There 
were no Russian printed new sheets, journals or almanacs; no plays, poetry or philosophy 
in print, although this lack was partially compensated by popular literature in manuscript, 
a flourishing oral tradition.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 5). Russia was so averse to foreign ideas 
and influence that in 1675, Czar Alexis decreed “courtiers are forbidden to adapt foreign 
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German and other customs, to cut the hair on their heads and to wear robes, tunics and 
hats of foreign design, and they are to their bid their servants to do so.” (Hughes, 1998, p. 
5).  
However, this picture of Russia would evolve during the study period.  It is for 
this reason that the study begins during this period. Although resistance to modernization 
and Europeanism within the upper echelon of Russian society, and across all levels of 
Russian society, would remain long after Peter’s death, it is arguable that the foundations 
of modern Russia emerged during this period.  During the short time frame examined, 
Russia underwent a transitional period that saw an enlightenment of society. “The 
Russians came very late, but the arts having been introduced amongst them in their full 
perfection, it has happened, that they have made more progress in fifty years, than any 
other nation had done before them in five hundred.” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 33). Voltaire’s 
evaluation not only speaks of the arts, but also the society as a whole, as Russia embraced 
European ideas and customs.   
Demographically, Russia during this period was based upon a class system not 
unlike the feudal system of Europe.  Voltaire’s evaluation of the population of Russia 
showed a culture steeped in feudal servitude. Voltaire calculated Russia’s population 
from tax records of the time, showing a population of 6.6 million inhabitants.  Of these, 
nearly 6 million were bondsmen (slaves) to the crown or noble land owners. (Voltaire, 
1845, pp. 34-35).  “To this number we may add the military list, which amounts to three 
hundred and fifty thousand men: besides, neither the nobility nor clergy, who are 
computed at two hundred thousand, are subject to this capitation.” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 35).  
The class breakdown of Russian society is important to understanding the magnitude of 
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the transitions that will be examined in the conflicts that were experienced by Russia 
during this era. Also of importance is understanding the sheer size and scope of the vast 
Russian Empire. With much of its land considered almost uninhabitable, the borders of 
the Russian nation-state touched a wide range of differing cultural areas. From the Nordic 
states, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, the ancient influences of other cultures was 
evident and could quite well be the determining factor to the xenophobic attitudes so 
evident during Peter’s reign. “The customs, diets, and manners of the Russians, ever bore 
a greater affinity to those of Asia than to those of Europe.” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 39).  
As presented here in this brief overview of Russian society, the characteristics of 
that society will assist with putting the transitions and conflicts of the era into 
perspective. From a behavioral standpoint, general Russian society presents us with an 
interesting profile. The late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 century societal profile shows a religiously 
devout people firmly under the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. This devotion 
to church and cultural traditions led to a state of almost obsessive xenophobic attitudes. 
The Russian people, along with the secular and religious hierarchies, present as 
distrustful isolationists with a tendency toward rigidity. The class structure, as exhibited 
during the era, presents a majority of the population that is submissive to both church and 
state, while possessing no documented examples of inquisitiveness. The population is 
largely uneducated and agrarian.  For the common man, concerns regarding international 
affairs were furthest from the mind.  The majority of the Russian population was trapped 
in a feudal system, beholden to an aristocracy, more concerned with survival than 
reformation. Whereas the new Czar was interested in promoting the international 
influence of the Russian state, and reforming the social structure of the nation to more 
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contemporary conditions, the aristocracy and church were more supportive of 
maintaining the status quo.  The following chart represents the conclusions regarding the 
majority of the Russian people.  The Czar, aristocracy, and church will be evaluated later. 
 
Table 3-1 
 
As shown in the Big 5 model of behavioral characteristics, Russia depicts a 
society adverse to new experiences and cautious of outside influences. Their general 
tendency to xenophobia signifies a solitary and reserved society, which strengthens the 
conclusion regarding the societal openness. The society is not analytical and the 
aforementioned xenophobia makes them detached from the outside world. The class 
structure exhibited by Russian society in this era also signals the detachment of the 
majority of the population through their servitude. No documentation would indicate 
from the society as a whole a feeling of security or confidence. In regards to 
conscientiousness, no classification was rendered, as none of the characteristics could be 
justified through the historical records of the examined era. 
 
 
Trait Openness 
to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Char. Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs.  
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Period 
Evaluation 
Cautious N/A Solitary 
Reserved 
Detached Nervous 
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Bio of Peter the Great 
 
The era is understandably known for the charismatic leader who originated the 
transitions of the period.  The biographical data regarding Peter I is extremely consistent 
throughout the historical records and perspectives. The consensus of the historical data is 
almost unanimous in its conclusion that Peter I was not only the father of modern Russia, 
but that his actions also transformed Europe from that point forward (Anisimov, 1993; 
Bushkovitch, 2001; Hughes, 1998; Oliva, 1970; Voltaire, 1845). The accomplishments of 
Peter I created the resulting transitions and conflicts which will be addressed in later 
sections. For the purpose of this section, the examination will focus upon the man himself 
and the personality and behavioral traits historically agreed upon as dominant factors.   
Peter I, although uneducated, was nevertheless inventive and curious, (Voltaire, 
1845) supporting the openness to new experiences conclusions in the big 5 model.  The 
extent of his unbounded energy is unanimously agreed upon by current historians and by 
Peter’s contemporaries.  Much of the big five conclusions made by the study are based 
upon the accounts not only regarding his physical features, but also the manner in which 
he fully engaged himself to subjects not traditionally considered worthy of a monarch. 
“Peter the Great, this figure who drew such contradictory responses, was a man of 
gigantic physical size and a ruler of enormous energy and ambition. He stood almost 7 
feet tall and possessed immense physical strength and vigor” (Critchlow, 2001).  
However, beyond Peter’s physically dominating appearance, the manner in which 
he engaged himself in not only affairs of state, but also the trades of technology, were 
from which knowledge and his policies of Europeanism would spring. “In his 36 year 
reign, he involved himself personally and all affairs of state, diplomacy, administration, 
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justice, finance, industry, and education (Critchlow, 2001). Peter’s involvement in these 
aspects of national interest garnered mixed reviews from his contemporaries.  
However, the czar’s thirst for knowledge beyond the borders of the Russian 
Empire is undeniable. “As a self-taught man he learned to speak Dutch and German 
while becoming familiar with several other languages. In addition, he learned some 20 
different trades from shoemaking to shipbuilding” (Critchlow, 2001). Regardless of 
Princess Dashkova’s scathing opinion of Peter’s temperament, by all historic counts the 
czar understood the importance of hands-on training. “He was an accomplished military 
and naval commander. In this capacity, he studied the art of military and naval science, 
serving first in the ranks and learning the use of each weapon before promoting himself 
as an officer” (Critchlow, 2001; Bushkovitch, 2001). 
From these historical accounts, the study makes its conclusions regarding Peter in 
the big five model. The study determines that the historical records confirm that Peter the 
Great was inventive and curious, outgoing and energetic, secure and confident. His 
confidence and security was as much a product of his physical size as his understanding 
of his position in Russian society (Bushkovitch, 2001) (Critchlow, 2001) (Hughes, 1998). 
Peter’s commitment to learning 20 different trades and involving himself in all aspects of 
Russian governance is one of the factors, from which the study makes the conclusion that 
the czar, was analytical. In regards to the czar’s conscientiousness, the research considers 
the aforementioned evaluation of Princess Dashkova.  It must be remembered that Peter 
was a product of the monarchal society. Peter was born into a family of wealth, position, 
and the inherent free time to explore whims and passions that those two advantages 
provide.  His position in society and the inherent vices that go with it may be attributing 
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factors to Dashkova’s evaluation of Peter’s ignorance. They might also attribute to the 
accounts of Peter’s advancement of his policies without consideration of consequences 
(Critchlow, 2001; Hughes, 1998; D. Wilson, 2009). This disregard for consequences, for 
which Peter showed a propensity, was the factor that led to the conclusion by the study 
that the czar exhibited a personality trait of recklessness. 
 
Table 4-2 
Trait Openness to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Char. Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs.  
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Peter I Inventive 
Curious 
Careless Outgoing 
Energetic 
Analytical 
 
Secure 
Confident 
 
 Existent and Adhered to hierarchy 
o Within Russia during this era, the power of the czar rested in the hands 
of the aristocracy.  
o At the beginning of his reign, power was shared with his half-brother 
Ivan (D. Wilson, 2009; Bushkovitch, 2001).  
o During this period, the monarchy underwent power struggles 
emanating from Peter’s half-sister Sofia (Bushkovitch, 2001). Shifts in 
power and influence were common to Russian politics of the time.  
o The strength and influence of the position of czar was only increased 
during the reign of Peter the Great as the influence of the aristocracy 
declined in favor of a more centralized power structure. 
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o  Peter’s understanding of this hierarchy and his adherence to it were 
critical factors in the creation of a governance structure with the czar 
as undisputed head (Bushkovitch, 2001).   
o Peter understood the hierarchy of his governance structure and adhered 
to it. 
 Planned economic policy, planned foreign policy, planned social policy 
o Peter I involved himself in all aspects of state politics.  
o His social policy of Europeanism for the Russian state was as much an 
economic and foreign policy as it was an internal social policy.  
 Adherence to economic policy, adherence to foreign policy, adherence to 
social policy 
o Peter’s policy of Europeanism for the Russian state guided not only his 
social policy but also the policies of economics and foreign relations.  
o His commitment to these policies is confirmed by his adherence to 
advancement of Russian throughout his reign (Bushkovitch, 2001; 
Oliva, 1970; Hughes, 1998; Voltaire, 1845).  
 Internal harmony, positive constituency opinion 
o Most of the aristocracy did not enthusiastically embrace Peter’s desire 
for Europeanism. Many of the aristocracy feared the more monarch 
centric governance structures of the European powers.  
o This fear was flamed by the knowledge that a more powerful central 
monarch led to declines in the influence of the aristocracy.  
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o The mixed reaction to Peter’s policies by those below the status of the 
social elite was as much a product of the Russian Orthodox Church’s 
opposition to allowing the heretical ideas of Catholicism within 
Russian borders as it was with the specific policies themselves 
(Hughes, 1998; Voltaire, 1845).  
The Russian writer Michael Kheraskov “captures the heroic, Christ like 
redeeming qualities of Peter the reformer” (Critchlow, 2001), whereas Princess Catherine 
Dashkova (1744 – 1810), express a less flattering view of the czar as “quick-tempered, 
brutal, despotic, he treated all without this distinction like slaves who had to bear 
everything; his ignorance prevented him from seeing that some innovations that he had 
introduced by force would have introduced themselves peacefully given time” 
(Critchlow, 2001).  Many historians attribute this difference of opinion as a result of 
partisanship. 
 Positive Diplomatic Relations 
o It is difficult to quantify the characteristics of the majority of 
diplomatic relations during this era.  
o The ongoing conflict with Sweden, a major power at the time, and her 
allies separates much of the European world into two almost equal 
factions, one of which saw Russian relations as good, (her allies), and 
the other were those who saw Russian relations as bad, (her enemies). 
However, only in the category of diplomatic relations is the characteristic chart 
divided in its conclusion. In this category, as indicated, the opinion was mixed. 
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The categories that are classified in the chart as disorganized are the relationships 
internally and with other branches of the government’s structure, in this case with the 
aristocracy, whose motivations were to maintain their power, which the new policies 
placed in jeopardy. The majority of the chart, however, shows that in the context of the 
study, as a head of state, Peter showed a propensity to be organized (see table 4-3). 
 
Table 4-3 
Organized Disorganized 
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy   
Planned economic policy   
Planned foreign policy   
Planned social policy   
Adherence to economic policy   
Adherence to foreign policy   
Adherence to social policy   
 Internal Conflict 
Positive Diplomatic Relations  Negative Diplomatic Relations 
Positive constituency opinion   
 
From the behavioral chart (see table 4-3), the study concludes that Peter the Great 
exhibited characteristics that would classify him as organized.   
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Governance 
 
 The governance structure of this era presents a stark contrast to the nation’s new 
czar. Much of this contrast is due to the shift in power experienced during the reign of 
Peter the Great. “It is said that the sovereign from the beginning wielded his monarchal 
power more absolutely than his predecessors” (Strahlenberg, 1985). This transition to a 
more absolute monarchy and the decline of the influence of the aristocracy continued in 
military and naval statutes. “His Majesty is a sovereign monarch, who is not answerable 
to anyone in the world in his affairs, but holds the power and authority to rule his 
realms… as a Christian monarch by his own will and good opinion” (Hughes, 1998, p. 
92).  This shifting, and the caution exhibited by the remaining governing structures of the 
Duma and Senate, are the foundation of the big 5 conclusions of personality presented 
below.  The hierarchy of the government was committed to retaining the “old ways” by 
opposing the European influences proposed by the Czar.  As their power declined, the 
former “legislative” bodies became more detached from governance, although not 
entirely by their choice. This detachment and decline, attributed to a reserved position in 
their ability to impose their ideas, also was a condition not entirely of their choice, both 
of which created an understandably nervous lack of confidence regarding their future 
position. However, it is in their cautious or more specifically their adverse approach to 
the new social policies of the Czar, as well as their adherence to their consistency in their 
opposition, from which the study draws its conclusion that the governance structure was 
reckless, and thereby contributed to their own decline and the continued loss of influence 
(Hughes, 1998).   
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Contrary to the claims of the Princess Dashkova, who resided within the legions of 
the aristocracy, which stood to lose much of their power and influence, Peter did show by 
all historic accounts an understanding and sensitivity to the concept of despotism 
(Hughes, 1998, p. 93). “Yet in some respects Peter was an autocrat by default, in that he 
tried to make others take decisions and act independently, to the extent of resorting to 
mock delegation and pretending on occasion that he was not czar at all” (Hughes, 1998, 
p. 93). “Although rejecting representative institutions, Peter developed bodies from the 
Magistrates Chamber of 1699 to the Senate in 1711. Each with a semblance of 
independent authority in so far as they were not immediately reliant on the presence of 
the czar as was for example, the old-style boyar Duma” (Hughes, 1998). 
The big 5 model of the governance structure shows the behavioral traits, as compared 
to the rising Czar, as stark opposites, with one chart illustrating the behavior of a rising 
power and the other charting the traits of a power in decline. 
Table 4-4 
Trait Openness to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Char. Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs.  
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Governance Consistent Careless Reserved Detached 
 
Nervous 
 
 In regards to the secondary trait model presented in the study, the governance 
structure during the reign of Peter the Great presents great inconsistencies with which to 
draw conclusions.  
 Existent and Adhered to hierarchy 
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o Historical records are clear that the structure of the time accepted and 
adhered to the hierarchal structure even as its structure itself was in 
transition.   
o Adherence means in so far as the aristocracy continued to accept the 
authority of the monarchy, even though the extension of power by 
Peter infringed beyond the normal limits of the historical position and 
power of past Czars.  
o There was, however, considerable opposition to the reformation 
policies, most strongly from the Orthodox Church and the reigning 
Patriarch.  
o Nevertheless, with only portions of the aristocracy willing to oppose 
the Czar, and that opposition being ill coordinated and without much 
substance, the social reform continued unabated.  
 Planned economic, foreign, social policy 
o The government accepted that a planned foreign and economic policy 
existed, which was directly tied into the Czar’s social policy of 
Europeanism.  
o However, the government’s position, mainly that of the church and the 
aristocracy, was in opposition to the modernization and move toward a 
more European social order.   
o The preferred social, economic, and foreign policy of the aristocracy 
and Orthodox Church was predominantly to continue with the methods 
and policies of the past that were less challenging to their authority. 
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 Adherence to economic, foreign, and social policy 
o Through their rejection of the social policy, they also in principle 
rejected the economic policies.  
o Regarding the foreign policy, the government was supportive of the 
alliances and war effort during the Great Northern War, taking a more 
nationalist approach.  
o The conclusion of being disorganized in two of these three areas is 
based upon the inability of the legislative bodies of Russia’s 
government to present any noticeable opposition to promote the 
policies they would support and thereby halt the modernization of 
Russian society. 
 Internal harmony 
o This disorganization and the resulting fight by the aristocracy to 
maintain power lead to a decline in internal harmony and the general 
harmony within the government.  
o During this time of transition within the early 18th century, Russian 
government cooperation was not a commodity often used.   
o As the reformation continued, purging of the “old guard” endured, and 
as the aristocrats formerly in positions of power were replaced by 
those more favorable to the Czars policies, harmony improved. 
 Positive Diplomatic Relations 
149 
 
 
o During the time of Peter the Great, diplomatic relations, beyond the 
relations between the separate factions within Russia, were the 
purview of the Czar.   
 Positive constituency opinion 
o The cumulative effect of this internal disarray did not promote positive 
opinion by the lower classes within society, who historically had 
enough reasons to distrust and despise the aristocracy.   
o Once the populace began to understand the reformation’s goals, 
support for the modernization increased, while the aristocracy’s 
support by the people, already low, continued to dissolve.  
Table 4-5 
 Organized Disorganized 
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy Rejected Hierarchy 
 Obscure economic policy 
Planned foreign policy   
Planned social policy   
 Abandoned economic policy 
Planned foreign policy  
 Abandoned social policy 
 Internal Conflict 
Positive Diplomatic Relations  Negative Diplomatic Relations  
 Positive constituency opinion No 
 
From the behavioral chart the study concludes that the governance structure of 
Russia during the period of evaluation was predominantly disorganized. 
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Transition the Reformation a Russian society 
 
The transition experienced during the reign of Peter the Great was the planned 
modernization of Russian society through the introduction of Europeanism.  The reforms 
proposed were widespread and affected all aspects of Russian society. For the purpose of 
this study, the exact specifics of the reforms enacted by Peter the Great are of less 
significance than for us to understand the methodology in which the reforms took place. 
When we consider the chart below, the questions being answered are a response to the 
event itself rather than the elements which precipitated or resisted the event. It is in this 
context that we consider the behavioral characteristics chart likened to that of a crime 
scene evaluation we would find in criminal profiling. As outlined in chapter 3, the 
methodology, when we refer to the charts regarding the transition, international and 
domestic conflicts, the response conclusions are an attempt to get a feel for the 
progression of the scene with conclusions that might affect the elements of head of state, 
and governance is reaction to the unfolding events. 
 Event Planned 
o The event was meticulously planned by the czar and not some 
spontaneous outcropping.  
o Industrialization and the reform of the serf economy were cornerstones to 
Peter’s new Imperial Russia.  
o “Building a new state structure was only part of the grandiose task that the 
great reformer Russia had set out to accomplish. His field of vision 
encompassed not only the administrative structure, economic policy, and 
military affairs, but society itself” (Anisimov, 1993, p. 184). 
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 Event Measured 
o The introduction and conduction of the event was well coordinated by the 
czar and his supporters and their actions were deliberate and with the full 
understanding of the reactions of the potential opponents. 
 Event Coordinated 
o The event was controlled as a transformation of Russia to a more 
European style monarchy, and the social structure was conducted over a 
period of time and in a very systematic manner.  
o They included the overhaul of the economic system traditionally 
employed, and even the clerical ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church, 
which maintained significant influence over the aristocracy, the czar, and 
thereby the state, would not be immune to the Reformation and under the 
new Imperial system saw a decline in their power. 
  “In his opinion the patriarchal system of administering the church 
had become ineffective” (Anisimov, 1993, p. 203).  
 In the eyes of the Reformation, the Russian church could become a 
princely system and enjoyed too much autonomy, which was in 
contradiction to the autocratic regime in which Peter desire to 
create (Anisimov, 1993, p. 204).  
 Offense/defense Planned 
o None applicable. 
 Event: Aggression 
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o Although it is true that in some cases aggressive tactics were used in the 
face of opposition,  such as the execution of Peter’s son Alexi who was 
seen as a potential rallying point for those aristocrats who might harbor 
ideas of resistance (Anisimov, 1993) (Bushkovitch, 2001) (Hughes, 1998) 
(Voltaire, 1845), the study concludes that this aggression is more 
attributable to domestic conflict, which will be examined later. 
 Event: Targeted 
o Each specific aspect of Russian society was targeted, and the ideals of 
Reformation were specifically tailored, as in the case of the Reformation 
of the Russian church, to transform the institution or societal element into 
a social body more desirable to an autocratic system. 
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o The Russian transformation owes much of its success to the maintaining 
of the ideological perspective from which it began.  
o The ideology of the Reformation was to create an all-Russian subject 
people much in the design of the European powers.  
 “Substantial changes came to the nobility’s position” (Anisimov, 
1993, p. 184).  
o Prior to the great Reformation, the Czar was an elected head of state 
selected from the ruling family by the aristocracy.  
 Members of the aristocracy maintain control over a Russia divided 
into separate provinces they governed.  
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 However, the reforms would change all that: “indeed, the noblest 
date of the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries, in the form that has come down 
to us from literature, was formed or, better, organized by Peter” 
(Anisimov, 1993, p. 184).   
 Event Specific 
o There is a significant number of elements to the Russian Reformation of 
the late 17
th
 and early 18
th
 centuries.  
 However, examining each element individually does not promote a 
better understanding of the overall characteristics of the event.  
 For example, the fact that at some point in time during the 
Reformation a tax was levied on all males who insisted on 
maintaining a beard (Anisimov, 1993; Hughes, 1998; Voltaire, 
1845),  
o Although an interesting historical fact, does little to 
increase our understanding of the general characteristics 
which shaped the Great Russian Reformation. 
For the Russian Reformation, the progression of the event is historically agreed 
upon concerning most of its elements. As exhibited in the chart below, the process of the 
Russian Reformation was an extremely organized undertaking.  
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Table 4-6 
Organized Disorganized 
Planned   
Measured   
Coordinated   
  
  
Generally Peaceful  
Targeted  
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Goal Orientated   
  
The study concludes that from a scene profile standpoint, the transition event 
examined is classified as 100% organized. 
Domestic Conflict Strel’sty Revolt 
 
In 1698, Russia was embroiled in two separate domestic conflicts conducted 
during the absence of the Czar and piloted by regiments of musketeers, or Strel’sty 
(Hughes, 1998). Although both revolts were believed to be instigated by the Czar’s half-
sister, no evidence was found beyond the Strel’sty position that following the overthrow 
of Peter, Sofia would be the obvious choice to replace him and return Russia to the “old 
ways” (D. Wilson, 2009, p. 65). The second, and larger, of the two revolts required a 
military response from those who remained in Russia during Peter’s absence and were 
loyal to the Czar. Voltaire (1845) presents a general account of the revolt; however, that 
account has be ignored by the study due to its obvious biased position against the 
Strel’sty and its opinionated conclusions as to the reasons and intrigue that Voltaire 
associated with the event.  
 Event Planned/coordinated/measured  
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o The revolt was ill planned and was a spontaneous event resulting 
from the Czar’s fortuitous absence from Moscow.  
o With so many different elements involved in the coup attempt, 
from the old guard military to the clergy to the traditionalist 
aristocracy, beyond the desire of usurping the Czar there was little 
coordination or control of the numerous factions of the event.  
o Although the Strel’sty had legitimate grievances regarding arrears 
of pay and unusual lengths of service (D. Wilson, 2009, p. 63), the 
revolt took shape when combined with the traditionalist elements 
of the aristocracy.   
 Offense Planned 
o Once in Moscow, the mutineers had planned to overtake the 
Voscrescziniskii monastery, thereby establishing an impregnable 
base (D. Wilson, 2009, p. 64).  
o This strategy was the extent of their military planning.   
o However, following the revolt, the Strel’sty continued to be a thorn 
in the Czar’s side.  
 “Cruel retribution was not enough to suppress the 
musketeer’s disaffection. If anything, exasperated it, 
especially as, after 1698, they were banned from Moscow 
and spread discontent all over Russia” (Hughes, 1998, p. 
454). 
 Defense Planned 
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o There is no evidence that preparation was made for defensive 
action if resistance occurred before their objective was obtained. 
(D. Wilson, 2009). 
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o The Strel’sty harbored resentment to the modernization proposed 
by the Czar, as the new military order introduced German officers 
designated to train and in many cases lead the new Russian 
military.   
o To the Germans, the Strel’sty was a unit that epitomized the 
backwardness of the Russian society: outdated and inefficient.   
 The new order relegated the Strel’sty to simple guard duty 
and little more than servitude to their new German masters.  
o Like the aristocracy, this loss of prestige and social standing was a 
major factor in the ideology of the revolts.  
  “During investigations it became clear that musketeers had 
vague notions of driving out traders and foreigners, 
establishing leaders sympathetic to them, and restoring the 
old order under which they, had enjoyed a privileged 
position” (Hughes, 1998, p. 454).  
o The ideological perspective of the former musketeers would 
continue.  
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 In July 1705 (Hughes, 1998), a new revolt would emerge 
from the same faction, with greater emphasis upon 
religious orthodoxy. 
 Event Specific/targeted 
o The goals of the coup, beyond the replacement of Peter, extended 
only to the Strel’sty abandonment of their posts and marching upon 
the capital.  
 “In their petitions to the authorities, vows to kill the 
Germans who were destroying orthodoxy mingled with 
threats to wipe out the new infantry regiments, their 
perceived rivals” (Hughes, 1998, p. 454). 
 
Table 4-7 
Organized Disorganized 
 Spontaneous 
 Disproportional 
 Coordinated  Not across all Elements 
Offense Planned  
 Defense Reactionary 
 Aggression 
 General Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective  
Goal Orientated  
 
From the historical data, the study concludes that the Strel’sty revolts of 1698 
were spontaneous in nature, and therefore poorly coordinated and controlled.  Although 
limited offensive strategies were made, no consideration to defensive strategies existed 
prior to the coup’s obtainment of their primary objective of securing the monastery. The 
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event was specifically targeted at the reforms of the Czar and continued to maintain, for 
the short duration of the revolt, its ideological perspective. From a scene profile 
standpoint, this domestic conflict event would be classified as disorganized. 
International Conflict the Great Northern War 
 
For the study to focus on one single battle, or even year of the conflict, would 
offer conclusions that might skew the evaluation toward an incorrect conclusion. As an 
example of the study’s contention that becoming singularly focused upon an individual 
event can lead to incorrect conclusions, the study presents the events of the battle of 
Narva, as retold by Voltaire (1845). One of the consequences of the reforms to introduce 
European ideologies to Russian culture was the Russian defeat at Narva. As was seen in 
the domestic conflict, which involved the musketeer regiment revolts, the current Russian 
army resented the introduction of European officers into their ranks. In many cases, these 
more experienced European officers would be put in positions of authority above the 
Russian counterparts. At Narva, with the Russian forces outnumbering the Swedes 10 to 
1, this resentment became evident. Following the placement of his army, the Czar quit the 
battlefield to attend a conference with allies, at which time shortly thereafter the small 
Swedish forces attacked. Surprised by the attack, the Russian army turned on his German 
officers and allies. “The duke de Croi attempted to give his orders, but prince Dolgorouki 
would not receive them. The Russian officers rose upon the German officers… Every one 
abandoned his post; and tumult, confusion, and a panic of terror, spread through the 
whole army” (Voltaire, 1845, p. 121). The result of prince Dolgorouki’s insubordination, 
coupled with the Russian resentment of their German allies, was a complete and total 
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Swedish victory. According to Voltaire (1845), “The Swedish troops had nothing more to 
do, but to cut in pieces those who were flying. Some threw themselves into the river 
Narva, where great numbers were drowned; others threw down their arms, and fell upon 
their knees before the conquering Swedes” (p. 121). This account of the battle, if being 
the single focal point for the study’s conclusions, would represent a far different picture 
than examination of the overall campaign presents.  
 Event Planned  
o The conducting of the Great Northern War was a very organized 
event, meticulously planned by both sides, which possessed 
concrete goals and objectives.  
 Although the study concedes that over the period of a long 
protracted conflict, such as the Great Northern War, some 
periods existed that exhibited less organized behavior than 
at other times, the consensus of historical data clearly 
indicates that the Great Northern War, by virtue of its 
length and military execution, was an organized affair.  
o “Peter’s declaration of war against Sweden in 1700 was not 
unheralded. In 1605, a British agent in Stockholm quoted a letter 
from Lefort to the effect that two Russian armies were to be 
dispatched” (Hughes, 1998, p. 27). 
 Event Measured 
o From the Russian perspective, the entire conflict involved the 
recapturing of territories once lost to Sweden that offered access to 
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important ports that would further the Czars plan to create Russia’s 
first formidable naval force.  
 “At this very time czar Peter entertained thoughts of seizing 
upon Ingria and Carelia. These provinces had formerly 
belonged to the Russians, but the Swedes had made 
themselves masters of them by force of arms...” (Voltaire, 
1845, p. 118).   
 Event Coordinated 
o Throughout the period of the great Northern war, like all extended 
conflicts, there are examples of victory and defeat, alliances and 
betrayals, and the shifting of advantage which is inherent to all 
extended conflicts.  
o Due to the volatility of the conditions that were experienced 
throughout the conflict period, the data evaluation must be made 
and the conclusions drawn from the preponderance of historical 
perspectives regarding the overall conducting of the conflict:  
No European ruler was a free-agent; each had to take account of the 
complex system of alliances and be alert to nuances and sudden changes. 
Russia had to join in the concert of nations, come what may, and to that 
end, in the course of his reign, Peter entered into diplomatic relations with 
virtually all the countries of Europe and some Asian ones too. (Hughes, 
1998, p. 27). 
 Offense/Defense/Aggression 
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o According to Hughes (1998), “The bare-bones of the story from 
the Russian point of view are condensed” (p. 26)  
 between the defeat in 1700 at Narva, as outlined above, and 
  the victory in 1704 at Narva four years later.  
 Between the battles of Narva came the founding of St. 
Petersburg in 1703.   
 For the Russians, the turning point of the war was the 
decisive battle of 1709 at Poltava and the capture of the 
ports on the southeastern Baltic shore in 1710.   
 This followed by the Finnish campaign of 1713-1714 and  
 finally culminated with the treaty of Nystad in 1721 and the 
subsequent end of the war. (Hughes, 1998; Bushkovitch, 
2001).  
 In total, the hostilities of the great Northern war were 
engaged in over a period of 18 years. 
 Event: Targeted 
o Like in all long protracted conflicts, the entire conflict cannot be 
judged through the lens of a single event, nor, for the purpose of 
this study, can the conflict scene be evaluated from only one side 
of the conflict.   
o When the conclusions regarding a conflict or transition are 
evaluated, the study looks at the conflict as an entire event, seeking 
a preponderance of action from which conclusions can be drawn.  
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One of the principal causes of all the revolutions which happened from 
Ingria, as far as Dresden, and which laid waste so many countries for 
the space of eighteen years, was the abuse of the supreme power, by 
Charles XI. king of Sweden, father of Charles XII. (Voltaire, 1845, p. 
118)  
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o Hughes (1998) maintains that “The most viable service that Peter 
performed for his country was to transform it from a maligned 
nation…, engaged mainly in fending off the attacks of its 
neighbors, to a world power with a proactive role in international 
politics” (p. 21).  
o The great Northern war was as much about the obtainment of 
respect as it was about the strategic military goals of the conflict.  
 “Now Denmark, Holland… Saxony, two, and almost all the 
German Empire, one spoke and thought ill of the Russian 
realm, have changed your bad opinions for the better” 
(Hughes, 1998, p. 21).  
 Event Specific 
o “The catalyst for Peter’s decision to attack Sweden was the end of 
the war with Turkey” (Hughes, 1998, p. 27). 
o “The Austro-Ottoman peace of Karlowitz appeared to leave Russia 
out in the cold with only a two year truce and none of the gains 
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deemed essential for consolidating the capture of Azov” (Hughes, 
1998, p. 27).  
o Therefore, in a time of conflict, Russia’s opportunity to increase 
her political and influential standing throughout the world was at 
hand.  
 “The reasons given for Moscow’s declaration of war on 19 
August 1700 where the insults suffered at Riga in 1697 and 
the Swedish crowns illegal occupation of Russian territory” 
(Hughes, 1998, p. 28).   
o The insult to the Russian ambassadors was as much a reason for 
the declaration of war as was Sweden’s conquering of territory and 
subjugating the ethnic Russians within.  
 “We are avenging the insult dealt to us and our 
ambassadors… For which, in response to a request to the 
Swedish ambassadors, the king of Sweden refused to give 
satisfaction” (Hughes, 1998, p. 28).  
o All historic accounts lead to the conclusion that the Russian war 
with Sweden was as much about respect as it was about territory.  
o Using the territorial dispute and the perceived diplomatic 
dishonoring of the Russian ambassadors, Peter was presented with 
a vehicle in which to engage in alliances with the rest of Europe, 
thereby increasing Russia’s position on the world stage. 
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o In Sweden’s defense, King Charles of Sweden made great claims 
that the Russian delegation had been treated with all possible 
civility.  
 “He pointed out, reasonably enough, that it was not the 
usual practice for diplomatic personnel to look around forts 
with telescopes explore fortifications, and make sketches of 
walls and buttresses” (Hughes, 1998).  
Regardless of the validity of Russia’s claims regarding territory and diplomatic 
slights, the conclusion that the conduction of the great Northern war was in fact an 
organized affair is borne out by the miscalculations of the Russian leadership, as “Peter 
was also taking on a more formidable enemy that he had imagined. Far from being an 
easy target, Sweden’s boy king proved to be even more single-mindedly devoted to war 
than Peter himself” (Hughes, 1998, p. 29). 
Table 4-8 
Organized Disorganized 
Planned   
Measured   
Coordinated   
Offense Planned   
Defense Planned   
 Aggressive 
Targeted Response  
Maintained Ideological Perspective  
Goal Orientated  
 
Therefore, with consideration for the specific rational for the conduction of the 
war by both sides and the planned execution of the overall campaign, the study classifies 
the Great Northern War as Organized.   
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 Engagement of the Transition and Conflict by the Secondary Elements 
 
The comparative analysis continues with the evaluation of how the secondary 
elements, head of state and governance structure, responded to the transitions and 
conflicts presented to them. Since this is the first period of evaluation, this era serves as 
the benchmark for determining homogony within the other evaluation periods. This is the 
era where the data conclusions will be measured against the conclusions of the following 
periods. The study has already made its conclusions regarding the behavioral 
characteristics of the secondary elements and the organizational characteristics of the 
event, as presented in the earlier sections. Now, the study will present its data regarding 
the response of those secondary elements to the events.  Evaluation of the conclusions 
made in this chapter will be presented in chapter 5. The evaluation begins with the 
reaction of Peter I to the reformation of Russian society.   
 Reaction Planned, Measured, and Coordinated  
o As this transformation was planned and implemented by the Czar, 
the conclusions of Peter’s reaction to the event are parallel to the 
characteristics of the event.  
o However, by all historical accounts, the Czar’s plan of reformation 
was pre-planned and executed in a coordinated, controlled and 
measured fashion, without the need for aggressive tactics. 
 Offense/Defense Planned, Aggression 
o The only deviation is in the category of offense and defense.  
o  Since the Czar enacted the transformation event, there was no 
need for consideration of these two elements.   
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 Event: Targeted, Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o The ideological perspective was maintained and specifically 
targeted at the areas believed to be in need of reform.  
 “Inasmuch as the state is not a God-given but a human 
creation, man himself may also perfect it, converted it into 
an ideal instrument for the transformation of society 
(Anisimov, 1993, pp. 144-145).  
o The organized manner in which the Reformation was conducted is 
illustrated in the length of time the policies endured.  
 “The grandiose, and all-encompassing nature of the Petrine 
transformations was such that even after century and more 
they had not become merely history but continued to be 
something real and vital that affected everyday life” 
(Anisimov, 1993, p. 3). 
 
Table 4-9 
Organized Disorganized 
Planned   
Measured   
Coordinated   
Peaceful  
Targeted Response  
Maintained Ideological Perspective  
Goal Orientated  
 
The study therefore concludes that the head of states reaction to the transition of 
Russian social and political reform was 100% organized. The same cannot be said of the 
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reaction of the governance structure of the time. The government presented a confused 
response, if any, due in part to the fact that the transition being enacted was targeted to 
reform the government as well as the social structure (Anisimov, 1993).  It should also be 
noted that the reaction of the government was not universal.  As was traditional in 
Russian politics of the time, factions existed along family lines that divided the 
aristocracy into supporters and detractors of the Czars reforms (Anisimov, 1993; 
Bushkovitch, 2001; Voltaire, 1845). This division is illustrated in the classification of 
“mixed” in the template and thereby strengthens a disorganized conclusion. Also of 
consideration is the response of the Orthodox Church; although not traditionally 
considered a part of a government, it was a faction that had significant influence over 
social and political policy and was also a target of reformation (Anisimov, 1993). 
Regardless of the source of the government response, there was no planning involved for 
a course of action they did not have (Anisimov, 1993).  
Table 4-10 
Organized Disorganized 
 Spontaneous 
 Disproportional as to effectiveness 
Coordinated Czar Supporters Yes Coordinated Czar Opposition No 
Peaceful  
 General Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective Yes  
Goal Orientated  
 
The study can only conclude that due to the disarray displayed by the government 
through its un-unified response and the use of ineffective attempts at slowing the progress 
of the reforms, the government response was disorganized. The Czar’s response to the 
Strel’sty rebellion shows the ability of Peter to react to totally unforeseen events. 
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Although the mutiny by the old guard forces was unexpected and therefore spontaneous, 
causing the Czar’s reaction to be also spontaneous, beyond the lack of restraint shown by 
the Czar’s response, the quelling of the domestic conflict was swift and effective.  
 
Table 4-11 
Organized Disorganized 
Planned  Reaction Spontaneous onset of conflict 
Measured   
Coordinated   
Offense Planned  Offense Reactionary onset of conflict 
Defense Planned  Defense Reactionary onset of conflict 
Aggressive For this event aggression 
organized 
 
Targeted Response  
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Goal Orientated  
 
For evaluation purposes regarding the Czar’s response to the musketeer mutiny, 
commentary must be made regarding the conclusions. In the three areas of which the 
behavioral characteristics are classified as disorganized, it should be noted that all three 
of these areas were disorganized due to the onset of the conflict for which there was no 
foreknowledge and therefore no planning was possible. Following the initial onset of the 
conflict, these three areas transitioned into an organized response. Also of note in the 
evaluation is that normally progressiveness is a sign of disorganization. However, in this 
case, the aggressive actions taken were in fact an organized response to a violent 
rebellion. The study therefore concludes that the czar’s overall response to the domestic 
conflict was predominantly organized. 
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The government response to domestic conflict followed exactly the head of state 
response. Regardless of the fact that the transitions being enacted by the czar were 
unpopular with the aristocracy, the musketeer mutiny presented a threat as much to the 
position of the aristocracy as it did to that of the Czar. Although it has been noted that 
some of the grievances of the Strel’sty were grounded in the old guard military’s desire to 
return to the old ways, the concept of the military usurping the aristocracy was enough to 
motivate the government to support the Czar during this conflict (Anisimov, 1993). 
 
Table 4-12 
Organized Disorganized 
Planned Spontaneous onset of conflict 
Measured  
Coordinated  
Offense Planned  Offense Reactionary onset of conflict 
Defense Planned  Defense Reactionary onset of conflict 
Aggressive For this event aggression 
organized 
 
Targeted Response  
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Goal Orientated  
 
As was the case with the head of state response to the domestic conflict, since the 
government is presented in full support, thereby mirroring the actions of the czar, the 
study concludes that the government’s response to the domestic conflict was organized. 
In the case with the domestic conflict, the response of the head of state and the response 
of the government were parallel. The actions of both secondary elements organized 
response to a nationwide conflict. Divisions created by the czar’s social transformation 
policies did not play a part in the cooperation of the government during wartime. It is also 
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of note that the great Northern war which took place over the course of 18 years was 
conducted during times in which the Reformation of the government was fully 
established and many the old guards had already been replaced. However even during the 
beginning of the conflict, the besieged old guard of the government, maintained full 
support of the war effort, from a nationalistic standpoint. 
As mentioned during the evaluation of the conducting of the great Northern war 
during the 18 years of its engagement the actions of the Czar and the government were 
not always consistently organized, as would be expected during a long protected conflict. 
The inclusion of the study of both elements exhibiting an organized response to the 
international conflict is based upon the overall actions exhibited by both. As was the case 
with the domestic conflict in the category of aggression, the aggressiveness shown is 
classified as organized since it is a natural element of wartime. 
Table 4-13 
Organized Disorganized 
Planned   
Measured   
Coordinated   
Offense Planned   
Defense Planned   
Aggressive For this event aggression 
organized 
 
Reaction: Targeted Yes  
Maintained Ideological Perspective Yes  
Reaction Specific Yes  
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Table 4-14 
Organized Disorganized 
Reaction Planned   
Reaction Spontaneous  
Reaction Measured   
Reaction Coordinated   
Offense Planned   
Defense Planned   
Reaction: Aggression   
Reaction: Targeted   
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Reaction Specific   
Characteristic Charts 
 
Table 4-15 
Trait Openness to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Char. Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs.  
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Peter I Inventive 
Curious 
Careless Outgoing 
Energetic 
Analytical 
 
Secure 
Confident 
Governance Consistent Careless Reserved Detached 
 
Nervous 
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Table 4-16 
Subject Element Characteristic Option 1 Characteristic Option 2 
Leadership Biography Organized  
Governance Structure  Disorganized 
Transition Organized  
Leadership Response 
to Transition 
Organized  
Government Response 
to Transition 
 Disorganized 
Conflict Domestic  Disorganized 
Leadership Response 
to Domestic Conflict 
Organized  
Government Response 
to Domestic Conflict 
Organized  
Conflict International Organized  
Leadership Response 
to International 
Conflict 
Organized  
Government Response 
to International 
Conflict 
Organized  
 
The Post- Soviet Period (Vladimir Putin 2000 – Present) 
Profile of the Period   
 
Sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya presented a view of Russians in an interview 
with CNN in 2013, as “She’s an expert on Russia’s elites and its political system” 
(Dougherty, 2013).  Her views, unlike the views of much of the literature originating 
outside of Russian boarders by non-Russian scholars, gives a stark evaluation of Russian 
mentality today.  
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“It’s not that Russians want Communism back, although some do, but the whole 
structure of life and secure social programs fell apart along with the USSR” (Dougherty, 
2013). Although totalitarian, the old Soviet regime presented social advantages, and 
albeit far from the extravagant standards of Western norms, there did exist a social order, 
which Russians could count on. This is evident in their opinion of the United States: 
“Russians who lived during the Soviet Union grew up with government-inspired anti-
Americanism. It’s one of the pillars of our country’s ideology” (Dougherty, 2013).  This 
ideology, perpetuated by the state, was the go-to excuse for communism failures.  “It was 
formed a long time ago and was carefully instilled in people by the Soviet leaders. Why 
are there problems? ‘It’s those people, the evil Americans, who are at fault, who make 
things worse for us.’ It’s an ideological cliché.” (Dougherty, 2013).  
“But today’s Russians, this sociologist says, are split down the middle. We have 
an ideological war in Russia, the opposition, and Putin’s people; they are two different 
fronts’ (Dougherty, 2013).  While almost reminiscent of the split in society during the 
referendums of Peter the Great, in this instance, the nation’s leader is the one proposing a 
return to the ‘old ways’. The split in Russian social ideology is clearly demarked. “We 
want democracy and everything should be the way it is in the West. They are the 
‘Westerners.’ People who are for Putin – they once were called ‘Slavophiles’ – they say 
‘No, we are a separate civilization. We have our own special path, for us the West is not 
the way’ (Dougherty, 2013).  
However, the prevalent action is to oppose the ideologies of the West. “Russian 
presidents that Americans like are the ones Russians don’t like, Gorbachev, whom the 
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whole world loved, Russians didn’t like. It’s the mentality” (Dougherty, 2013). From this 
evaluation, the study makes the following conclusions using the Big 5 model: 
 
Table 4-17 
Trait Openness to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Char. Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs.  
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Period 
Evaluation 
Consistent 
Cautious 
 
N/A Solitary 
Reserved 
Detached Nervous 
 
Russia presents a divided society, not unlike the divisions along ideological and 
political lines experienced here in the United States. The Russian society is nervous, 
mainly due to the loss of the social structure protections of the old Soviet Union, which 
are absent today. The uncertainty that dominates Russian society today and the Russian 
people’s reaction to it expresses a great need for consistency, even when that consistency 
may not present the most desirable conditions. The observation that the Russians 
maintain the old ideologies regarding the West and the United States in particular suggest 
a consistency in actions and a solitary and reserved manner as it pertains to the outside 
world.  Although not xenophobic, as was the case during Peter’s time, there remains a 
distrust of outsiders and a general feeling of inferiority. This feeling of inferiority is an 
important characteristic in the research findings, as it represents a homogony which 
guides Russian opinion and action. The Russian people today have been indoctrinated 
with the concept that Russia is not respected by the West in the manner it should be. 
“Putin acts according to our traditional mentality which is to respect only strength. That 
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one has to be quite aggressive, that you have to demonstrate crude power so that people 
will respect you” (Dougherty, 2013).  This mentality is epitomized by the statement “We 
even have that expression – “when people fear you it means people respect you’ 
(Dougherty, 2013). This concept will be explored further in the discussion and conclusion 
sections of chapter 5.  
Bio Vladimir Putin 
 
To say that Vladimir Putin rose to power from obscurity might be an 
understatement.  However, when we consider the potential for a relatively obscure former 
KGB agent to rise to the office of the presidency to be attributed as much from the 
missteps, mistakes, and politically suicidal actions of his potential opponents as his own 
ambition and personal fortitude, in a country emerging from behind a wall of secrecy, this 
makes the possibility more believable. Gessen (2012) paints a picture of a leader who is 
as much illusion as reality: 
Because Vladimir Putin was catapulted to power from obscurity, and 
because he spent his entire adult life within the confines of a secret and 
secretive institution, he’s been able to exercise greater control over what is 
known about him than almost any other modern politician, certainly more 
than any modern Western politician. He has created his own mythology. 
This is a good thing, because, to a far greater extent than is usually 
possible for any man, Vladimir Putin has communicated to the world 
directly what he would like to be known about him and how he would like 
to be seen. What has emerged is very much the mythology of a child of 
post-siege Leningrad, a mean, hungry, impoverished place that bred mean, 
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hungry, ferocious children. At least, they were the ones who survived. 
(Gessen, 2012) 
This evaluation of Putin would hark back to the behaviorist theories of Skinner 
and Pavlov, who would argue that the situations we find ourselves in shape who we are 
based upon a fundamental understanding of reward.  Sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya 
presented a view of Putin in an interview with CNN in 2013 because “She’s an expert on 
Russia’s elites and its political system. For 23 years she headed the Department of Elite 
Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences and now is director general of the research 
center” (Dougherty, 2013).  Her evaluation of Putin is from a centralist Russian 
perspective. “In his first term, she recalls, Putin said the greatest geopolitical catastrophe 
of the 20th century was the dissolution of the Soviet Union” (Dougherty, 2013). As 
notated in the profile of the period, according to Kryshtanovskaya, Putin uses the anti-
American sentiments left over from the cold war. “When Putin thinks of how he can 
justify his policies, it’s faster to recall this old enemy than to create a new one. This 
external enemy is a factor of the internal politics of Russia, as strange as that may seem.” 
(Dougherty, 2013). Putin also uses condemnation of the old enemy as a method of 
rallying support and boosting Russia’s profile in the eyes of the people. “‘If you think 
that heaven on Earth is the United States, that everything is ideal and wonderful there – 
No! It’s not that way. They have problems.’ So it was an attempt to lower America a bit 
and boost yourself” (Dougherty, 2013).  Being the counterbalance suggested in chapter 1 
also presents the opportunity to elevate Russian self-confidence and perception of self-
worth. “Putin also is an example of courage for Russians, Putin says ‘See? I’m not afraid 
to speak the truth, even to the most powerful country in the world. We are a very 
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influential country. Look at our proposal on Syria, which is being welcomed” 
(Dougherty, 2013)   
If the framework for destroying Syria’s chemical weapons, proposed by 
Russia, works out, Kryshtanovskaya says, Russia will jump on it as a PR 
opportunity. “’We are great! Hooray! We are geniuses! We found a way 
out. We are an influential country,’ she says. “That is, to strengthen the 
position of Putin and the government.”  If it doesn’t work out, it it’s not a 
tragedy, she says. “We can say ‘Those bad Americans. How terrible they 
are. Wherever they go, war follows. They’re starting a new war. We tried. 
We did everything we could. We were the power of good, but the power 
of evil didn’t listen to us.’”  Putin, she is convinced, “is going to play on 
the fact that we are great – and Americans are the enemy.” (Dougherty, 
2013). 
 
Table 4-18 
 
The homogony found in the profile of the period is echoed in Kryshtanovskaya’s 
evaluation regarding the motivations of the Russian president. “Putin’s way of behaving, 
she says, is an attempt to say ‘We are a great power, you have to fear us, we have nuclear 
Trait Openness to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Char. Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient organized 
vs.  
easy-going careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Vladimir 
Putin 
Consistent 
Cautious 
 
Organized Solitary 
Reserved 
Analytical 
Detached 
Secure 
Confident 
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weapons, etc.’ That is our mentality.” (Dougherty, 2013).  It would appear that the United 
States is to Russia today as Sweden was during the late 16
th
 and early 17
th
 century.   
 Existent and adhered to hierarchy  
o To claim that Vladimir Putin adhered to an existing hierarchy is a 
question that depends upon how adherence is defined; a better concept 
would be entered and then created.   
 “On May 7, 2000 Vladimir Putin was inaugurated as president 
of Russia.  Strictly speaking this was the first such ceremony in 
history” (Gessen, 2012, p. 151).   
o Although Russia had previously had a president in the personage of 
Boris Yeltsin, at that time Russia was still a member of the now 
defunct Soviet Union, the experiment of democracy having just begun 
for the tumultuous Russia state (Gessen, 2012).  
o The hierarchy of the new federal republic of Russia was, for the most 
part, Putin’s to shape.   
o He began with the inauguration ceremony, taking a page from the days 
of the Monarchy.  
  “Putin had the opportunity to shape a ritual. The ceremony, 
originally planned for the modernist State Palace…was moved 
to the Historic Great Palace, where the Czar’s once lived” 
(Gessen, 2012, p. 151).  
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o This was a visual reminder of the importance Putin was placing within 
the new hierarchy of the office of the presidency, as an undisputed 
leader of the new nation, democracy or not.    
During an interview regarding the Russian constitution, Putin put forth numerous 
comments that strengthened the conclusion that the new democracy was his to shape.  
When asked if the law was immutable, Putin responded “The law must be observed, if it 
becomes outdated, it must be altered.  One of the postulates of legal theory is that the law 
always lags behind real life” (Putin, Gevorkyan, Timakova, & Kolenikov, 2000, p. 185). 
The interviewer further pressed about the constitution and the powers of the president, 
questioning the comment regarding the constitution lagging and the term limits of the 
president. “The constitution should enshrine the most general principles… But 
amendments can be made” (Putin, Gevorkyan, Timakova, & Kolenikov, 2000, p. 185). 
And specifically regarding the powers of the president: “From the very beginning, Russia 
was created as a supercentralized state…practically laid down in its genetic code, its 
traditions, and the mentality of its people.  Under certain conditions…monarchy has 
played and continues to this day to play a positive role” (Putin et al., 2000, p. 186).  
Whether this is a signal of the philosophy of the need for Russia to return to the days of 
monarchal rule, or a generalized comment regarding the virtues of centralized power 
within government, there is little doubt of Putin’s understanding of the hierarchy as he 
was creating it.   
 Planned economic policy 
o Jack (2004) states that, “For most of Putin’s initiatives, it is too early 
to tell what the effects will be” (p. 251).  
180 
 
 
o The reforms of Russia’s economy to a more market-based system 
spans almost the entirety of Russian society.  
o Land reforms are replacing the old communist system, 
  “But the social consequences for those existing farmers were 
displaced, and the risks that the purchasers are dominated by a 
few oligarchs, are considerable” (Jack, 2004, p. 251).   
o There also exists a restructuring of the electrical sector. 
 “Greater liberalization is attractive and theory, if it encourages 
competition, investment and cheaper electricity for consumers. 
But the current plan risks creating a series of regional near 
monopolies which may do little to improve or even worsen the 
status quo” (Jack, 2004, p. 251).  
o However, the most often cited success of Putin’s era in office points 
not to economic policies, but rather to consistency.  
 “It is not the detailed economic reforms for the minutiae of any 
particular law, so much as the general climate of political 
stability” (Jack, 2004, p. 251). 
 Planned foreign policy 
o As specifically outlined earlier, the main goal of Putin’s foreign policy 
is to return Russia to its former place of influence.  
 “In the months following the signing of the Treaty of Moscow 
cutting nuclear arsenals, Russians came to resent what they saw 
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as the one side relationship with Washington” (Baker & 
Glasser, 2005, p. 219).  
o The consensus is that in many areas, Russia had succumbed to the will 
of the United States in hopes of American help in rebuilding the 
Russian economy.  
 “Putin’s most important priority was rebuilding of his 
economy, and Bush did nothing to help him with that” (Baker 
& Glasser, 2005, p. 219).  
o Disenchanted with relations with United States, a new foreign policy 
emerged.  
 “Putin demonstrated a neo-Imperial streak, throwing his weight 
around in former Soviet republics, but typically used economic 
rather than military pressure to keep neighbors in line, such as 
cutting off natural gas” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 222).  
o For Russia, economics was the new driver of foreign policy. 
 “Rather than building a new Army to flex his muscles abroad, 
Putin believed that the key to restoring Russia is great power 
was economic” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 222).  
o Putin’s foreign policy would abandon the string of concessions made 
to the Americans.  
o His new theater of foreign operations would involve anyone he felt 
could better promote his economic goals. 
 Planned social policy 
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o Like Russia’s foreign policy, the social policy is linked to the 
rebuilding of the country’s economy.  
o During an interview, a question regarding the legalization of 
prostitution was raised.   
 Putin, who purports to be against the legalization of 
prostitution, made a comment which gives insight to his overall 
vison of social policy for Russia:   
 “If you live a normal life, if the country develops, if the 
standard of living rises” (Putin, Gevorkyan, Timakova, 
& Kolenikov, 2000, p. 199).   
o Social stability, therefore, is linked to the ability to “live normally”, 
which in turn is linked to economic stability.   
 As exampled by Putin’s pension reforms,   
 “Pension reform has given Russians greater freedom to 
choose how to invest funds for their retirement, but 
within the system where they risk losing everything to 
private managers with high costs and little experience” 
(Jack, 2004, p. 251). 
 Adherence to economic, foreign, and social policy 
o  Although there has been an adjustment in the economic policies, 
namely Russia’s disengagement with America and engagement with 
other avenues and partners for economic growth, the foreign and social 
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policies that are a direct reflection of the desire to promote greater 
economic influence are consistently adhered to.  
o The examples presented in the study are but a fraction of the consistent 
application of policy.  
o The study recognizes that it is the preponderance of adherence which 
is observed, and not a 100% adherence to policy that always meets the 
goal.   
o Nevertheless, Russia is presenting policy and ideological shifts in 
social and foreign relations reform that is designed to promote and 
advance its economic goals. 
 Internal harmony  
o As a centralist political structure, the harmony between the president 
and the government is positive.  
o Although there is always opposition in any government, in the case of 
Russia this is limited, whether due to fear of reprisal or political 
maneuvering by avoiding conflict with a popular and politically 
powerful president, the opposition is divided and in this case moot.   
o At present, Russia presents as a united governance structure, firmly on 
board with the direction of a future Russia as envisioned by its 
president.  
 Positive Diplomatic Relations  
o Although Russian language can be considered antagonistic at times, 
the new conciliatory counterbalanced approach seems successful.   
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o Even with those nations with which Russian relations are strained, 
dialog remains open and potentials for diplomatic compromise exist. 
 Positive constituency opinion  
o As shown in the overall profile, the Russian people are split in their 
opinion of Putin.   
o However, this split would seem to be more along ideological lines than 
policy, as Russia as a nation continues to observe the centralist 
ideology of their government and generally support the leader who is 
in power at the time. 
As indicated in the chart below, Russia’s Vladimir Putin presents as a very 
calculated organized leader with a full understanding of the position his country holds in 
the international arena.  He is also cognizant of the limitations of Russia regarding her 
military and is accepting of the social order of the world that rewards economic power 
with influence.  Rather than attempting to shape the world to his specifications, he shows 
a perceptive understanding of politics in the 21
st
 century. Unlike his predecessors, he 
shows a willingness to use soft power as an alternative to military action in international 
conflict. 
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Table 4-19 
Organized Disorganized 
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy   
Planned economic policy   
Planned foreign policy   
Planned social policy   
Adherence to economic policy   
Adherence to foreign policy   
Adherence to social policy   
Internal harmony   
Positive Diplomatic Relations   
Positive constituency opinion   
Governance 
 
In a centralist governance structure, it is difficult to separate the government from 
its head of state, especially in those cases where the nation’s leader exhibits confidence 
and strong authority, as does Vladimir Putin. The current Russian government presents 
no differently. Although there are strong communist elements within the Putin 
government, they exhibit limited ability to influence the direction of the nation.  Rather, 
the communist element, simply by its existence and public support by those who would 
prefer to see Russia return to the totalitarian communist regime, present an impetus for 
consistent decision making by the president and progression of the economic, political, 
and social goals, which are designed to promote increased Russian influence.  For these 
reasons, the Big 5 Chart for the government is the same as that of its leader.  Likewise, 
the characteristic chart is parallel to that of Putin’s, as is the assessment of the elements 
that drive the conclusions. 
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Table 4-20 
Trait Openness 
to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Char. Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs.  
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Government  Consistent  Organized Reserved Analytical Confident 
 
 Existent and adhered to hierarchy  
o The government accepts the centralist structure of Russian politics, 
and whether by design or political maneuvering, adheres to this 
concept.   
o Although there are opposition parties within the government, as a 
centralist state with a politically adept leader, the opposition is limited. 
 Planned and Adherence to economic, foreign, and social policy 
o There is no indication that the social policies of the president are 
directly opposed in any meaningful way by the government at large. 
 Internal harmony  
o The acceptance of the centralist system promotes the harmony 
described in the Putin evaluation.   
 Positive Diplomatic Relations 
o As the foreign office of Russia works under the direction of the 
president, the diplomatic relations of the government mirror that of 
Putin. 
 Positive constituency opinion 
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o  As a centralist system, the opinion of the government cannot be 
directly divided from the opinion of the president, so long as the 
government supports presidential policies, which in this case they do.  
 
Table 4-21 
Organized Disorganized 
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy   
Planned economic policy   
Planned foreign policy   
Planned social policy   
Adherence to economic policy   
Adherence to foreign policy   
Adherence to social policy   
Internal harmony   
Positive Diplomatic Relations   
Positive constituency opinion   
Transition the Move toward Democracy? 
 
The transition toward a more democratic social structure began before the election 
of Vladimir Putin. However, the question of the transition toward democracy is a concept 
clouded by perception.  Democracy is a concept that in western terms equates directly to 
the concept of freedom.  Once again, the term freedom is a subjective concept, which can 
have different levels in which it is measured. For the purpose of this study, the researcher 
will eliminate the concept of freedom as a definitive requirement and instead consider the 
simple dictionary definition:  “A form of government in which people choose leaders by 
voting” (Merriam Webster, 2013). Under this definition, the transition in Russia meets 
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the criteria.  It should be noted that if the political structure of the United States were 
measured against all the potential definitions of democracy presented in the dictionary, 
America would not meet all those definitions.  “When Putin and President Bush met… In 
Santiago, Chile… The American leader came in for a lecture on the uniqueness of Russia 
and its need to have a style of government that was consistent with Russian history” 
(Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 377). Therefore, rather than chronicling the transition event, 
the study will focus upon the ideology of the transition itself as it relates to the 
characteristics model.  The important concept to consider is that the “democratic 
transition” of Russia must be viewed by the criteria with which Russians understand and 
accept the concept, rather than a western view of democratization.  
 Event Planned, Measured, and Coordinated 
o The level of planning that Putin’s government put into the 
democratization of Russia was as much a product of the failure of 
Putin’s predecessor Boris Yeltsin as the organizational efforts of Putin 
himself.  
 “Putin disavowed any aspirations to restore Soviet-style 
dictatorship…his favorite theme, the need to preserve Russia 
from the sort of democracy that sprung from the Soviet 
collapse” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 378).   
o Yet the majority of Russians, although not the democracy desired by 
the west, accepted the transition.  
 “The president was popular precisely because he had re-
installed Russia’s traditional model of government; an 
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autocratic state in which citizens were relieved of responsibility 
for politics… and foreign enemies are invoked to forge an 
artificial unity” (Pipes, 2004; Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 376). 
o  The consensus is that Putin understood the Russia in which he was 
transitioning:  
 “Putin had long since abandoned the label, no longer bothering 
with fiction of preserving the fragile emerging democracy the 
Boris Yeltsin and bequeathed to him and promising only to 
avoid a return to totalitarianism” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 
376).  
o Rather than offering the Russian people Western-style democracy, 
Putin offered stability. From this, one question remained: “was Russia 
under Putin a soft authoritarian regime or something more menacing” 
(Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 376).  
o To their critics, they presented this argument “advanced by Putin 
himself and his political allies. Russia, they now proclaimed openly, 
was neither ready for democracy or are historically suited for it” 
(Baker & Glasser, 2005, pp. 376-377). 
It is therefore difficult to classify the transition in Russia in terms of one ideology. 
The idea of democracy started with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Under the chaotic 
leadership of Boris Yeltsin, Russians’ first taste of Western democracy had not been 
positive. Putin thus returned to a more autocratic system with the centralist power 
structure emanating from the Kremlin. However, this continues to be a transition of 
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significance. “The new system built by the Kremlin offered what political analyst Lilia 
Shevtsova called ‘imitation democracy’, democracy without its inconveniences” (Baker 
& Glasser, 2005, p. 376). Whatever label is placed upon the new political structure within 
Russia, the event was a transition from both the old Soviet dictatorships of Stalin and his 
predecessors and the dismal chaos created by the ineffective Yeltsin and his reformers.  
 Event: Aggression 
o The reforms did not necessitate aggression; however, the aggression 
experienced during this period is examined in the domestic conflict 
historiography of this study: the Chechen Revolts.  
o Therefore, in the characteristic chart for this section, the elements of 
offense and defense have been excluded. 
 Event: Targeted 
o The transition in Russia, once under the control of Putin, evolved into 
a targeted event.   
o Unlike the chaotic attempts at reforms by the Yeltsin period, the Putin 
regime instituted what Russians generally referred to as Putinism. 
Stability was Putin’s slogan and focus (Baker & Glasser, 2005).  
o Abandoning western ideals of democracy for a more functional and 
historically acceptable autocracy, Putin and his government focused 
upon what it saw as the new highway to international influence and 
recognition, the economy.  
o The transition was less about democracy and more about returning 
Russia to international prominence.  
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o When the old Soviet Union had collapsed under its own economic 
isolationism (Baker & Glasser, 2005), and Yeltsin had tried to 
introduce too much reformation too quickly, Russian influence had 
slipped in international circles.  
o Whatever governance structure emerged from the ashes of the Soviet 
Union and the Yeltsin debacle, Putin’s Russia would emerge again as a 
world power, regardless of the opinions of the western democracies.  
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o This perspective, to reclaim world influence, is and remains a 
cornerstone of the evolving Russian society today.   
o Long gone are the appearances of embracing democratic principles as 
defined by the west.   
 A former Yeltsin supporter and former Prime Minister Mikhail 
Kasyanov summed up the new regimes attitudes:  “Russia does 
not support, does not follow, and does not respect any 
democratic principles” (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 374). 
o Although this could be considered a case of sour grapes, coming from 
a Prime Minister fired by Putin on the eve of his reelection, Russian 
officials only commented that the former Prime Minister was a puppet 
of the United States (Baker & Glasser, 2005, p. 374), and there was 
never a solid denial of the assessment.   
o The ideology of returning Russia to an autocratic system, as a means 
to an end, remained consistently applied. 
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 Event Specific 
o The specificity of the maintained ideology was the return of Russian 
influence through economic strength and a political ideology of 
compromise and diplomacy.  
o The goal was to re-achieve influence and to do so without the threat of 
military force. 
 
Table 4-22 
Organized Disorganized 
Event Planned   
Event Measured   
Event Coordinated   
  
  
Event: Peaceful  
Event: Targeted Response  
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Event Goal Orientated   
 
As indicated in the text, the chart reflects a well-organized transition.  However, 
this transition presents with a paradox.  The transition was as much a transition of the 
transition as it was a social ideology.  What began as an answer to a collapse of a decades 
long political system was to first turn to western principles as an answer to recovery. 
Following the failure of to introduce western democracy as a viable alternative to the 
historically autocratic Russian political society, the transition then transitioned again into 
what exists today, an autocratic government based upon centralism; however, it is a 
system that is cognizant of public and international opinion, while abandoning the 
flaunting of military superiority for a business-like approach to economic superiority.  
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Domestic Conflict: The Chechen Revolts 
 
The fighting in Chechnya began before the election of Vladimir Putin.  However, 
the conflict with the Chechen republic has endured through centuries.  The purpose of the 
study is not present a detailed history of the Russian -Chechen conflicts. Rather, the study 
looks to determine the characteristics of the conflict from which conclusions regarding 
the Russian reaction to the conflict can be measured. Briefly, “Chechens and Russians 
have clashed viciously almost ever since the contact began at the start of the 18
th
 century” 
(Jack, 2004, p. 91).  Much of the negative perception of Chechens is generated from the 
activities in which they engage. “The long involvement of some Chechens in organized 
crime in Russian cities has not helped the reputation” (Jack, 2004, p. 91).  As a Muslim 
culture, Chechens have always been looked upon with suspicion by the Christian Russian 
Orthodox Church. “Chechens tend to be more rural and less integrated into Russian 
society than Russians and other ethnic groups. They received little positive 
encouragement and plenty of discrimination to maintain the status quo” (Jack, 2004, p. 
92). However, Chechnya is rich in oil deposits, which have historically been easily 
exploited by the Russians. During the Stalin era mass deportations were conducted; 
generally these deportations included and were directed at the intelligentsia of Chechen 
society. The vacuum created by the removal of the elite of society opened the door for 
those that remained in Chechnya to engage in more illicit activities. “The Republic 
became a center for drugs production and trafficking, oil theft and illegal refining, 
counterfeiting, diamond smuggling and contraband alcohol” (Jack, 2004, p. 93).  The 
chaos of the Yeltsin government precipitated the beginning of the 1994 Chechen war. 
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“The military campaign partly employing the intensive bombardment tactics that had 
been used in Afghanistan on behalf of Soviet forces a few years before poison public 
opinion” (Jack, 2004, p. 94). 
When we evaluate the characteristics of the Chechen conflict, the study must 
consider the Chechen revolt in the same light as did the Russians, who regarded the 
Chechens as terrorists.  This is not to say that the study has made a judgment regarding 
the Chechen fighters as revolutionaries or terrorists. Rather, to evaluate the Russian 
response to the conflict, the study must do so from the perspective of the Russians who 
would respond.  
 Event planned, measured, coordinated 
o Like any conflict, even one considered terroristic in nature, there is 
some level of planning involved. The Chechen conflict was no 
exception.  
o Lead by guerilla leaders such as Shamil Basayev, Chechen fighters 
coordinated incursions into Russian territory, taking hostages and 
creating chaos for the Russian government.   
o However, the methods and targets of the Chechen violence included 
schools and hospitals, which enraged the Russians and cultivated 
negative international opinion. (Jack, 2004).  
o The Chechen violence, which indiscriminately killed Russian civilians 
as well as military personnel, was unrestrained and disproportional.  
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o So disproportional was the Chechen violence that the result was 
positive Russian opinion regarding the heavy-handed response by the 
Putin government.  
o The Chechen tactics became so brutal that they weakened the original 
sympathy they garnered from their years of oppression, and instead 
strengthened the government they desired to weaken. 
 Offense/defense Planned 
o As in all military operations, be they by a standing army or guerilla 
forces, targets were selected in an attempt to break the Russian will to 
fight. 
 Event: Aggression 
o All historic accounts of the Chechen revolt chronical brutal violence, 
not only against military targets but also civilian populations. 
 Event: Targeted 
o The Chechen targets were determined to weaken the resolve of the 
Russian government, though they were distracted by its own internal 
transition issues.  
o The civilian targets were selected to promote the highest shock value. 
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o Although it is hard to equate an ideological perspective to the violence 
seen in the Chechen revolts, independence from Russian rule was the 
major driver. 
 Event Specific 
196 
 
 
o All events were specific to the goal of Chechen independence. 
Table 4-23 
Organized Disorganized 
Event Planned   
 Event Disproportional  
Event Coordinated   
Offense Planned   
Defense Planned   
 Event: Aggressive 
Event: Targeted Response Event: General Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Event Goal Orientated   
 
The Chechen revolt was an organized event, or as much as any rebel revolt could 
be considered organized. The fact that the out matched Chechens maintained the revolt 
for over a decade against a superior Russian force is a testament to the overall 
organization of the event.  It should be noted that the Chechen revolt, to this day, is still 
ongoing and has yet to be resolved. 
International Conflict Terrorism of 9/11 
 
The international conflict selected by the study was not one in which Russia was 
directly involved at the onset.  Nonetheless, the attacks upon the United States did bring 
the “war on terrorism” to all nations, including Russia.  What the study will evaluate is 
how the Russian government engaged this conflict.  However, before any conclusions 
regarding the actions of Russia in regards to this world affair can be reached, the conflict 
itself must be evaluated.  As previously noted, this is not a detailed history of the events 
of 9/11, but rather a brief examination of the characteristics of the original attack.  The 
conclusions are a compilation of the widely accepted characteristics assigned to the 
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attack, and the resulting ideology expressed by the nations of the world as to the required 
response.  Of greater interest to the study is the response Russia engaged in, both 
internally and with the greater global community. Although not directly involved, the 
nations suspected of complicity with the terrorist organizations that conducted the attacks 
are regional neighbors and historical enemies and, in some cases, historical allies of the 
Russian republic.  
 Event planned, measured, coordinated  
o It is universally agreed that the attacks upon the World Trade Center, 
the Pentagon, and the failed attack that ended in Pennsylvania, were 
planned, coordinated, and measured for their maximum impact upon 
the United States and the world at large.   
o It is also agreed that the attack on a civilian target, like the World 
Trade Center, was disproportional to any ideological cause.   
 Offense Planned 
o The coordination of the attacks on 9/11, and the subsequent attacks on 
civilian targets throughout the world, demonstrate a planning of 
offense.  
o Specific targets are selected to generate the maximum civil disruption 
possible. 
 Defense Planned 
o The planning of a defensive strategy would arguably be difficult, 
considering that the terrorist organization could not anticipate the 
world’s response.  
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o Likewise, with the terrorist organization being a collection of 
individual cells and separate fundamental groups sharing the same 
ideology, coordination of defense would necessarily be difficult to 
coordinate and would be dependent upon the specific situation of the 
individual groups.  
 Event: Aggression 
o There is no question as to the aggressive nature of the attacks or the 
subsequent attacks worldwide. 
 Event: Targeted 
o The majority of the attacks are civilian.   
o However, military targets have been engaged.  (For the purpose of the 
evaluation, suicide bombings, the preferred method of inflicting 
damage, is considered an engagement). 
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o The ideological perspectives of the terrorist organizations are the 
driving motivation of, and continue to be, Islamic fundamentalism and 
the destruction of western culture. 
 Event Specific 
o Although it could be argued that each attack is a culmination toward 
an overall goal of the terrorist organizations to destroy western 
civilization and the perceived repression of the Islamic faith, it is 
difficult to assign a specific goal to each specific attack, beyond the 
disruption of civil society.   
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o General demands are made and ideological rhetoric regarding the 
ideology behind the attack are reported; however, the obtainment of a 
specific objective is unclear. 
 
Table 4-24 
Organized Disorganized 
Event Planned   
 Event Disproportional  
Event Coordinated   
Offense Planned   
 Defense Reactionary 
 Event: Aggressive 
Event: Targeted Response  
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
 Event Lack of Goal  
 
The conclusion regarding the organizational characteristics of the terrorist conflict 
is split between organized and disorganized.  The study concludes that the division in the 
chart is representative of the failure to comprehend an overall objective sought by the 
terrorist organization beyond the dissemination of chaos. 
 
Engagement of the Transition and Conflicts by the Secondary Elements 
 
 Reaction planned, measured, and coordinated  
o Although the onset of the transition was underway before the Putin 
presidency began, the president implemented the redirecting of the 
transition away from democracy and toward a more familiar autocratic 
centralist governance structure.   
200 
 
 
o As indicated in the Putin Bio, this redirection was well planned, 
measured, and implemented by the Putin government. 
 Offense, defense planned 
o The transition was not military in nature and therefore had no 
offensive or defensive components of interest to the study. 
 Reaction: Aggression 
o The implementation of the plan was through policy and restructuring 
and therefore had no aggressive components. 
 Reaction: Targeted 
o The reaction was targeted in support of the new autocratic centralist 
governance structure. 
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o The ideological perspective of abandonment of western democratic 
principle for the more familiar autocratic system, for the purpose of 
better increasing Russian influence was maintained. 
 Reaction Specific 
o The reactions of the government were specific to the implementation 
and support of the transition. 
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Table 4-25 
Organized Disorganized 
Reaction Planned   
Reaction Measured   
Reaction Coordinated   
Offense Planned   
Defense Planned   
Reaction: Peaceful  
Reaction: Targeted Response  
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Reaction Goal Orientated   
 
The evaluation of the government’s response to the transition is parallel to the 
conclusions of the head of state response. Considering that the new governmental system 
is centralist and autocratic and lacking any documented coordinated deviation from the 
head of state response, the study concludes that both responses are the same. 
Table 4-26 
Organized Disorganized 
Reaction Planned   
Reaction Measured   
Reaction Coordinated   
Offense Planned   
Defense Planned   
Reaction: Peaceful  
Reaction: Targeted Response  
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Reaction Goal Orientated   
 
The reaction to the domestic conflict presents a different picture to that of the 
transition.  However, as in the transition model, Putin and his government exhibited 
similar reaction characterisitics. 
 Reaction planned, measured, coordinated  
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o The literature is clear: when dealing with the Chechen revolts, the 
Russians took a hard line stance (Baker & Glasser, 2005) (Jack, 2004).  
o In regards to Vladimir Putin,  
 “His hard line approach to Chechnya undoubtable raised his 
profile, turning what looked like another short-lived hapless 
Yeltsin nominee into an unchallengeable presidential successor 
within weeks” (Jack, 2004, p. 103). 
o Although personal advancement was not Putin’s only consideration 
when considering a plan for dealing with the Chechen rebels, the fact 
remains that Chechens were bombing civilian targets in Moscow, and 
the terrorist attacks were getting out of hand (Jack, 2004).  
o Following the September 13 bombing in Moscow, Putin addressed the 
parliament.  
 “Putin was measured…stressing that there was a Chechen 
connection…but also the need to distinguish ordinary 
Chechens from terrorists…arguing there was no need to 
extinguish the Chechen people” (Jack, 2004, p. 102).  
o The coordination of Russian military efforts were made with 
consideration of the poor results experienced during the first Chechen 
revolts of 1994-1996.   
o One thing was clear; Russia could not handle such a public opinion 
disaster again.   
 Offense/defense planned 
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o Although from a political standpoint the reaction of the Russian 
government was a coordinated implant affair, for the military this was 
quite different.  
o In fact, many within the Russian military believed that military force 
was not the answer to the Chechen problem.  
o In 199,8 General Kulikov, former head of the Russian Armed Forces 
and interior minister,  
 “argued strongly that a renewed attempt to solve the Chechen 
problem through military force is out of the question.  
 Instead he stressed a more dovish line of the need for Moscow 
to participate in the reconstruction of Chechnya” (Jack, 2004, 
p. 110).  
o Putin was also split regarding his decision on the appropriate way to 
handle the Chechen problem.  
 “In early 2000, he claimed that he only decided to invade the 
Republic after the apartment blasts” (Jack, 2004, p. 111).  
o It is clear, however, that the offensive and defensive measures against 
the Chechen rebellion centered on protection of Russian targets and 
containment of the Chechen forces within Chechnya.  
 “The idea of a cordon sanitaire around Chechnya had long been 
discussed by policymakers. By securing the northern part of the 
Republic… They believe that they could create a 
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demonstration zone, showing to the Chechens in the South 
attraction of Moscow rule” (Jack, 2004, p. 112). 
 Reaction: Aggression 
o All historical accounts agree that the response to the Chechen rebellion 
was one of aggression. 
 Reaction: Targeted 
o When considering a conclusion regarding whether or not the response 
was targeted, we must consider that the Russian military was not 
dealing with a standing army of another nation-state.   
o Rather, as was the case with the Americans in Afghanistan, they were 
dealing with a terrorist organization by all Russian accounts, which 
used real warfare and terrorist bombings of civilian targets as their 
method of promoting aggression.  
o Therefore, the chart concludes that the targeting of the government and 
the leadership of Russia during the Chechen revolts was mixed. 
Specific targets were identified in an effort to contain the Chechen 
violence against civilian targets.  
o Likewise, when civilian targets were successfully attacked by the 
Chechens, the response was more general in nature. 
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o The ideological perspective of Vladimir Putin and his government was 
simply to find an answer to the Chechen problem.  
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o As indicated earlier Putin had no desire to commit genocide against 
the Chechen people; however, the terrorist activities employed by the 
Chechen rebels made targeting specifics a difficult endeavor.  
o Further complicating this was the growing deep distrust and hatred of 
the Chechen people by not only the military, but also the public in 
general. 
 Reaction Specific 
o The reactions by Vladimir Putin and his government were specific to 
the events of the revolt.  
o The general goal was the end the hostilities and to place the Chechen 
Republic firmly under Moscow rule.  
o However, it should also be noted that the disproportionality of the 
response by the Russian military in many cases further complicated the 
obtainment of this goal. 
 
Table 4-27 
Organized Disorganized 
Reaction Planned   
 Reaction Disproportional  
Reaction Coordinated   
 Offense Reactionary 
 Defense Reactionary 
 Reaction: Aggressive 
Reaction: Targeted Response Reaction: General Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Reaction/Event Goal Orientated   
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As with the case of the transition response, the evaluation of the government 
response to the domestic conflict is parallel to the conclusions of the head of state 
response.  Considering that the new governmental system is centralist and autocratic, and 
lacking any documented coordinated deviation from the head of state response, the study 
concludes that both responses are the same. 
Table 4-28 
Organized Disorganized 
Reaction Planned  Reaction Spontaneous 
 Reaction Disproportional  
Reaction Coordinated   
Offense Planned  Offense Reactionary 
 Defense Reactionary 
 Reaction: Aggressive 
Reaction: Targeted Response Reaction: General Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Reaction/Event Goal Orientated   
 
More in line with the implementation of the social/political transition, the Russian 
reaction to the international conflict produces similar conclusions. 
 Reaction planned, measured, coordinated 
o The Russian responses to the attacks on 9/11 are a study in adept 
diplomacy.  
o With terrorism firmly at the forefront of Putin’s mind with the 
Chechen conflict, the terrorist attacks upon the United States and 9/11 
presented an opportunity for Russia to advance its political 
international goals: 
The Russian president had much more in mind during his September 
phone call to Bush that mere personal expression of sympathy. Yet ideas 
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for wide-ranging cooperation that would stretch beyond the public 
statements of concern of other four leaders in which would help transform 
the relationship between the nations. (Jack, 2004, p. 256) 
 This concept of turning the 9/11 attacks upon the United States into an advantage 
for Russia to advance her political and economic goals would be the cornerstone to the 
assistance Russia would lend to the coalition of nations who would actively fight 
terrorism. 
 Offense, defense planned 
o For Russia, the reactions were supportive to the coalition of nations, 
since the conducting of the war on terror was being held well within 
their sphere of influence.  
o Active engagement militarily by the Russians with the coalition was 
avoided. Through support concessions, the Russians indirectly 
supported coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.   
o Russia was seen as an important regional support partner with 
intelligence capabilities important to the success of the coalition.   
 By September 24, Putin made his decision: “He pledged to 
work with the Central Asian states in favor of the US 
operation, establish humanitarian corridors in Russian airspace, 
and continue weapon support for opponents of the Taliban” 
(Jack, 2004, p. 257). 
 Reaction: Aggression 
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o By taking a stance is a regional support partner, Russia was able to 
avoid direct aggression in military action within the coalition. 
 Reaction: Targeted 
o Although the Taliban represented a threat to Russian interest in 
Afghanistan, the target of the support efforts for the coalition were 
designed to elicit good relations with the west and thereby advance the 
economic policies and desires of the Russian Federation. 
 Maintained Ideological Perspective 
o Russia maintained this ideology of support for the war on terror in 
exchange for positive considerations and better relations with the 
international community, which would further her economic goals. 
o Russia calculated that their indirect essential support of the coalition 
against the war on terror would lead the international community to 
forget that Russian had returned to an autocratic centralist political 
structure abandoning the concepts of Western democracy (Baker & 
Glasser, 2005; Jack, 2004). 
 Reaction Specific 
o The Russian reaction, although specifically tailored to support the 
coalition efforts, was inherently general in its response.  
o With the unrest in Chechnya still presenting disruptive influences upon 
the Russian people and the Russian government, maintaining a general 
stance on the conflicts emerging in Afghanistan and Iraq preserved the 
appearance of Russian involvement without taxing Russian resources. 
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Table 4-29 
Organized Disorganized 
Reaction Planned   
Reaction Measured   
Reaction Coordinated   
Offense Planned   
Defense Planned   
Reaction: Peaceful  
 Reaction: General Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective   
Reaction Goal Orientated   
 
As with the case of the transition response, the evaluation of the government 
response to the international conflict is parallel to the conclusions of the head of state 
response.  Considering that the new governmental system is centralist and autocratic and 
lacking any documented coordinated deviation from the head of state response, the study 
concludes that both responses are the same. 
Table 4-30 
Organized Disorganized 
Reaction Planned  
Reaction Measured  
Reaction Coordinated  
Offense Planned  
Defense Planned  
Reaction/Event: Peaceful  
 Reaction: General Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective  
Reaction Goal Orientated  
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Characteristic Charts 
 
Table 4-31 
Trait Openness 
to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Characteristics Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs.  
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs.  
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Vladimir 
Putin 
Consistent Organized Reserved Analytical 
 
Secure 
Confident 
Governance Consistent Organized Reserved Analytical 
 
Secure 
 
Table 4-32 
Subject Element Characteristic Option 1 Characteristic Option 2 
Leadership Biography Organized  
Governance Structure Organized   
Transition Organized  
Leadership Response to 
Transition 
Organized  
Government Response to 
Transition 
Organized  
Conflict Domestic Organized  
Leadership Response to 
Domestic Conflict 
Mixed Mixed 
Government Response to 
Domestic Conflict 
Mixed Mixed 
Conflict International Mixed Mixed 
Leadership Response to 
International Conflict 
Organized  
Government Response to 
International Conflict 
Organized  
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Chapter 5: Discussion/Comparison of Period Data 
 
The following is a review of the data contained in Chapter 4. The study compares 
each element from one period against the similar element of the second. The study 
assigned the Period of Peter I as the benchmark data set from which to compare the data 
from the Post-Soviet period.  To comprehensively evaluate the data, the study, conducted 
as a historiography, adheres to the chronology of eras, hypothesizing the existence of the 
behavioral traits theorized for nation-states.  
The data comparison presented here is not a historiography of the elements.  The 
limited historiography conducted and presented in chapter 4 detailed data significant to 
the research. The review of the data section also does not attempt to draw conclusions 
from the comparisons. All conclusions regarding the comparisons and general data will 
follow in the next section.    
Comparison of the Periods 
 
Table 4-1 
Trait Openness to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Characteristic Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs. 
easy-going  
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs. 
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Period 1  Cautious N/A Solitary 
Reserved 
Detached Nervous 
Period 2  Consistent 
Cautious 
 
N/A Solitary 
Reserved 
Detached Nervous 
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When we examine the Big 5 model comparison chart for both periods, the data 
conclusions are very similar.  However, the similarities are even starker when we 
consider the underlining data from which these conclusions were drawn. When 
contemplating the conditions facing the populace during the period prior to the reign of 
Peter I, Russia, as reported by Voltaire, was a backward nation with little influence on the 
rest of the world.  Militarily weak, technologically behind the great powers of Europe, 
while socially entrenched in old customs and traditions, fostered by the myopic liturgical 
control of the Russian Orthodox Church. As a nation, Russia was a loose confederation of 
regional powers, controlled by an aristocracy, who elected a Czar with limited power 
over the subject regions.  The majority of the populace lived in servitude to the 
aristocracy, more concerned about daily survival than affairs of state.  Militarily, Russia 
presented an easy target for constant invasion and exploitation of their resources from 
both external and internal enemies. From the European perspective, Russians were 
backward, brutish, uneducated farmers without art, literature, culture, or a viable 
economic system. In all ways deemed appropriate to measure a nation and people at the 
time, Russia was inferior and insignificant. The reign of Peter I would be the turning 
point for changing European opinion.  
Russian Republic at the turn of the 21
st
 century presents a similar picture. The 
once mighty Soviet Union has collapsed. Russian attempts at forging a Western-style 
democracy have failed. The former communist system has left the nation economically 
unprepared for the new challenges of the global economy. The Russian military’s 
inability to effectively deal with the Chechen rebellion has exposed deficiencies. Russia, 
once a formidable adversary for the Americans in regards to technological advancements 
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such as the space race of the late 1950s and 1960s and the decades old arms race, no 
longer possesses the veil of secrecy afforded by the Iron Curtain and is now exposed as a 
flawed technical giant. The cost of being an adversary of the American capitalistic 
system, the largest economy in the world, proved financially unsustainable by the 
communist system. The weight of the financial resources necessary to maintain an arms 
race and propaganda induced space race proved too much for the system to bear.  
From the ashes of the old communist system, oligarchs appeared, becoming the 
new Russian aristocracy to which the government and the people become subservient. 
The rest of the world sees the poor state of Russian affairs. They looked on with the 
disbelief in the chaos of Boris Yeltsin’s attempts at Western democracy. The world 
concludes that Russia is no longer a superpower and begins to dismiss Russia, decreasing 
Russian influence in international circles. Behind the Iron Curtain created by 
communism, Russia was able to effectively hide these deficiencies and present to the 
world the illusion of a nation more powerful than it actually was. However, in the year 
2000, Vladimir Putin would rise to power and create a second turning point in changing 
world opinion. 
When comparing the two societies, separated by almost 300 years, there exist 
significant correlations. In both examples, the previous social structure, or the “old 
ways”, contribute to social decline, and more importantly, a negative opinion of the world 
powers at the time. Feudalism and orthodoxy had stifled social growth before the time of 
Peter the great, whereas communism had done the same throughout the 20
th
 century. It is 
significant to note that regardless of the social stagnation identified in hindsight, the “old 
ways” retained support. Even following the emplacement of the two leaders who would 
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be responsible for guiding their country out of the stagnation through policies of 
transition, at the onset of both, transitional policies faced significant opposition to leaving 
behind a way of life the people had always known existed. More importantly, the opinion 
of the rest of the civilized world was similar: both times, Russia was labeled as 
backwards and behind the times. In the 16
th
 and early 17
th
 century, Russia was almost 
totally disregarded as insignificant, while late 20
th
 century Russia only maintained some 
veiled respect due to their nuclear arsenal.  
Comparison of Heads of State 
 
Table 5-2 
Trait Openness to 
experience 
Conscientiousness Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism 
Characteristic Inventive 
curious vs. 
consistent 
cautious 
Efficient 
organized vs. 
easy-going 
careless 
Outgoing 
energetic vs. 
solitary 
reserved 
Friendly 
compassionate 
vs. 
analytical 
detached 
Sensitive 
nervous vs. 
secure 
confident 
Peter I Inventive 
Curious 
Careless Outgoing 
Energetic 
Analytical Secure 
Confident 
Vladimir 
Putin 
Consistent 
Cautious 
 
Organized Solitary 
Reserved 
Analytical 
Detached 
Secure 
Confident 
 
The Big 5 Model shows two very different men.  Only in the characteristic of 
judging neuroticism do they show a parallel personality. Many of the differences are 
attributable to the different upbringing both experienced.  Peter I, an aristocrat born to 
privilege and wealth, grew up in the privileged environment that wealth afforded at the 
time.  Putin, the son of a former sailor and subsequent laborer, growing up on the streets 
of Leningrad with the hardships that existence entailed. The uneducated Czar compared 
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to the well-educated public servant.  Even their physical characteristics are a picture of 
great diversity, with Peter I standing well over six and a half feet tall, compared to the 
diminutive five foot five Putin. In almost all personal aspects, these two leaders of 
Russia, separated by almost three hundred years, could present no more stark a different 
picture.   
However, the difference in the personality characteristics of the two men does not 
translate into behavioral characteristics regarding their actions in conflict situations or 
periods of transition. When we consider the accomplishments of the two leaders and the 
considerable parallel circumstances in which they achieved their goals, the question 
naturally rises, how could two so different individuals accomplish, or endeavor to 
accomplish, almost the same objectives while separated by centuries? 
Table 5-3 
Peter I Vladimir Putin 
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy  Existent and Adhered to hierarchy 
Planned economic policy  Planned economic policy  
Planned foreign policy  Planned foreign policy  
Planned social policy  Planned social policy  
Adherence to economic policy  Adherence to economic policy  
Adherence to foreign policy  Adherence to foreign policy  
Adherence to social policy  Adherence to social policy  
Internal Conflict Internal harmony  
Diplomatic Relations Mixed Positive Diplomatic Relations  
Positive constituency opinion Positive constituency opinion 
 
The parallels, although illustrating similarities in the two leaders, does not fully 
show the level of parity demonstrated in each characteristic conclusion. Regarding 
hierarchy, although the conclusions are positive, noting that both leaders accepted and 
adhered to the hierarchal structure, the historiography shows that in both instances the 
two men themselves created the hierarchal structure accepted. In the case of Peter I, a 
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strong centralist monarchy was formed, whereas with Putin a strong centralist autocracy 
was created. Both, however, embraced a centralist system, with themselves at the center.  
There does exist a slight deviation when examining closer the planning and 
adhering to policy. The historiography clearly indicates that during both periods, the 
approach by both leaders focused upon one ‘driving’ policy, which the other policies 
were tailored around; this is a parallel.  However, in the case of Peter I, the social policy 
of reformation and Europeanism is the foundation for the associated foreign and 
economic policies, whereas in the case of Putin, economics is the focus and from which 
the foreign and social policies are dependent. The approach of focusing upon one aspect 
or policy ideology from which to guide and tailor other policy aspects is a meaningful 
parallel.  
Internally, both leaders experienced an overall positive opinion from the 
constituencies under their rule. Like in all politics, this positive opinion ebbed and flowed 
throughout the leader’s tenure; nevertheless, once the transitions proposed finally gained 
general acceptance, opinions remain generally positive. There does exist a disparity in the 
categories of international relations and internal harmony within the government. 
Regarding international relations, the mixed conclusion for Peter I is a result of the 18 
year war with Sweden, which dominated the period.  The internal harmony disparity is a 
product of the aristocracy’s initial opposition to the social reforms, which decreased their 
power, whereas in the case of Putin, the centralist autocracy he promoted was generally 
considered a better alternative to the chaotic democratic experiment recently abandoned 
following the Yeltsin presidency. 
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The conclusion of the research finds two leaders of starkly differing backgrounds 
and characteristics, working within different governance structures, yet promoting similar 
ideologies of governance.  Both leaders promoted transformative initiatives, based upon a 
single goal of increasing Russian international influence and promoting international 
respect.   
Comparison Governance 
 
Table 5-4 
Peter I Monarchal Aristocracy Vladimir Putin Centralist Autocracy 
Existent and Adhered to hierarchy Mixed Existent and Adhered to hierarchy 
Planned economic policy  Planned economic policy  
Planned foreign policy  Planned foreign policy  
Planned social policy  Planned social policy  
Abandoned economic policy  Adherence to economic policy  
Adherence to foreign policy  Adherence to foreign policy  
Abandoned social policy  Adherence to social policy  
Internal Conflict Internal harmony  
Diplomatic Relations Mixed Positive Diplomatic Relations  
Negative constituency opinion Positive constituency opinion 
 
The resistance to the social reforms of Peter I present as the main reason for the 
disparities found in the characteristic chart of the governance structures. The initial and 
ongoing resistance by the aristocracy to maintain their political power, over the course of 
the transition and hence to the abandonment of their social and economic policies, shows 
a weak governance structure unable to stem the tide of reform, thereby eventually 
succumbing to the reforms. The Putin era government, parallel to the characteristics of 
the head of state, illustrates an acceptance of the centralist autocracy.  The research 
attributes this characteristic analogy to the previous president’s poor execution of 
democracy and the centralist ideology being a comfortable throwback to the communist 
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era, which represents stability.  However, for all their differences, both government 
structures are centralist and autocratic, which presents its own parallel. 
Comparison of Transition 
 
Table 5-5 
Social Reformation Peter I Democracy/Autocracy Vladimir Putin 
Planned  Planned  
Measured  Measured  
Coordinated  Coordinated  
  
  
Generally Peaceful Peaceful 
Targeted Targeted  
Maintained Ideological Perspective  Maintained Ideological Perspective  
Goal Orientated  Goal Orientated  
Organized Organized 
 
Both transitions present the exact same characteristic models: well planned and 
coordinated, targeted and measured in their approach, conducted generally peacefully, 
while remaining goal orientated from similar ideological approaches. Upon closer 
examination of the historiography, both transitions had a single parallel goal of increasing 
and/or returning Russian influence on the world stage. The reforms of Peter I created 
modern Russia and a sense of world power, whereas the political reforms of Putin 
attempt to regain political world influence, and maintain modern Russia. 
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Comparison of Domestic Conflict 
 
Table 5-6 
Strel’sty Revolt Chechen Revolt 
Spontaneous Planned 
Disproportional Disproportional 
Coordinated  Mixed Coordinated 
Offense Planned Offense Planned 
Defense Reactionary Defense Planned 
Aggression Event: Aggressive 
General Response Mixed Response 
Maintained Ideological Perspective Maintained Ideological Perspective 
Goal Orientated Goal Orientated 
Disorganized Mixed 
 
The domestic conflicts during the periods present very different models, some of 
which is attributable to the length of each being different, as was the implementation 
manner.  These two domestic conflicts are significantly divergent in their scope, goals, 
and method of conduction. The Strel’sty revolts were short-lived engagements, usually 
spontaneous and reactionary to the perceived social status demotion of members of the 
Russian military.  Although goal orientated and maintaining their ideological 
perspectives, their coordination, and methods of implementation, mostly due to the 
spontaneity of the revolts, were considerably disorganized.  The Strel’sty desire was to 
turn back the transition of Europeanism and return to the former system, whereas the 
Chechen revolts, being more a cultural resistance to Russian rule and conducted as a 
guerrilla form of engagement, shows better planning of the implementation.  
Both domestic conflicts, however, are a product of the transitions of the period. 
The Strel’sty revolts are a direct response to the transitions enacted by Peter I, and 
directly tied to the opposition to the transitions goals. The modernization of Russia the 
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transition proposed directly conflicted with the desires of the Strel’sty.  In the case of the 
Chechen revolts, the transition, first in the 1990’s during the failed democratization of 
Russia, and then again in the beginning of the 21
st
 century following the Putin election, 
provided an opportunity for the continuation of the revolt to achieve autonomy. In spite 
of this, in both cases, the transition experienced during both periods was either the 
catalyst or the creator of a window of opportunity for the domestic conflict to arise. 
Comparison of International Conflict 
 
Table 5-7 
Great Northern War Disorganized 
Planned  Planned 
Measured  Disproportional 
Coordinated  Coordinated 
Offense Planned  Offense Planned 
Defense Planned  Defense Reactionary 
Aggressive Aggressive 
Targeted Response Targeted 
Maintained Ideological Perspective Maintained Ideological Perspective 
Goal Orientated Lack of Identifiable Goal 
Organized Mixed 
 
The international conflicts of both periods, like the domestic versions, were also 
fundamentally different in almost all manners for consideration.  One was a war against a 
world power by its neighbors, conducted over an extended period, in an effort, from the 
Russian perspective, to promote the goals of the transition and increase the influence of 
the Russian nation through military recognition, an acceptable method of garnering world 
influence at the time. The other was an exercise in civil disruption and destruction, 
designed to promote a religious fundamental ideology not condoned by the mainstream 
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Islamic faith, against the fabric of civil society, to achieve vague goals of social and civil 
restructuring world order. The Great Northern War was a conflict of nations, with 
specific agendas and goals, utilizing traditional armies, and with directed violence against 
an identified opponent.  The War on Terror, in contrast, is against a network of radical 
fundamentalists, engaging civilian targets with no identifiable goal beyond the crippling 
of society by introduction of fear promoted by feelings of insecurity.  
As indicated in the table, the Great Northern War was an organized conflict, or as 
organized as wars could be considered, whereas the Terrorism campaigns against society, 
although in implementation has aspects of organization, in ideology and goals lack these 
characteristics.  
Comparison of Element Engagement of Conflict and Transition 
 
Table 5-8 
Subject Element Characteristic Option 1 Characteristic Option 2 
Leadership Response 
to Transition 
Organized  
Government Response 
to Transition 
 Disorganized 
Leadership Response 
to Domestic Conflict 
Organized  
Government Response 
to Domestic Conflict 
Organized  
Leadership Response 
to International 
Conflict 
Organized  
Government Response 
to International 
Conflict 
Organized  
 
The response to conflicts and transition in Russia during both eras show 
considerable continuity. Only when we consider the transition’s response during the 
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period of Peter I do we see any divergence from the overall propensity for organized 
response and reaction, regardless of the type, organizational level, or extent of the event 
addressed. The one disparity, the transition during the reign of Peter I, as indicated in the 
evaluation of the period, is a direct result of the effects the transition had upon the 
governance of the time.  The disorganization was a result of a split response by those 
willing to embrace the transition due to the potential for consideration of retaining some 
political power through their assent, and by those who rejected the transition in its 
entirety in an effort to maintain the status quo. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
The conclusions drawn from any historical account will represent an exercise in 
subjective reasoning.  Rather than presenting empirical proof of the theoretical concept, 
historiographies only present conclusions drawn by the researcher, although those 
conclusions are drawn from the historical evidence provided. This valid point deserves 
serious consideration, and is the foundation of the methodology employed during the 
research.  This study does not represent a traditional qualitative research design. Knowing 
that the conclusions would necessarily be of a subjective nature, the research approached 
the problem from the perspective of legal research methodology.  To promote the 
theoretical hypothesis, rather than engaging in the traditional qualitative research models 
of phenomenology, narrative, or participatory action, the research design engaged in a 
methodology similar to case building.  In the legal disciplines, a side proposes a 
conclusion; that conclusion is then supported by a preponderance of evidence, both 
factual and circumstantial, with the intent to build a consensus that leads to the proposed 
conclusion being the logical end.   
The research approached the inherent subjectivity of its conclusion by engaging a 
similar ideology. Within the scholarship of the social sciences, many conclusions 
regarding theoretical principles are arguably subjective.  Psychology, sociology, political 
science, and anthropology are all areas of scholarship which accept subjective 
conclusions as legitimate positions from which theories are developed. Unlike the hard 
science of physics, which utilizes mathematics as a foundation of proof, the social 
sciences must rely upon subjective conclusions from which to acquire answers. This 
study is presented in a qualitative format rather than quantitative, and therefore lacks the 
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empirical numeric data that attributes to the “reproducibility’ of results”.  This does not 
diminish the conclusions postulated herein; rather the lack numerical statistics becomes a 
focal point in which the study sought to build a case in which the preponderance of 
historical evidence produced logical conclusions.     
The first question of the research proposes, do nation-states have an individual 
personality, which creates behavioral characteristics?  The research concludes that the 
preponderance of evidence in Russian actions point to a conclusion of yes. This 
conclusion is a product of understanding the underlining motivations to Russian actions 
in conflict, as exhibited by the examples and the coloration of the data from the separate 
periods.   
Before the reign of Peter I, it is clear from the historical accounts that Russia was 
a disregarded nation, socially, economically, and technologically behind the great powers 
of Europe. The focus of the transition of Europeanism enacted by Peter I was a direct 
plan to address this national issue. Following the reform’s implementation, Russia’s 
status within the world community increased. From this point, the need to belong became 
a fundamental motivation for Russian actions. This is a basic human characteristic, 
commonly labeled belongingness (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). The principle of 
belongingness exists within Maslow’s Hierarchy of needs or motives, under the category 
of social needs (Coon, 1977, p. 467).  Arguably, all nations maintain some level of desire 
for belonging and recognition. However, the level of which this desire influences a nation 
is different within each nation-state.  The level of which belongingness plays a role in 
national motivations and actions also varies from nation to nation.  In some nations, 
belongingness is a minor drive exhibiting an almost introvert personality, only emerging 
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into the affairs of the international community when necessary for the protection of their 
interests. Other nations become so obsessed to belong that all their motivations and 
actions are driven by this personality characteristic.  
However, the Russian psychology was not limited to simple belongingness.  The 
need to belong extended to the next level of the hierarchy, the need for achievement, 
attention, recognition, and reputation. These characteristics are another human behavioral 
motivation found in Maslow’s Hierarchy at the level of esteem and self-esteem (Coon, 
1977, p. 467).  This concept of Russia’s need for self-esteem was measured not only by 
Russia’s perception of their place in the world, but also by the perception of the rest of 
the world regarding Russian importance in international affairs. The transition during the 
period of Peter I could have simply been conducted to move Russia into the present; 
however, the intent of the actions beyond the social reforms enacted provide historical 
proof that the ultimate goal was not to address the need for simple belongingness, but to 
address a higher need on Maslow’s hierarchy, self-esteem. 
 Peter I did not limit his reformation to transforming Russian society into 
something modeled after the European powers. His engagement into the international 
conflict and harsh repression of the domestic Strel’tsy revolt are indicators of the level of 
motivation. The need to be recognized was not only as an equal member of the world 
community, but also as a power which the world needed to respect. The engagement in 
the Great Northern War, against the world power of the time Sweden, a war for which 
initially Russia was ill prepared to engage, points to the drive to address this level of need 
for status recognition being tantamount to narcissism, as the term relates to the need for 
power and prestige. The conducting of a war of the magnitude displayed in the Great 
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Northern War, while in the process of transitioning the nation into a modern social 
construct that was under resistance from important elements of the society, against a 
superior opponent demonstrates the level of obsession Peter I exhibited to address this 
need.  
The continuation of this need for recognition is evident in the second period of the 
research’s construct, the Putin era.  Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, 
now exposed as a nation with significantly less power than was presented from behind 
the Iron Curtain, began to lose its significant place in international affairs. Although the 
Soviet Union continued to present a face of power and success, another example of the 
continuation of the personality traits described, once the deficiencies were exposed, the 
first priority of the Putin era Russia was to retain it. The Putin plan to restoring 
recognition displayed a significantly different path than the original design of Peter I, 
although one that was no less driven. Whereas in the time of Peter I, the level of power 
was measured by military might as much as any other political indicator, the path to 
power for Russia in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century had diverged.  Economic might 
had become as significant an indicator of world influence as military abilities. Putin 
recognized that Russia, although still a nuclear state, possessed a military that lagged 
behind technologically; this became evident during the Russian-Afghan war and the 
Chechen revolts, which displayed the Russian inability to overwhelm her opponents with 
military superiority.  
Putin therefore enacted a policy that would seek economic recognition through 
the building of a strong Russian economy, thereby presenting an opportunity to improve 
the military capabilities. So important was the motivation for the resurrection of Russian 
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self-esteem that Russia abandoned any pretense of democratization. Russia entered into 
alliances with former ideological and cold war enemies against global terrorism, their 
international conflict, in the hopes of garnering economic favors for their efforts. This 
leads to the next question proposed by the research, do these characteristics regardless of 
transitions in political, economic, or social structures, consistently exhibit influence on 
Russian conflict and foreign policy?   
The data and historical information conclusively indicate that, not only do these 
characteristics influence policy during transitions and conflicts, they are the underlining 
motivator for those transitions and conflicts. The reformation of Russian society by Peter 
I, and the return to centralist autocracy by Putin, exhibit two transitions not only 
influenced by the characteristics, but also a direct response to achieving the characteristic, 
with each designed to increase Russian international influence. During both periods, the 
international conflicts engaged in, the Great Northern War and the War on Terror, are 
also direct actions formulated and conducted to be a means to this end. Both were 
specifically engaged in to produce increased Russian esteem through clearly narcissistic 
actions.   
The next question was, is the behavioral characteristics observed and identified a 
product of the leaders personality or an inherent condition within the nation-state itself? 
Does the  personality characteristic exist within the nation-state, as the driver being 
responsible for the actions of the society, or is does the characteristic which drives action 
reside within an element of society, specifically the head of state or governance structure, 
which is then responsible for the nations actions? The research has considered this 
question.  Are the observed characteristics actually imbedded into the personality of the 
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nation? For this, we return to the question of if there does exist a common Russian 
foreign policy ideological phenomenon, which occurs regardless of the social/political 
structure of the Russian government and the historic period in which the study examines. 
Since the study concludes the characteristic exists and is observable in both periods, and 
is not dependent upon social, political structure or the personage of the head of state, the 
characteristic therefore resides within the personality of the nation.  
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, as demonstrated by the research 
data, the social, political structure, and leadership changed without having any effect 
upon the behavioral characteristics observed. The research data specifically outlined the 
diversity of the periods to demonstrate whether any element or combinations of elements 
within society could affect the personality characteristic. The findings were negative. The 
behavioral and personality characteristic is concluded to exist within the nation-state as 
an element separate of the influences of the actors and environment.  The nation-state is 
the constant, and since the actors and environment in which the nation-state resides is 
fluid, if the characteristic remains, it therefore must be an embedded element of the 
nation-state. 
The research concludes that Russia has historically exhibited the behavioral 
characteristics of the need for belongingness and self-esteem as a counter to an inferiority 
complex common when the motivations for these two needs are high (Coon, 1977). The 
drive to satisfy these needs is of sufficient strength to cause the nation-state to engage in 
narcissistic behaviors to meet these needs.  The study further concludes that regarding 
behavioral characteristics in nation-states, homogeny exists and is identifiable as a factor 
through the historical examination of Russian actions, both domestic and international, 
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and that a method of inquiry traditionally employed in the study of humans is valid if 
employed as a method of inquiry for nations. Since the research has concluded that 
behavioral characteristics exist, nation-state behavioral profiling in this instance is valid 
in determining national behavioral homogony within conflict. 
The study also examined the effects of transition upon nation-state actions as they 
relate to the behavioral characteristics. The study originally hypothesized that major 
social/political transitions should disrupt measurably existing characteristic homogenies, 
and that political and social transition should affect how Russia deals with international 
and domestic conflict. The study concluded that social/political transitions in the case of 
Russia had no disruptive effect upon the behavioral characteristic, but in fact were the 
approach for achieving satisfaction for the characteristic.  Furthermore, the characteristic 
identified is a prime motivation in the methods and strategies employed for dealing with 
domestic and international conflict. Finally, periods of transition did not affect the 
national behavioral homogony toward conflict.  Russia, unlike other nations that have 
experienced disruption of their ideological homogenies during transitional periods, 
exhibited no lasting influence on their behavioral homogeny.  Russia has exhibited no 
parallel impact to the examples provided in chapter 1.  Conflict does not alter Russia’s 
behavioral homogeny.   
 In regards to the methodology, the research concludes that nation-state behavioral 
profiling is a valid methodology, and when employed, creates a deeper understanding of 
the conflict and/or conflicts elements. The identification of these behavioral 
characteristics can contribute to a more detailed model with which to predict future 
Russian actions, and this new information, when used, could create proactive conflict 
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mitigation. Understanding that Russia will consistently strive to satisfy its internal need 
for not only belonging but also the elevation of self-esteem, and will exhibit narcissistic 
behavior in which to obtain that satisfaction, signals a potential for Russia to engage in 
any activity in which to satisfy that need.  This conclusion regarding Russia’s willingness 
to engage in extreme behaviors is supported by the research historical data. 
The final conclusion of the study is that historically, examining nation-states for 
the existence of human parallel behavioral characteristics by comparing historical periods 
and the conflicts, transitions, and elements of the society which made up the nation-state 
at the time, is not only valid and produces logical conclusions, but by its discovery and 
identification of behavioral characteristic, is a necessary component to fully 
understanding the motivations of nation-state actions. 
The Study and its Relation to Conflict Resolution 
 
Many might ask the question, what does this dissertation have to do with conflict 
analysis and resolution?  This is a valid question. Some might consider this study more 
appropriate within the disciplines of political science or history, rather than that of 
conflict studies. This study, not presented from a traditional conflict analysis and 
resolution approach, does not seek to examine a specific conflict situation, analyze it, and 
then offer resolution options. It does not focus upon a single incident, nor does it attempt 
to quantify the effects of any one conflict. The shelves of the libraries are full of research 
which engages in that type of scholarship. Instead, this dissertation is an example of the 
potential which exists within the discipline of conflict analysis and resolution, which 
might better be labeled conflict science.  The study engaged conflict through theoretical 
development.  Engagement techniques such as mediation, facilitation, negotiation, all 
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honed in the disciplines of law, or social sciences and each a valuable tool, do not need to 
be the limit of our arsenal. As a discipline, we can propose our own theoretical models, 
so long as we maintain the focus of those models on conflict. This dissertation is not a 
product of a political scientist, but a conflict scholar, and therefore regardless of its 
similarity of approach and focus to that of the political sciences, it belongs entirely to 
conflict science. 
The research believes that the ultimate goal of conflict analysis and resolution should 
be the elimination of conflict.  We should challenge ourselves to expand our efforts to 
conflict elimination. We ought to focus more on producing theoretical foundations and 
models usable throughout the discipline to better mitigate existing conflict and engage 
conflict before it happens. There will always be cases when conflict engagement will 
necessarily be reactive, as some conflict, regardless of preparation, is unavoidable. Yet 
this inevitability should not present a barrier to realizing that the potential exists for 
expanding the skills of conflict analysis and resolution to a more proactive endeavor.  
Conflict science can be proactive. Efforts to better understand and mitigate those 
dynamics with the greatest potential of influencing the events that can lead to conflict is 
an essential component of a proactive effort. Conflict analysis should endeavor to 
identify those conditions that signal the need for the engagement of conflict mitigation 
prior to the need for resolution.   
The major consequence to the current reactionary model is that conflict, when 
allowed to come to fruition, has detrimental effects to those involved.  Mitigating conflict 
when the direct participants are already engaged in conflict is difficult.  When a conflict 
comes to fruition, the concentration and focus of the participants is on the conducting of 
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the conflict, rather than its resolution.  Successful engagement strategies must include an 
understanding of the motivations and drivers that influence conflicts.  Understanding 
motivations creates potentials before a conflict begins, as is the goal of this study, which 
examines the roots of conflict and society from a behaviorist perspective. The study’s 
intent is to identify these motivations and drivers, from this unique perspective, thereby 
offering a theoretical foundation from which further scholarship of conflict studies can 
build. 
However, creating theory is not the only avenue of scholarship in which conflict 
science should further engage. Conflict analysis scholars must examine present day post-
conflict strategies to determine success potentials and thereby offer new and enlightened 
strategies which break the cycle of continuous conflict. We must treat each region, 
culture, and nation-state as a unique entity with its own personality traits, which requires 
acknowledgement and then factoring into any conflict mitigation strategies. This is the 
foundation of this researches goal. Conflict scholars must not only apply theoretical 
models, but must also engage in new empirical methodologies that address every 
potential avenue of epistemology, not limiting themselves to the parameters preset in 
traditional qualitative and quantitative research methods.   
We therefore finally return to the original question postulated at the beginning of this 
section, what does this dissertation have to do with conflict analysis and resolution? The 
one word answer is, everything. 
Areas for Further Research 
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Whenever we are offering new theoretical principles, the potentials for further 
research present themselves. This is especially true when those theories look at a problem 
from a different perspective than is traditionally accepted. While conducting this 
research, one of the most difficult aspects is resisting the desire to addressing those 
further research ideas while in the process. This project was no different.  While 
conducting this dissertation, numerous areas that would require further development 
presented themselves. What follows are just a couple of those areas for which further 
research regarding behavioral characteristics in nation-states exists. 
Of primary importance is the development of a language in which to classify the 
results of the behavioral characteristics found.  As I look back at the terms, narcissism 
and inferiority complex are insufficient to describe the characteristics found.  
Unfortunately, their use was necessary, as they represented the closest correlating 
classification found within behavioral science. The inferiority complex, as described in 
the conclusions, is deeper, and in many ways a characteristic with different dynamics 
than the term traditionally implies.  Likewise, classifying Russia’s actions as examples of 
narcissism, although fundamentally correct, in this case they are also of a different 
dynamic from the traditional presentation of the narcissist. However, since the study was 
conducted from the lens of the behaviorist, the researcher deemed labeling the findings in 
a context which is appropriate to that field necessary.  If this theoretical principle is 
accepted and further developed, new classification language, terms and labels, which 
define human behavioral characteristics as applied to social constructs such as nation-
states, would be a first step necessary for the coordinated development of the founding 
concepts.  
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The need for new language is further evident when considering the stigmas 
associated with the traditional labels and classifications of human behavior presently 
used.  Humanity places a considerable value upon language and its connotations.  
Political correctness plays an important role in society.  Any theory that classifies a 
nation’s personality as having behavioral characteristics likened to paranoia, psychosis, 
or narcissism, as examples, however valid, might lose support from the offense they 
create.  Many human behavior classifications maintain a negative connotation within 
society. We should remember that one hundred and fifty years ago, the terms retard and 
moron were valid medical diagnoses that were widely used, until their use extended 
beyond medicine and became synonymous with insults and derogatory name-calling.  
The same caution must be exercised here; using a classification which although may be 
technically correct, yet has derogatory connotations or perception by those using it, could 
create a resistance to an otherwise valid theoretical principle, simply due to the inability 
to express its findings in an acceptable manner. Creating new language, terms, and 
definitions, which not only define the findings accurately and with only those 
characteristics identified by the research, but also possessing no historical perceptions as 
to their connotation, is necessary. 
Other further areas of research exist in the application of the theoretical principle 
to social constructs beyond the nation-state.  Every event, organization, or conflict has the 
potential for examination from the behaviorist perspective. However, not all necessarily 
would enlist the same model of research employed in this study. Taking the concept of 
behavioral characteristics existing within all social, political, and organizational 
dynamics and applying it to characteristics not determined solely by the humans directly 
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responsible for the construct, but characteristics inherent to the construct itself, allows for 
a new perspective in which to examine the dynamics of the society, and the components 
of that society in which we live. As conflict scientist, we cannot limit ourselves to simply 
examining the conflict alone.  Our focus cannot be rigid and dictated by tunnel vision.  
We must look outside the conflict to the elements and actors directly and indirectly 
involved, to “see the big picture” and thereby create a more comprehensive 
understanding of the conflict we desire to resolve. Because conflict is a dynamic event, 
with many facets that make up that dynamic, we should discount nothing. 
Finally, it is important to remember that this research study is but the beginning of 
the process.  Herein is contained only the foundation, the presentation of an idea, and a 
conceptual framework in which to argue its validity. As with all beginnings, it is 
incomplete in its infancy. However, like all new ideas, the potential of the idea exists far 
beyond the simple application presented here. If nothing else, this theory proposed here 
may become a catalyst for discourse in which other ideas or theories are born. Within 
scholarship, even those theories that are discounted become topics from which the 
argument against it becomes the foundation of new and better theory. This is how human 
knowledge advances as every improvement of our knowledge begins with an idea. With 
the question: what if? There is no shame when the answer is no.  However, regarding this 
study, I would conclude the answer is closer to maybe, and that until the principle has had 
the opportunity to advance beyond its infancy, we cannot render a final judgment upon its 
validity or potential for practical application. This theoretical principle presented, through 
time and development, may someday produce an understanding that advances the goals 
of conflict science.  
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